Dor-Moriah

How the American Withdrawal from Syria Confirmed the Worst Predictions — and Exposed New Threats

Analysis based on a January 2026 survey conducted by the Dor Moria Analytical Center under the Haifa Format project. Sample: 1,009 respondents, nationally representative of the Israeli population. Margin of error: ±3.1% at 95% confidence level.

One of the most dangerous moments in national security planning is not when threats intensify, but when societies misread the threat landscape. A month ago, the Dor Moria Analytical Center examined the gap between Israeli public perception and geopolitical reality. When asked which state could neutralize the Turkish threat, 55% of respondents named the United States; only 6.4% pointed to Russia.[1] When asked about the future of the buffer zone in Syria, just 4.7% considered the deployment of Russian forces there a possibility.

January 2026 revealed the cost of that gap — not in abstractions, but in the rapid reordering of Syria’s balance of power and Israel’s deterrence calculus.

From Plans to Catastrophe: The Kurdish Collapse

In December, we asked: «The U.S. is planning to withdraw its forces. Who will fill the vacuum?» The concern was straightforward: a drawdown of the roughly 2,000 American troops in northeastern Syria — announced as a phased repositioning — would remove the security umbrella that had allowed the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces to hold territory, guard ISIS detainees, and control oil-producing regions. The answer came faster than expected — and it was worse than any forecast.

In the space of two weeks in January, the Syrian Democratic Forces — America’s allies for a decade, the force that destroyed the ISIS caliphate — ceased to function as an independent military actor. The provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor were lost. Oil fields fell under Damascus’s control. The Kurds were pushed back into Hasakah province, their historic heartland.[2]

The cost of this defeat extends beyond territory. Estimates of ISIS fighters who escaped from Kurdish-guarded prisons range from 200 to 1,500 — the wide spread reflecting the gap between Pentagon assessments and open-source reporting, with no independent verification yet possible. Separately, the Pentagon facilitated the transfer of more than 7,000 suspected ISIS detainees to Iraqi custody — a move characterized by U.S. officials as an emergency measure to prevent mass jailbreaks. Senators Graham and McCaul have warned of a potential caliphate resurgence.

The January 20 agreement drew the final line: SDF fighters are to be integrated into the Syrian army individually — not as a formation, but as separate persons. This was not merely a cartographic change. The political formalization of the collapse effectively dismantled Kurdish autonomy, eliminating an indirect stabilizing buffer that had functioned for years.

Ambassador Tom Barrack — simultaneously accredited to both Ankara and Damascus — publicly accused Kurdish commander Mazloum Abdi of attempting to «drag Israel into the conflict.»[3] The implication was hard to miss: Washington views Israeli interests as an obstacle to its Syria strategy.

America did not simply leave. Its withdrawal objectively strengthened Turkey’s position in Syria and across the broader region.

Turkey vs. Israel: Military Deterrence Replaces Diplomacy

In December, we noted that roughly 80% of Israelis consider Turkey a threat, yet 65% do not follow the issue. January 2026 demonstrated that the threat can no longer be ignored. What emerged was not diplomatic friction, but active military deterrence.

In the seven months following Assad’s fall, Israel dramatically escalated its air campaign across Syria. Syria’s new president, Ahmed al-Shara, stated at the Doha Forum in early December that Israel had conducted more than 1,000 airstrikes and staged some 400 incursions into Syrian territory since the regime change.[4] For comparison: over the preceding seven years, according to open-source tracking databases, Israel carried out an estimated 334 strikes. The intensity increased roughly threefold.

What lies behind these numbers? According to Israeli and regional reporting, Ankara had planned to deploy three military installations in central Syria to project power across the region. Israeli strikes forced a suspension of that deployment. This is no longer a diplomatic standoff — it is military deterrence driven by structural incompatibility.

A deconfliction mechanism exists: according to regional sources, a military hotline has been established between the two countries’ armed forces, routed through Azerbaijan. But this is a technical instrument, not a political one. The fundamental divergence of interests has not gone away.

Turkey seeks a centralized Syria under its patronage. Israel has an interest in a fragmented Syria with buffer zones. These objectives are incompatible. Ankara regards Israel as the primary threat to the stability of the new Syria. Moreover, Turkey is encouraging Damascus to request Russian military observers in the south — in order to constrain Israel’s freedom of action.

The paradox is stark: the same 55% of Israelis who in December counted on the United States to neutralize the Turkish threat are now watching as the American withdrawal strengthens Turkey’s hand.

Russia: From Blind Spot to Indispensable Channel

In December, only 4.7% of Israelis considered the deployment of Russian forces in the Syrian buffer zone a realistic scenario — despite the fact that Russia maintains a naval facility in Tartus and an air base at Khmeimim, and that Syria’s new president had requested the return of Russian military police. We described this disconnect as a «blind spot.» January confirmed the diagnosis — and added a new dimension.

On January 14, 2026, the Washington Post reported an event that went largely unnoticed by the Israeli public: in late December 2025, Moscow facilitated a secret back channel between Israel and Iran. Israeli officials used the Russian channel to notify Iranian leadership that Israel would not strike Iran unless attacked first. Iran responded through the same channel with reciprocal assurances. According to the Post, the Trump administration learned of the exchange after the fact.[5]

On January 16, 2026, Putin held separate phone calls with Netanyahu and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the same day. According to the Kremlin, «the Russian side reaffirmed its commitment to continuing mediation efforts and facilitating constructive dialogue.»

This is not an argument for alignment with Moscow. It is an observation about channels. Russia is the only actor maintaining working relationships simultaneously with Israel, Iran, Turkey, Arab states, and the new Syrian government. Long regarded in Israeli public discourse as peripheral, Moscow has proven to be one of the few platforms maintaining functional channels across the entire regional map. That is a function no other player can currently perform.

The January survey captures a notable dynamic: 46.4% of Israelis expect relations with Russia to «remain unchanged» in 2026. This is the highest stability indicator across all foreign-policy dimensions — nearly double the figure for the United States (23.4%). Stable expectations, however, should not be confused with a demand for deeper engagement: for now, this is passive acceptance of the status quo rather than a deliberate strategic pivot toward Moscow.

A New Threat Hierarchy: A Historic Shift

The January survey registered something absent from December’s data: for the first time, domestic concerns have overtaken Iran as the primary perceived threat among Israelis.

The numbers: domestic socioeconomic and political conditions — 35%. Iran — 25.8%. A gap of 9.2 percentage points.

This does not mean the Iranian threat is perceived as diminished. But priorities have shifted — and shifted unevenly. For secular Israelis (44.2%) and the Arab sector (43.5%), the dominant threat is internal. Among traditional respondents, Iran ranks first (33.1%). Religious respondents distribute their concern across domestic issues (24%), Iran (27.5%), and rising antisemitism (17%).

This internal divergence carries strategic consequences. The traditional model of «rallying around the flag» in the face of an external enemy has ceased to function. For a significant portion of the public, invoking the Iranian threat is perceived not as a mobilizing force but as a distraction from pressing domestic problems. A society divided over its threat hierarchy struggles to sustain coherent long-term deterrence.

In Lieu of a Conclusion: Lessons of January

A month ago, we wrote about the gap between perception and reality. January 2026 did not close that gap — it laid it bare.

When asked about neutralizing the Turkish threat, 55% counted on America. The American withdrawal from Syria objectively strengthened Turkey.

Only 6.4% saw a role for Russia in the regional balance. Russia provided the only functioning back channel between Israel and Iran.

Thirty-seven percent believed the buffer zone on Syrian territory would remain under Israeli control. But with the Kurds effectively eliminated as a fighting force, Syrian-Turkish forces now have the ability to concentrate on the southern front.

For the first time, Israel’s domestic problems outrank the Iranian threat in the eyes of the Israeli public. Society is so deeply fractured that it cannot agree on who the main enemy is.

January 2026 did not introduce new threats for Israel. It stripped away comforting illusions. The lesson is not pessimism, but clarity. Strategic planning cannot rest on assumptions that no longer hold. When perception lags behind reality, strategy becomes reactive rather than anticipatory — and reaction carries inherent delay.

Methodology

Research conducted by the Dor Moria Analytical Center in partnership with the Geocartography Center under the Haifa Format project. Sample: 1,009 respondents, nationally representative of the Israeli population (Jewish and Arab sectors). Margin of error: ±3.1% at a 95% confidence level. Survey conducted in January 2026, building on December 2025 baseline data.

References

[1] Dor Moria Analytical Center. (December 2025). «Israelis and Syrians Crisis.»

[2] Associated Press. (January 2026). «Syrian Democratic Forces Withdraw to Hasakah Province.»

[3] Times of Israel. (January 2026). «US Envoy Pans Israel’s Syria Intervention, Doubles Down on Support for Damascus.»

[4] Washington Institute for Near East Policy. (December 2025). «Prospects for Syria-Israel Relations.»

[5] The Washington Post. (January 14, 2026). «Israel, Iran Exchanged Secret Messages Through Russia.»