Dor-Moriah

Abstract

This Dor Moria study examines a core strategic contradiction in U.S. Middle East policy: engaging the transnational Muslim Brotherhood (MB) while claiming to combat Islamism. We argue that the MB—an ideological incubator for Al-Qaeda and ISIS—has become a tool of managed instability as Washington seeks leverage against BRICS and the broader Global South in the Islamic world. The paradox is stark: while the Trump administration considers designating the MB a terrorist organization, its Gaza settlement plan relies on Qatar and Turkey—the Brotherhood’s principal state sponsors. The October 13, 2025 Sharm el-Sheikh agreement excludes Saudi Arabia and the UAE as guarantors and makes no mention of Hamas’s roots in the Muslim Brotherhood.

We document the failure of Israel’s attempt (January–June 2024) to arm Palestinian clans, underscoring that Hamas cannot be dismantled without addressing the Brotherhood’s ideological and social infrastructure. We outline three tiers of destabilization: (1) degradation of Israeli security via MB–Hamas continuity; (2) an existential challenge to Gulf monarchies from the Brotherhood’s republican Islamism; and (3) radicalization across the Global South through Qatari-Turkish educational and charitable networks. References to potential Gaza operations by «trusted partners under U.S. auspices» further illustrate how MB-linked structures can function as a geopolitical lever, turning counterterror rhetoric into an instrument of great-power competition.

The American Strategy Paradox

Trump has declared war on Islamism, yet his Gaza plan rests on Qatar and Turkey—the Brotherhood’s principal state sponsors. This contradiction poses direct threats to Israel, the Gulf monarchies, and Global South stability, effectively transforming counterterrorism into a geopolitical lever.

The core issue. Since 2025, the Trump administration has actively considered designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.¹ Senator Ted Cruz introduced bill S.2293 in July 2025, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirming in August 2025 that the designation process had been «initiated.»² Yet neither the US nor Israel officially recognizes the movement itself as a terrorist organization—only specific affiliates face such designation: Hamas since 1997,³ and Egyptian groups HASM and Liwa al-Thawra.⁴ Israel banned the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in 2015 but not the transnational Ikhwan movement.⁵ Why this selective approach? The Brotherhood remains too useful as a lever of geopolitical influence, exercised through key allies Qatar and Turkey.

From Sayyid Qutb to Hamas: An Ideological Through-Line

The Counter Extremism Project explicitly describes the Muslim Brotherhood as «a bridge between political Islamism and jihadist violence.»⁶ Sayyid Qutb, the Brotherhood ideologue executed in 1966, developed the foundational doctrines of jahiliyyah (viewing modern societies as having returned to pre-Islamic ignorance), hakimiyyah (absolute sovereignty belonging to Allah alone), and takfir (excommunicating Muslims deemed insufficiently faithful).

The 2015 British government review concluded bluntly: «Qutb’s views inspired terrorist organizations including Sadat’s assassins, Al-Qaeda and its offshoots. The MB has never institutionally renounced them.»⁷

The biographical evidence for this continuity is overwhelming. Osama bin Laden belonged to the Brotherhood on the Arabian Peninsula. Ayman al-Zawahiri joined the Egyptian MB at 15 and called Qutb «the spark that ignited the Islamic revolution.» Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi joined the movement at university before transitioning to violent Salafism. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, architect of 9/11, encountered Qutb’s ideas at MB camps at age 16. The 9/11 Commission identified Qutb as «a strong intellectual influence» on bin Laden.

The ideology persists unchanged: Qutb’s training materials remain staples of indoctrination for ISIS and Al-Qaeda recruiters.

The Qatari-Turkish Axis: Institutionalizing MB Influence

Qatar Charity has served as a principal financial conduit for MB-aligned projects. Leaked 2014 documents revealed €71 million channeled into 113 mosque and Islamic center projects across Europe (2011-2014). British affiliate QCUK transferred £38 million from Doha (2014-2020). Qatar provided up to $850,000 to Egyptian President Morsi, himself a Brotherhood member.⁸ MB spiritual leader Yusuf al-Qaradawi received Qatari citizenship and a weekly Al Jazeera platform. A 2020 leak captured a former Qatari prime minister confirming that «Al Jazeera is controlled by MB members.»⁹ Hamas has received over $2 billion from Qatar since 2012.¹⁰

Turkey provides both political sanctuary and media infrastructure. Following the 2013 coup attempt, 1,500 Egyptian Brotherhood members received asylum. Erdogan’s AKP is widely characterized as «effectively the Turkish wing of the MB.»¹¹ Turkey finances MB satellite channels (Mekameleen TV, Rabaa TV, Al-Sharq) that broadcast anti-Egyptian propaganda.

In August 2025, Erdogan received a delegation from the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS, headquartered in Qatar and designated terrorist by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain in 2018).¹² In March 2025, IUMS issued a fatwa endorsing «armed jihad» against Israel—which Qatar declined to condemn.¹³

A 2020 King’s College London study confirmed that Qatar and Turkey «finance and sustain an interconnected network of MB organizations throughout Europe.»¹⁴ The French exposé «Qatar Papers» (2019) documented 140 projects exceeding €100 million aimed at «strengthening Islamic identity and spreading political Islam within Europe’s Muslim communities.»¹⁵

Trump’s Gaza Plan: The MB Elephant in the Room

On September 29, 2025, Trump unveiled a 20-point peace plan for Gaza. The ceasefire agreement was signed October 9, 2025.

The guarantor structure: USA, Qatar, Turkey, Egypt—who signed the «Trump Declaration» on October 13, 2025, in Sharm el-Sheikh.¹⁶ Saudi Arabia and the UAE were explicitly excluded from primary guarantor status, despite initial invitations.¹⁷ Crown Prince MBS and UAE ruler MBZ conspicuously absented themselves from the ceremony.

The plan makes no mention of Hamas’s roots in the Muslim Brotherhood. Point 1 addresses «deradicalization,» Point 13 prohibits Hamas from participating in governance «directly, indirectly, or in any form,» yet the Brotherhood ideology underpinning Hamas’s 1988 charter («Hamas is a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood,» Article 2) receives no analysis.¹⁸ In June 2025, Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies observed: «It is highly questionable whether the ideological foundation of resistance rooted in the MB can be dismantled through military means alone.»¹⁹

The IDF’s «Clan Project»: A Failed Bet

In January 2024, the IDF launched a program to arm Palestinian clans as a Hamas alternative.²⁰ By March 2024, most negotiations had collapsed amid clan fears of Hamas retaliation. Netanyahu confirmed in June 2024 that «Hamas killed clan leaders Israel attempted to recruit.» Hamas established the «Arrow Unit» specifically to eliminate Israeli collaborators. While limited clan-arming continues (the Abu Shabab clan in Rafah fields ~400 fighters), FDD concluded: «Arming clans has failed to create meaningful pressure on Hamas. Despite significant degradation, Hamas remains Gaza’s dominant organization.»²¹

Saudi Arabia has shifted from support to alarm. On September 29, 2025, Riyadh joined in welcoming the plan.²² But by October 16, 2025, Israel Hayom reported that Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain had warned the White House about imminent plan collapse, stating they «will not participate without a decisive US response and fundamental changes in the mediator approach—Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey.»²³ A Saudi diplomat elaborated: «Saudi Arabia is scaling back participation in Trump’s plan. Gaza reconstruction is impossible while Hamas retains even a single Kalashnikov.» The UAE announced it would rebuild only southern zones under Israeli control, refusing involvement elsewhere without complete Hamas disarmament.

The Destabilization Triangle: Israel, the Gulf, and the Global South

For Israel, the elevation of Qatar and Turkey—both Brotherhood sponsors—as plan guarantors creates an acute paradox. An Arab diplomat told Israel Hayom: «Trump spoke of ending the era of terror and hatred, yet his team elevates actors who deploy wealth and media to promote exactly that.» INSS warned that «the MB will likely persist in Gaza as a sociopolitical movement. Even if formally outlawed—as in Jordan and Egypt—its negative social influence and resistance to deradicalization will prove extraordinarily difficult to eliminate.»²⁴

For Gulf monarchies, the Brotherhood poses an existential challenge. German think tank SWP observed in 2020: «The MB advances a more republican, religiously inspired political model offering a viable alternative to the autocratic monarchical/tribal systems prevailing in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.»²⁵ The UAE designated the movement terrorist in March 2014, with Saudi Arabia following suit. The Brotherhood’s electoral successes in Egypt (2012) and Tunisia (2011-2014) demonstrated this alternative governance model in practice.²⁶ The New York Times noted in 2014: «The Saudis and other Gulf monarchies fear the group because of its extensive organization, mass appeal, and calls for elections.» By elevating Qatar and Turkey, Trump’s plan undermines Saudi and Emirati standing throughout the Sunni world.

For the Global South, the Brotherhood has constructed vast radicalization infrastructure through education, mosques, and charity. Sudan represents the most extreme case: Hassan al-Bashir’s MB regime (1989-2019) hosted bin Laden and waged jihad against South Sudan (approximately 2 million dead).²⁷ In 2025, the movement stands accused of stoking the SAF-RSF war ongoing since April 2023.²⁸ Jordan banned the MB in April 2025 following the arrest of 16 members for manufacturing rockets and drones while stockpiling explosives.²⁹ Tunisia is prosecuting over 100 Brotherhood leaders in 2025, including Ennahda party chief Rached Ghannouchi, for recruiting fighters for Syria.³⁰ Indonesia: the PKS party (MB affiliate) captured 6.79% of votes in 2014. Malaysia: PAS has governed Kelantan state since 2002. Bangladesh: Jamaat-e-Islami (MB analog) was banned in 2013 but maintains influence.³¹

Brotherhood charitable networks finance radicalization. Islamic Relief (founded 1984, offices in 20+ countries) has been designated a terrorist financing entity by both UAE and Israel; founders include Essam El-Haddad, advisor to Egyptian President Morsi.³² A 2017 Middle East Forum investigation documented $164 million in taxpayer funds flowing to Islamist groups, including $122 million to organizations with terrorist ties.³³ Holy Land Foundation, the largest terrorism financing case in US history, was shuttered in 2001 for funding Hamas.

US Strategic Calculus and Its Consequences

The duality in American policy is unmistakable. The US maintains its largest Middle Eastern military installation in Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base) while treating Turkey as a NATO ally—even as both states sponsor the MB.³⁴ Brookings Institution observed in 2017: «No American MB expert supports designating them a foreign terrorist organization.»³⁵ Carnegie Endowment called such designation in 2019 a «counterproductive political stunt that will make all Americans less safe.» Yet this very «pragmatism» opens critical strategic vulnerabilities.

Washington deploys the MB as soft power against Gulf monarchies, working through the Qatari-Turkish axis to influence the Sunni world from the grassroots up. Presidential Study Directive 11 (PSD-11) under Obama in 2010 mandated assessment of the MB and «political Islamist» movements, concluding that US policy should shift from supporting «stability» (authoritarian regimes) toward engaging «moderate» Islamists.³⁶ Secretary Clinton stated in 2011: «It is in US interests to engage with all parties committed to peaceful, nonviolent action.»³⁷ Documents reveal State Department orchestration of MB leader appearances at Carnegie (2012) and meetings with Libyan MB figures.³⁸

Competition with Saudi Wahhabism across Africa and Asia is intensifying. Saudi Arabia has spent $75 billion disseminating its Islamic interpretation globally through the Muslim World League.³⁹ The MB competes via networks of schools, mosques, and charities in Somalia (Qatar financed Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in 2012, Turkey invested over $1 billion), Libya (Qatar/Turkey back the Government of National Accord with MB ties against Saudi/UAE-backed Haftar), and Sudan (MB elements in SAF against UAE/Saudi-backed rivals).⁴⁰

The regional stability implications are severe. Trump’s plan creates a structure where guarantors (Qatar, Turkey) maintain ideological and financial linkages to Hamas through the MB, rendering genuine «deradicalization» and «demilitarization» virtually impossible absent wholesale dismantling of MB infrastructure. Israel cannot eliminate Hamas’s ideological foundation while MB networks remain operational.⁴¹ Gulf monarchies watch their regional influence erode to MB-style republican Islamism. The Global South faces escalating radicalization through MB educational and charitable endeavors financed by Qatar.⁴²

Conclusion: American strategy’s reliance on the MB as a pragmatic tool creates a fundamental contradiction between counter-terrorism rhetoric and geopolitical alliance realities. Elevating Qatar and Turkey as Gaza’s guarantors while ignoring Hamas’s MB origins renders the Middle East less stable, undercuts monarchical allies, and feeds global radicalization. Until Washington reconciles this contradiction, Trump’s proclaimed «end of the era of terror» remains mere rhetoric.

[1] FDD

[2] U.S. Senator Ted Cruz

[3] New Jersey OHSP

[4] brookings

[5] brookings

[6] Counter Extremism Project

[7] Publishing Service

[8]Counter Extremism Project

[9] Al Arabiya

[10] FDD

[11]  Francis Online

[12] Nordic Monitor

[13] Middle East Forum

[14] thenationalnews

[15] Grey Dynamics

[16] . Al Jazeera

[17] israelhayom

[18] New Jersey OHSP

[19] Worldcrunch

[20] The Times of Israel

[21] FDD

[22] The White House

[23] israelhayom

[24] inss

[25] Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

[26] Project on Middle East Political Science

[27] Afpc

[28] Zero Hedge

[29] The Hill

[30] ImArabic

[31] Project on Middle East Political Science

[32] American Thinker

[33] Middle East Forum

[34] THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

[35] brookings

[36] Gulf News

[37] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

[38] Gulf News

[39] Hudson Institute

[40] United States Institute of Peace

[41] Worldcrunch

[42] TRENDS Research & Advisory