Historical material. Dates, proposals and invitations refer to the time of the original publication.

Results of the sociological survey

The study «Israel and Hamas: War and World» was conducted through an internet survey among 1,007 respondents, Israelis, internet users aged 18 years and older. The survey was conducted in the first week of February 2024. The maximum statistical sampling error is 4.0% at a 95% confidence level. The survey was conducted by the sociological center «Geocartography» according to the questionnaire provided by the analytical center of the NGO «Dor Moria.

In your opinion, what should Israel’s policy be towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after the end of the war with Hamas?

Original survey data
Annexation of the territories of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip with the expulsion of Palestinians to Arab countries28%
Implementation of the «two-state solution» policy23%
Continuation of the existing policy prior to the war11%
Annexation of the territories of Judea and Samaria, as well as the Gaza Strip without expelling Palestinians6%
Establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories of the Palestinian Authority5%
Implementation of the «one-state solution» policy5%
Other5%
Don’t know17%

Table 1

The largest share of respondents (28%) supports the idea of annexing the territories of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, with the expulsion of Palestinians to Arab countries. 23% of respondents advocate for the «two-state solution,» while 11% would prefer to continue the current policy before the war. The proportion of those who would prefer the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories of the Palestinian Authority is only 5%. However, there is a high level of uncertainty, with 17% of respondents finding it difficult to give an answer to this question.

Moreover, the older the respondent, the more likely they are to insist on implementing the «two-state solution» policy, while the younger respondents are more inclined towards annexing the territories of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip and deporting Palestinians to Arab countries.

Age and post-war strategy

Annexation and expulsionTwo states
18–34
Annexation and expulsion33.8%
Two states15.9%
35–54
Annexation and expulsion25.4%
Two states27.2%
55+
Annexation and expulsion19.3%
Two states30.7%
Share of respondents, %. Selected responses are shown; paired series do not necessarily add up to 100%.
Original chart
Original chart
Original chartView original ↗
Original survey data
The strategy of Israel /Age (years)18–3435–5455+
Annexation of the territories of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip with the expulsion of Palestinians to Arab countries33,8%25,4%19,3%
Implementation of the «two-state solution» policy15,9%27,2%30,7%
Continuation of the existing policy prior to the war11,9%7,9%12,5%
Annexation of the territories of Judea and Samaria, as well as the Gaza Strip without expelling Palestinians5,3%6,9%8,5%
Establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories of the Palestinian Authority3,8%7,1%6,3%
Implementation of the «one-state solution» policy5,7%4,8%2,8%
Other6,0%4,0%3,4%
Don’t know17,7%16,7%16,5%

Table 2

As expected, there is a huge difference in responses to this question between the Arab and Jewish populations of Israel. Nearly half of the Arab population (49%) most often chooses the political strategy of «Two states for two peoples» (with only 1.5% to 10% choosing another strategy from their number), while among the Jewish population, such responses are three times fewer (16.2%). The Jewish population tends to favor the idea of «Annexation of the territories of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip and the deportation of Palestinians to Arab countries» (34%), whereas less than 5% of the Arab population supports it.

It should be noted that among the Arab population, the level of «consensus» in responses is significantly higher than among the Jewish population.

Religious Israelis (Orthodox and traditional) are most supportive of the political strategy of «Annexation of the territories of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip and the deportation of Palestinians to Arab countries» (42-43% compared to 24.5% secular), while secular Israelis are most oriented towards the implementation of the «Two states for two peoples» policy (26.1% compared to 5-9% of religious Israelis).

Original survey data
Secularity-ReligiosityPopulation of IsraelStrategy after the war
SecularTraditionalOrthodoxJewishArab 
24,5%41,9%42,4%34,0%4,5%Annexation of the territories of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip with the expulsion of Palestinians to Arab countries
26,1%9,0%5,3%16,2%49,0%Implementation of the «two-state solution» policy
10,3%14,3%10,6%11,8%5,5%Continuation of the existing policy prior to the war
4,5%9,0%13,2%7,7%1,5%Annexation of the territories of Judea and Samaria, as well as the Gaza Strip without expelling Palestinians
8,7%4,7%0,7%5,8%4,0%Establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories of the Palestinian Authority
3,2%3,9%4,0%3,6%10,0%Implementation of the «one-state solution» policy
5,5%5,7%6,0%5,7%1,0%Don’t know

Table 3

How do you think the opinions of these countries towards Israel will change after the war with Hamas?

Original survey data
 Will improveWill worsenWill not changeDon’t knowI[1]  
United States36%14%40%11%22
European Union22%29%35%14%-7
China7%39%35%19%-32
Russia5%50%32%13%-45
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)7%44%30%18%-37
Abraham Accords participant countries (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan)19%30%37%14%-11

Table 4

Results of responses to this question show that Israelis have the most optimistic expectations regarding the United States. They more often than others say that this country’s attitude toward Israel will change for the better, less often – that it will change for the worse, and more often than others are convinced of the stability of the US-Israel relationship.

The index of the possibility of changes in relations, calculated as the difference between positive and negative responses, has negative values for all countries except the US, which means that Israelis predominantly have negative expectations regarding changes in the attitudes of the international community towards Israel.

Concerns about deteriorating relations with Israel after the war with Hamas are most pronounced among Israelis, primarily towards Russia, but also towards China and the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). These same countries have the lowest values of responses regarding the possibility of improving their relationship with Israel.


[1] index is calculated as the difference between positive and negative responses.

In your opinion, which policies will have the greatest impact on the Middle East after the war with Hamas?

Original survey data
  18-3435-5455+
Joe Biden41%43,3%36,8%42,0%
Donald Trump31%27,4%37,0%25,6%
Vladimir Putin26%21,6%28,8%32,4%
Benjamin Netanyahu26%24,7%23,5%32,4%
Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia)23%25,2%23,8%14,2%
Ebrahim Raisi (President of Iran)19%17,9%20,1%20,5%
Emmanuel Macron (President of France)9%7,9%7,9%12,5%
Recep Tayyip Erdogan (President of Turkey)7%8,6%5,3%5,1%
Don’t know24%25,4%20,9%25,6%

Table 5

The largest group of respondents believes that the most influential politician in the Middle East after the war with Hamas will be Joe Biden (41%). It is worth noting that our previous research shows that he currently holds a similar status. Following him, with a significant margin, are Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Benjamin Netanyahu. 31% of respondents voted for Donald Trump, while 26% each voted for Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu.

Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud takes fifth place, with the support of 23% of the votes. Approximately the same proportion of respondents found it difficult to answer this question, indicating a significant level of uncertainty in the situation.

Respondents associate the lowest leadership prospects with Emmanuel Macron and Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

In your opinion, do conflicts in Ukraine and Yemen influence the nature of military actions by the Israeli army in its fight against Hamas?

Original survey data
 On average Jewish populationArab population  
Have a significant influence10%38%9,7%12,0%
Have some influence28%29,0%21,5%
Have little influence32%45%34,8%18,5%
Do not influence at all13%12,8%13,0%
Don’t know18% 13,8%35,0%
Total100% 100,0%100,0%

Table 6

Respondents are slightly more inclined to the opinion that the specified conflicts do not influence the course of military actions of the Israeli army — answers about the lack of influence of conflicts in Ukraine and Yemen on the nature of military actions of the Israeli army in the fight against Hamas slightly prevail over the opposite answers. Thus, in total, 38% of respondents are convinced that such influence exists in one way or another, while in varying degrees deny it, totaling 45% of respondents.

The Jewish population is more inclined to the opinion that conflicts in Ukraine and Yemen influence the military actions of the Israeli army in the fight against Hamas. 38.7% of the Jewish population believe that the influence of these conflicts on the military actions of the Israeli army is quite or very significant. Meanwhile, only 33.5% of the Arab population draw such conclusions. Among the Arab population, more people are inclined to believe that conflicts in Ukraine and Yemen do not affect the military actions of the Israeli army. 31.5% of the Arab population believe that the influence of these conflicts on the military actions of the Israeli army is not so great or completely absent, compared to 24.1% of the Jewish population.

As age increases, the proportion of respondents claiming that these conflicts influence the military actions of the Israeli army decreases, and conversely, the proportion of responses about such influence increases as the age of the respondents decreases.

Effects of the wars in Ukraine and Yemen: age

Have some effectNo effect at all
18–34
Have some effect30.0%
No effect at all8.6%
35–54
Have some effect26.7%
No effect at all13.0%
55+
Have some effect22.7%
No effect at all23.3%
Share of respondents, %. Selected responses are shown; paired series do not necessarily add up to 100%.
Original chart
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Original chartView original ↗

In your opinion, how do you think the influence of conflicts in Ukraine and Yemen manifests in the nature of military actions by the Israeli army in the fight against Hamas? (among those who answered positively to the previous question)

Original survey data
They divert budgets of economic and military aid from the USA to Israel40%
They divert the world’s attention from Israel’s war with Hamas28%
Due to military conflicts in Ukraine and Yemen, the international community is less critical and aggressive and more tolerant of Israel’s military actions in the Gaza Strip18%
Other14%
Total100%

Table 7

Priorities for rebuilding Gaza differ between Jewish and Arab respondents. The most frequently named option among Jewish respondents is the UN, at 35.6%; among Arab respondents it is the Arab League, at 36%. The subgroup tables form the basis of this comparison. Arab respondents more often name the Arab League (36% versus 19.3%), the EU (23.5% versus 12.1%) and Russia (19% versus 10.3%). The UN is selected by 30.5% of Arab and 35.6% of Jewish respondents; the US by 24.5% and 23.5%, respectively. Secular respondents more often select the UN and the US. Uncertainty is higher among Orthodox respondents: 25.2% do not know who should be responsible, compared with 15.4% among traditional and 10.8% among secular respondents.

Who do you think should be responsible for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Gaza after the war and the elimination of Hamas? (You can give more than one answer)

Responsibility for rebuilding Gaza: responses by group, %. Multiple answers were permitted.
 Jewish sectorArab sectorOrthodoxSecularTraditional  
UN (United Nations)35,6%30,5%24,5%40,6%34,4%
United States23,5%24,5%22,5%27,2%19,0%
European Union12,1%23,5%12,6%11,3%12,9%
Russia10,3%19,0%9,3%11,9%8,6%
China4,6%5,5%3,3%4,2%5,7%
Other1,6%5,5%2,0%1,6%1,4%
League of Arab States19,3%36,0%19,2%19,5%19,7%
Don’t know15,1%8,5%25,2%10,8%15,4%
Sum of displayed shares122.1%153.0%118.6%127.1%117.1%

Table 8

How do you think the current situation in Israel will or will not affect the date of the Knesset elections?

Original survey data
Will not affect — elections will be held on time17%
Elections will be held in the near future20%
Elections will be held immediately after the end of the war35%
Elections will be postponed for a year after the war15%
Don’t know14%
Total100%

Table 9

The majority of respondents believe that the current situation in Israel will somehow affect the date of the Knesset elections, which, in our opinion, indicates a pronounced dissatisfaction of the respondents with the political situation.

35% of respondents claim that the elections will take place immediately after the end of the war, 20% believe that the elections will be held in the near future, and another 15% believe that the elections will be postponed for a year after the war. Only 17% are convinced that the current situation should not affect the timing of the Knesset elections due to the current situation in the country.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: «Adopting the Constitution of the State of Israel will contribute to political stability in the country»?

A constitution and political stability: responses by age and religiosity, %. Balance is agreement minus disagreement.
 18-3435-5455+SecularTraditionalOrthodox
Strongly agree21,0%24,1%31,3%29,30%21,90%11,30%
Somewhat agree32,0%35,2%29,5%34,00%39,40%31,80%
Somewhat disagree16,1%12,4%11,4%12,90%14,30%17,20%
Strongly disagree3,1%6,3%7,4%2,90%5,40%11,90%
Don’t know27,8%22,0%20,5%   
Agreement balance, percentage points33,840,642,047,5041,6014,00

Table 10

Agreement that a constitution would contribute to political stability is 53.0% among ages 18–34, 59.3% among ages 35–54, and 60.8% among those 55+. Disagreement is 19.2%, 18.7% and 18.8%, respectively. These totals combine the two positive and the two negative response categories in the source table.

The agreement balance rises with age: +33.8, +40.6 and +42.0 percentage points. It is +47.5 among secular, +41.6 among traditional and +14.0 among Orthodox respondents. These are descriptive group differences, not evidence that age or religiosity causes the attitudes.

Sources and materials

Original publication Photograph source