



Turkey's Cognitive War Against Israel

Analytical Report

October 2026

Abstract

“Turkey's Cognitive War Against Israel. Analytical Report”

This report examines Turkey's state communication campaign against Israel from April to August 2026. The Turkish state apparatus works to have Israel described worldwide as an aggressor, an occupier, and a state committing genocide.

The report shows who in Turkey produces these formulations, through which channels they spread, how they reach Israeli audiences without any Turkish presence in the country, and why Israel's detection system does not register them. The analysis draws on the model Ukraine codified in its Foreign Ministry's Communication Strategy for 2026–2030.

Main sections of the report:

1. Cognitive warfare: term and mechanism. Defines the concept, uses the strike on Abu al-Duhur air base to show how cognitive influence differs from propaganda and disinformation, and describes the four levels on which the Turkish apparatus produces and disseminates terms.

2. Ukraine's strategy documents and the 14-indicator matrix. Examines the Communication Strategy of Ukraine's Foreign Ministry and Volodymyr Zelensky's August 3 statement tasking ambassadors with work during elections in partner countries, Israel included. Ukrainian and Turkish practice are compared across 14 indicators.

3. Turkey's state communication infrastructure. Covers three layers: the core (the Presidential Directorate of Communications, the Foreign Ministry, the Center for Combating Disinformation, TRT, Anadolu), the institutional belt (TİKA, Diyanet, foundations, the consulate in East Jerusalem), and a non-subordinate layer of six types of disseminators.

4. Objectives of the Turkish campaign. Analyzes six objectives (diplomacy, language, religious representation, law, Palestinian politics, and Israel's election) and the time frame of each.

5. Dissemination. Examines language models as a new channel; the Arabic, English, Russian, and Turkic language tracks; the path of Turkish terms into the Israeli debate; and why Israeli detection does not see them.

6. The Ukrainian factor. Separates what is established, what analysis indicates, and what is not established, and ranks three explanations for the similarity of the two models by the evidence.

7. Limitations of the study and verification plan. Sets out what remains unknown and what data must be collected.

The report covers events of 2026, including the approval of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's Communication Strategy on July 23, the Istanbul court's arrest warrant for Israel's prime minister of July 14 and the Interpol Red Notice request of August 21, the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement of August 7, the Israeli State Comptroller's special report of July 7, and data from four Dor Moriah surveys.

It is intended for Israeli agencies responsible for public diplomacy, foreign policy, and security, and for political analysts and specialists on Turkey and the Middle East.

Key findings: Turkey is waging an open, state-run cognitive campaign against Israel, built on the same model as Ukraine's campaign against Russia. Its formulations take hold in international documents, foreign media, and language-model answers, and reach Israeli audiences secondhand. Israel has no body responsible for countering such a campaign and no external frame of its own that could replace the Turkish one.

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About Dor Moriah: An independent research center specializing in the analysis of social inequality, solidarity structures, lobbying, and the Human Development Index as a tool of political analysis. The center develops practical solutions for overcoming social cleavages and building an effective society on the principles of solidarity and ethical development.

Key Judgments

KJ-1. The Turkish state frame.

Judgment (analysis indicates). Turkish state structures systematically build and disseminate a frame that casts Israel as an aggressor, an occupying party, and a source of regional instability. Elements of the frame are then reproduced by foreign newsrooms, governments, issue-based communities, and commentators that need not be organizationally or financially linked to Ankara.

Basis. Statements by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Directorate of Communications, the August 11–12 communiqué, case 2026/108 in an Istanbul court, TRT and Anadolu wire output (Section 3, Section 4).

Limitation. Reproduction of Turkish wording does not in itself prove that Turkey directs the disseminator.

KJ-2. Entrenchment of terms.

Judgment (established). Turkish formulations (“genocide,” “occupied East Jerusalem,” “occupying power”) are already reproduced in materials of international organizations, foreign newsrooms, and political actors.

Basis. Joint statements by a group of states, communiqués, foreign newsroom materials (Section 5).

Limitation. The extent of these terms' adoption in search engines, language-model responses, and educational materials was not measured in this study. If current dynamics persist, there is a risk that they will take further hold as the default description of Israel.

KJ-3. Six objectives.

Judgment (analysis indicates). Six objectives are identified in Turkish communication activity. Four are not tied to dates, one (the Palestinian objective) is linked to the 2027 PA presidential election, and the sixth is linked to the Knesset vote of October 27, 2026.

Basis. Section 4.

Limitation. Five objectives are long-term and do not depend directly on the composition of the next coalition. The intensity and forms of their pursuit may change after the election. There is no official Turkish plan setting out these objectives. The authors reconstructed them from observed actions.

KJ-4. Structural similarity to the Ukrainian model.

Judgment (analysis indicates). On the basis of strategy documents of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the authors identified 14 observable indicators of a state cognitive-communication model. In the corpus examined, manifestations of all 14 indicators were identified both in Ukrainian practice toward Russia and in Turkish practice toward Israel.

Basis. The matrix in Section 2.3. On August 3, at a meeting of heads of diplomatic missions, the president of Ukraine listed upcoming elections in partner countries, including Israel's, and tasked ambassadors with working with society, media, and youth during the election period (Section 2.2).

Limitation. The similarity concerns the structure of communication activity and does not prove coordination, borrowing, or common direction. Alternative explanations are examined in Section 6.

KJ-5. Dissemination pathways.

Judgment (analysis indicates). The corpus reveals three pathways by which the Turkish frame can reach Israeli audiences without any direct contact between the recipient and Turkish state structures:

- through resolutions, foreign newsrooms, joint statements by states, and language-model responses, where the perceived source is the international arena, including Israel's allies, and Turkish authorship is not visible;
- through Israeli politicians and commentators who use similar arguments in their own case-making, and the origin of the wording may go unrecognized or unattributed;
- through Ukrainian officials and actors associated with the Ukrainian agenda who operate openly in Israel (working hypothesis, Section 6).

Basis. Section 5.3, Section 5.5.

Limitation. At certain periods, the public arguments of Ankara, the Ukrainian side, and the Israeli opposition converge in criticism of Israel's current government, although their motives and goals differ. No indications of a dedicated Turkish dissemination network inside Israel were found. Turkey's institutional presence in East Jerusalem (Section 3.2) operates in the cultural and religious sphere and is not directed at the electorate.

KJ-6. Interagency gap.

Judgment (not established). The study was unable to identify an Israeli body formally tasked with monitoring of how foreign state narratives penetrate third-country documents and are subsequently used inside Israel.

Basis. The State Comptroller's special report of July 7, 2026 finds that, as of March 2026, the national response to foreign influence was not assigned to any agency, and efforts to create such a mechanism have been under way since 2017. Functions are dispersed: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs records statements, the security services detect covert networks, the Ministry of Justice handles court cases, the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs works with communities, and the Central Elections Committee oversees elections.

Limitation. The finding reflects the results of an open-source study. No full audit of government agencies was conducted.

Basis and Scope of the Report

Corpus. Open materials from Turkish state bodies and state media for April–August 2026 in English, Arabic, and Russian; court documents; joint statements by states; strategy documents of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Israeli official reports; four studies by Dor Moriah (Appendix A). Media reports were used as a source of fact only when they referenced a primary document or a public statement.

Types of claims. The label *established* means confirmation by primary sources, *analysis indicates* means a conclusion drawn from comparison of data, *working hypothesis* means an explanation that requires verification, and *not established* means that evidence is insufficient. The formulas “not established” and “not identified” refer to the open sources examined.

The 14-Indicator Matrix. The authors derived the indicators from provisions of the strategy documents of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and refined them on the basis of how those provisions are applied. The basis status of each row is marked with a letter. D means that the indicator is directly set out in a document, O means that the authors operationalized it from a more general provision, and E means that the indicator is established from practice. Coding is qualitative. The “14 of

14” score reflects only the presence of the indicators in the corpus. Frequency and causal links were not measured.

Worldview frame. The worldview frame (hereafter, the frame) means a stable system of roles, causal links, and evaluative categories through which an audience is invited to interpret new events. Three features distinguish it from an ordinary state position: roles are assigned before the event and are not revised when new events occur, terms are selected as a linked set, and the formulation is reproduced by different bodies and disseminators without any change in roles.

Elections. The report describes influence on the pre-election information environment, that is, communication directed at Israeli audiences during the pre-election period. The electoral effect was not measured.

Caveat. Coincidence of wording, timing, and targets does not in itself prove coordination, funding, unified direction, or the passing of instructions.

1. Cognitive Warfare: Term and Mechanism

1.1 The Term

Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented its Communication Strategy for 2026–2030 on June 18, 2026. The strategy was approved by order of Minister Andrii Sybiha on July 23, 2026. For the first time, the strategy introduces into an official document the concepts of cognitive confrontation and cognitive influence, and it sets the task of holding the initiative in cognitive confrontation. The ministry has dedicated units, a budget, and performance indicators for this activity.

In this report, the term “cognitive warfare” is used as an analytical label for state activity that fixes an interpretive frame among foreign audiences. The Ukrainian documents serve as the source of an analytical model. They contain no scholarly definition of the term.

The activity runs along two tracks: against Russia and in partner countries. The strategy states the goal of the work in partner countries as follows: “In partner countries, as part of implementing the communication strategy, it is necessary to ensure that support for Ukraine is maintained regardless of changes of government.”

1.2 The Frame

Cognitive warfare is waged over the frame. The frame fixes in advance who in a conflict is the culprit, who is the victim, and why. An established frame reduces the likelihood that the initial allocation of roles will be revised as new events emerge. It can be reproduced using accurate facts, as well as alongside selective context, evaluative vocabulary, or false claims. A dispute over how to interpret a new event within already fixed roles takes place inside the frame and does not change it.

In practice, the categories of cognitive influence, propaganda, and disinformation overlap. The difference lies in the dominant mechanism. Propaganda seeks agreement with a claim, while disinformation substitutes a fact. Cognitive influence locks in the frame through which the audience itself draws conclusions from accurately presented facts.

1.3 Example: The Strike on Abu al-Duhur

The Israeli Air Force struck Abu al-Duhur air base in Idlib province, 55–70 kilometers from the Turkish border, after Syria permitted Turkish forces to be stationed there.

In the logic of disinformation, Turkey would have reported that a Turkish civilian convoy carrying humanitarian aid was at the airfield at the time of the strike and that TİKA staff were killed. In the logic of propaganda, it would have said that Israel had committed yet another crime and that everyone must condemn it. Both claims can be contested.

The Turkish government's statement accused Netanyahu of pursuing expansionist and destabilizing policies in the region in the course of his campaign ahead of the Knesset election. The wording reinforces Israel's positioning as a destabilizing factor in the Middle East with which no

agreement is possible. A similar interpretation was voiced publicly by Tom Barrack, US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria, and by members of the Israeli opposition (Section 5.5).

The factual part of the wording is accurate. The strike took place before the October 27 election, and the decision was made by the government. The dispute shifts from facts to motive, and the Israeli side is put on the defensive.

1.4 The Mechanics

Each Turkish action can also be explained on its own terms: a Foreign Ministry statement as a reaction to an incident, a communiqué as part of a bilateral agenda, a joint statement by a group of states as a contest for regional leadership. Each such explanation is correct, and each stops at the event itself.

The activity operates on four levels.

1. The frame is built by the state apparatus: the Presidential Directorate of Communications, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Center for Combating Disinformation, TRT, and Anadolu. The frame determines who plays which role in the conflict, what is happening in it, and what requires explanation.

2. Terms are selected to fit the frame: “genocide,” “ethnic cleansing,” “occupying power,” “settler terrorism,” “international isolation,” “the Hitler of our time.” The terms are formed as a linked set. Istanbul case 2026/108 combines genocide, crimes against humanity, and torture in a single set of charges. The August 19 statement by the head of Turkey's Presidential Directorate of Communications ties Israel's isolation, the October 27 election, and domestic political pressure on the Israeli government into a single argument. Whoever accepts one link accepts the rest, and refutation has to target the whole set.

3. The term passes through several stages, and at each stage a wider circle voices it: a minister, then a joint statement by a group of states, then a court, then social media, where the origin of the wording can no longer be traced.

4. The term is picked up by foreign newsrooms, third-country governments, issue-based communities, commentators, and participants inside Israel (Section 3.3).

The term “genocide” has been applied to Israel for decades in activist and academic circles. South Africa's case at the International Court of Justice in December 2023 gave it legal form. Ankara took the term ready-made and raised it two stages higher: the phrase “Netanyahu's genocidal government” in Erdoğan's Ankara speech following talks with the head of the Palestinian Authority on August 11–12; and the charges in case 2026/108 together with the request for an Interpol Red Notice on August 21.

The Israeli side responds on the merits and argues that there is no intent and therefore no genocide. After such a response, intent becomes the subject of the dispute, while the word “genocide” remains in the question. The fact that Gaza is the scene of a war against an armed group drops out of the discussion.

The phrase “the Hitler of our time,” used by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2026, works the same way. The comparison is offensive, and silence would be read as assent. Yet every Israeli response repeats the phrase. An outlet that would not have quoted the Turkish statement publishes the Israeli rebuttal and, with it, sets out what is being rebutted. The subject of the dispute becomes whether intent has been proven and whether the comparison is appropriate. Whether it is appropriate to discuss Israeli policy in these categories at all is never raised.

Analysis indicates that Israel has no frame of its own shared by its state speakers. The IDF Spokesperson, ministers, and politicians explain each event after it has occurred, and in words already set by the other side.

2. Ukraine's Strategy Documents and the 14-Indicator Matrix

2.1 Ukraine's Strategy Documents as the Source of the Analytical Model

The model is built on three documents. The Communication Strategy of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 2026–2030 describes the operational architecture: holding the initiative, proactive communication, interagency coordination, the single-signal principle, and the “communication community” (the strategy's term). The Public Diplomacy Strategy of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs sets out narratives, audiences, and partnerships. Ukraine's Foreign Policy Strategy sets out sanctions, coalition, and international-law instruments.

The Communication Strategy names crisis communication as one of the lines of information defense. It prescribes holding the initiative through speed, unexpected news hooks, and asymmetric moves.

The strategy provides for a distributed system. The ministry and its subordinate structures shape the position, while its dissemination is supported by embassies, state broadcasting, partner governments, newsrooms, diaspora and civil-society organizations, and individual commentators. Most participants are not subordinate to the ministry. There is one position, and it reaches the recipient through many seemingly independent voices.

The stated audience includes governments as well as the societies, media, and youth of partner countries. The ministry works with foreign academic circles and textbook authors.

The stated measure of success is support that does not depend on a change of government in the partner country. The strategy speaks of work with society before elections and of maintaining support through a change of government. It sets no task of securing a specific electoral outcome. The strategy also provides for transferring expertise. Ukrainian diplomats conduct training for counterparts from NATO, EU, G7, African, Asian, and Middle Eastern countries.

2.2 From Document to Implementation

On August 3, eleven days after the strategy was approved, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, speaking at the annual meeting of heads of diplomatic missions in Kyiv, listed upcoming elections in partner countries: state elections in Germany from September, then Israel, then the United States, and next year France and the Baltic states.

The task set for ambassadors was to build long-term ties with leaders and the political elite as well as with society, media, the cultural community, and business, so that partners have an interest in supporting Ukraine under any scenario. For the election period, the task added active counterpropaganda, work with public opinion and youth, and with all leaders and media that shape public opinion.

Channels are chosen by country. In some, the work is conducted officially, in others unofficially, and in some, public activity is considered more harmful than helpful. Social media, podcasts, and YouTube are named as channels for younger audiences.

2.3 The 14-Indicator Matrix

The indicators were identified by the authors (see “Basis and Scope of the Report”). The basis status is preliminary.

No.	Analytical indicator	Basis in Ukrainian strategy documents and practice	Observed manifestation in the Turkish corpus	Status
1	A fixed definition of the adversary through which any of its actions is read	Aggressor, occupier, terrorist state	Occupier, violator of international law, “committing genocide”	O/E
2	Shift from criticizing the government to characterizing the state or ideology	The cause lies not in Kremlin decisions but in Russia's imperial nature	The cause lies not in government decisions but in expansionism and “colonial Zionism”	E
3	Personalization of the conflict	Putin as the source of the war and the obstacle to peace	Netanyahu as the source of the war; the phrase “the Hitler of our time” (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2026)	E
4	Appropriation of the category of peace and assignment of responsibility for continuing the conflict to the adversary	Moscow talks peace and continues the war	The Netanyahu government sabotages peace and continues expansion	O/E
5	Battle over vocabulary: an entrenched term assigns blame in advance	Not “the Ukrainian crisis” but “Russian aggression”	Not “the dispute over Jerusalem's status” but “occupied East Jerusalem”; not “security measures” but “incursions”	D/O
6	Classification under international and criminal law	War crimes, cultural genocide, abduction of children	Genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity; the August 11–12 communiqué describes Gaza as a territory stricken by genocide	D
7	Use of judicial procedures for political legitimization	International Criminal Court, International Court of Justice, ECHR, special tribunal for the crime of aggression	ICC, International Court of Justice; on July 14 an Istanbul court issued an arrest warrant for Israel's prime minister in the flotilla interception case; on August 21 an Interpol Red Notice was requested	D
8	Sanctions and institutional isolation	Sanctions; exclusion of Russia from sports, culture, and science	Trade embargo, scaling back of contacts, extension to culture and sports	D (sports, culture, science — from practice)
9	Interagency state-media system	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies, SPRAVDI, Center for Countering Disinformation	Presidential Directorate of Communications, Center for Combating Disinformation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Anadolu, TRT	D
10	Delegitimization of the adversary's messaging: its messages are propaganda, one's own are the truth	Center for Countering Disinformation, SPRAVDI; communication boycott of Russian state media	Center for Combating Disinformation; Israeli messages labeled “Israeli propaganda”	D/O
11	Work with third-party audiences instead of persuading the adversary	Monitoring the penetration of Russian narratives into Global South countries	The bulk of messaging is addressed to Muslim countries, the Global South, and European newsrooms	D
12	Building international coalitions	Coalitions that reproduce Ukrainian formulas	Joint statements with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Pakistan, Indonesia	D
13	Historical and decolonial frame	The history of Russia and Ukraine read through decolonization and the struggle against empire	Palestine and Jerusalem placed in an anticolonial frame drawing on Ottoman memory	D/O

No.	Analytical indicator	Basis in Ukrainian strategy documents and practice	Observed manifestation in the Turkish corpus	Status
14	Presenting the national interest as a common one	Resisting Russia is defending Europe and the world order	Palestine as a question of humanity's conscience and the defense of the Muslim world	D

In the corpus examined, both systems display all 14 indicators. The similarity concerns the structure of communication activity: frame building, allocation of roles, organization of dissemination, and work with external audiences. On its own, it does not establish borrowing, common direction, or coordination. Alternative explanations remain: shared professional standards, similar institutional tasks, and independent application of comparable methods.

3. Turkey's State Communication Infrastructure

The three-layer division is the authors' model. The layers are distinguished by three criteria: legal subordination and budgetary dependence (the core), subordination while operating in non-communication categories (the institutional belt), and no established subordination while reproducing Turkish wording (the non-subordinate layer). Thematic overlap alone is not grounds for assignment to the first two layers.

3.1 The Core

The Presidential Directorate of Communications, the Center for Combating Disinformation under it, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This layer has established subordination, a budget, staff, and reporting lines. This is where the frame is built, that is, who plays which role in the conflict and what terms to use for it. Adjacent to the core are state media with differing status. TRT is the state broadcaster. Anadolu is the state news agency that distributes its wire by subscription.

3.2 The Institutional Belt

TİKA, Diyanet, affiliated foundations, the consulate general in East Jerusalem, and scholarship programs. These structures are subordinate to the state but operate in cultural, educational, and religious categories. Their participation in the communication activity under review is documented separately only for TİKA (restoration programs in East Jerusalem, Section 4). For the other participants, presence is established but not a role in disseminating formulations.

3.3 The Non-Subordinate Layer

This layer comprises everything that reproduces Turkish wording without established instructions. An Egyptian activist living in Turkey runs his own campaign. An Arabic newspaper reprints Anadolu because it subscribes to the wire. States sign a joint statement with Turkey because it serves their own interests. Searching this layer for signs of an organizational link to Turkish state structures repeats the error of the claim, which surfaced on July 27, of a Turkish networked influence operation targeting Israel's election. Such an operation was looked for and not found in the available data.

Six types of disseminators:

- **Foreign newsrooms.** They subscribe to the wire and use the material as an ordinary source. The author is still visible.
- **Third-country governments.** Joint statements, resolutions, communiqués. One state's position becomes a group's position, and the author disappears.
- **Issue-based communities on social media.** Palestinian, Islamic, anticolonial, human-rights, and student milieus, for which the Turkish wording matches their own position. The term no longer needs a source.

- **Public commentators and personal media channels.** Regular commentators, personal pages, channels, and podcasts, often in several languages. Some are based in Turkey, some are third-country nationals, and some have no connection to Turkey. The Turkish origin of the wording can no longer be traced.

- **Campaigns from Turkish territory.** Individuals and organizations running their own campaigns. Their link to Ankara comes down to territory and language, and no institutional link has been established.

- **Participants inside Israel.** Politicians and organizations that use arguments in the election campaign that coincide with Turkish ones (Section 5.5).

Instructions, funding, or contact with Turkish state structures were not established for any participant in this layer. The lower boundary of the layer is the ordinary user who shares material. Such users are not an object of observation.

4. Objectives of the Turkish Communication Campaign

The authors reconstructed the objectives from the actions of Turkish state structures. All six objectives derive from a single frame and are broken down along six lines.

Diplomacy. Ensure that regional security and transit issues are settled without Israel's participation. This is served by the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, and by the promotion of a Turkish-Syrian route for the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). No fixed deadline.

Language. Establish Turkey's own terms. The vocabulary falls into four groups. Criminal-law terms: “genocide,” “crimes against humanity,” “war crimes,” “ethnic cleansing.” Case 2026/108 is built on them. Territorial terms: “occupied East Jerusalem,” “occupying power,” “incursions” in place of security measures. Personal terms: “the Hitler of our time” (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2026), “Netanyahu's occupation approach,” “international isolation” as the result of his government's conduct. Status terms: “Israeli propaganda” applied to any Israeli message, “settler terrorism,” “rogue state.” Each term brings into circulation the frame from which it is drawn. The goal is to move the terms beyond Turkish sources and into resolutions, the language of foreign newsrooms, educational materials, and language-model responses. No fixed deadline.

Religious representation. Acquire the role of protector of Jerusalem and Gaza. Ankara holds no mandate over the Jerusalem holy sites. That mandate belongs to the Jordanian crown and is enshrined in the 1994 Israel–Jordan peace treaty. Ankara substitutes presence for the mandate. TİKA runs restoration programs in East Jerusalem, Turkish foundations fund the upkeep of sites and social projects, and the restoration of the Ottoman heritage is presented as a historical right of guardianship. Added to this is recognition from the PA chairman. Harsh rhetoric toward Netanyahu positions the Turkish leadership as a consistent defender, in contrast to Jordan, whose mandate operates alongside a peace treaty. No fixed deadline.

Law. Secure decisions that constrain Israel in international courts, in trade preferences, and in access to cultural and sports venues. The timeline is set by each new decision of a court or organization.

Palestinian politics. Secure a position in the competition for the PA leadership after Abbas. The timeline is set by the 2027 PA presidential election.

Israeli elections. Reduce the conflict to a single government that can be replaced. The cause of isolation is declared to be neither the state nor its policy, but the current coalition and its leader personally. It follows that a change of government will end the isolation. The deadline is set by the date of the vote, October 27.

Only the last objective is tied to an imminent date, and that is why the entire campaign is read as electoral. The other five objectives are long-term and do not depend directly on the outcome of the vote.

5. Dissemination

A common error in Israeli assessment is to treat social media and the press as the place where formulations are created. In the system described here, they are where ready-made formulations spread. Some structures produce, others disseminate, and the campaign is built on this division.

5.1 Language Models

Everything Turkish structures publish openly (Foreign Ministry statements, communiqués, TRT and Anadolu wire output) enters the body of material from which language models generate responses. This body is large, structured, multilingual, and constantly growing. The advantage goes to whoever's text is structured and available in the right language, regardless of volume. There is no editorial filter here. Where editorial standards took years to make a term standard, here the time frame may shrink to months. The presence of Turkish sources in model responses was not measured in this study.

5.2 Language Tracks

Multilingualism gives a single message as many independent entry points as there are languages in use, and in each segment it lives on without reference to the Turkish original. Four tracks matter for Israel.

Arabic. The main channel of this track, TRT Arabi, has operated since 2010, with a stated reach of over 450 million people. This is where the vocabulary on Jerusalem, Gaza, and the Palestinian question is formed. From here it reaches the regional press and Israel's Arabic-speaking audience. Among Israeli Arabic-language outlets, use of the Anadolu wire is documented for the Arab48 portal. No information was found for other outlets, and this finding is limited to the scope of the search.

English. TRT World and Anadolu's English-language wire are aimed at European and American newsrooms, international organizations, and the expert community. This track shapes the terms in which Israel is described in documents and commentary cited in Brussels and Washington.

Russian. TRT's Russian-language service covers the Israeli election campaign on a regular basis. The commentators in these materials are Russian and Azerbaijani, with no Turkish commentators among them. No systematic retransmission was detected in Israel's Russian-speaking segment. The first instance of material crossing over was recorded on August 20. The channel exists, and Ankara does not need to build it.

Turkic. Broadcasting in Azerbaijani, Kazakh, and other Turkic languages targets a space in which Israel has partner relationships of its own. Influence is constrained by the pragmatism of local elites. Public positions may nevertheless shift in line with Turkish wording while practical cooperation continues. An example is Azerbaijan's statements of June 28 in connection with Israel's recognition of the Armenian genocide.

In the Arabic and English segments, the Israeli position competes with the Turkish one. In the Russian and Turkic segments, it is weakly represented.

5.3 No Network Inside the Country

No dedicated Turkish dissemination network in Israel was found. Even so, the frame arrives by the three pathways described in KJ-5. Ankara does not need to hire people inside the country for this. The work is done by those acting for their own reasons.

Turkish terms enter the Israeli debate within arguments that Israelis make to other Israelis, and their Turkish origin is not visible. A survey by Dor Moriah conducted jointly with the Geocartography

Institute in mid-August 2026 (1,003 respondents) shows that 28.6% name their own government's actions as the main cause of international pressure, while 22.9% name a campaign by adversaries. In the Arab sector the ratio is 40.8% to 4.2%. 51.7% believe that the West's attitude depends on a political settlement of the Palestinian question.

Perception also depends on the structure of the Israeli audience. Dor Moriah's October 2024 study (1,005 respondents) found that Israelis' positions on logically unrelated questions (the form of the state, chosenness, "two states for two peoples," Western orientation) cluster into two stable groupings with high internal consistency, and 61% of respondents stay with one pole as they move from question to question (methodology in Appendix A). In such a setting, a new claim is tagged as belonging to one of the clusters and is attached to the existing set. The formula "two states for two peoples" belongs to the secular-liberal cluster, and Turkish formulations using the same terms are perceived as belonging to that pole. Disputing them is read as a statement of camp affiliation.

Turkey's overt electoral work abroad is well known, but it requires two conditions: either its own diaspora or a territory under its control, and open statements by top leaders. This was the case in Bulgaria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Northern Cyprus. In Israel, neither condition is met. The Northern Cyprus case is telling. In October 2025, the Ankara-backed candidate received 35.81% against 62.76%, and a former Erdoğan adviser attributed the result to voters' reaction to the interference itself. Where the source is visible, voters resist. The report's working hypothesis is that where the source is not visible, arguments are perceived as one's own.

5.4 Why Detection Fails

Israel's analytical system is tuned to the Iranian pattern: bots, fake personas, mass messaging. Such activity is concealed and therefore leaves technical traces. Turkish activity is open. Broadcasting is public, missions are accredited, institutions are registered, and statements are made under their own names.

The state agency publishes under its own name. The foreign newsroom reprints by subscription. The user shares out of conviction. The model retrieves by relevance. At no step is there an indicator the tool is designed to detect. A check designed for covert activity returns a negative result, and that result is taken to mean there is no threat.

5.5 Converging Arguments Before the Election

Until October 27, a similar argument, that the country's isolation is the result of its government's actions, is heard from three sources. Ankara needs it for the sixth objective in Section 4. For the Ukrainian side, Israel's current government is the most cautious partner on weapons, sanctions, and relations with Moscow. For the Israeli opposition, it is an ordinary campaign interest. The three sides' targets of public criticism partly coincide, while their motives and ultimate goals differ.

The week after the strike on Abu al-Duhur shows this through a single event. The Turkish government stated that the strike stemmed from Netanyahu's intention to pursue expansionist and destabilizing policies before the election. Tom Barrack, US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria, called the strike an unnecessary escalation and attributed the rhetoric of regional leaders to election campaigns. In his words, Netanyahu is heading toward October and knows what his electorate wants, and the strike may have been an attempt to force Turkey into a confrontation before the election. Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak saw signs of political calculation in the escalation shortly before the election. According to Axios, some US officials consider the strike partly election-driven, and the administration asked Damascus to show restraint until the Israeli vote.

Turkey did not have to deliver such formulations to Israeli audiences. Allies and opponents of the government voiced them under their own names and for their own reasons. The Makkah Joint

Defence Agreement was read the same way. In the Israeli debate, it was presented as proof that the Abrahamic track had run its course and that Washington accepted this.

The Turkish frame absorbs any Israeli military response as confirmation. In its logic, the aggressor behaves like an aggressor, the three-state defense agreement gains a justification, and Washington finds it harder to maintain public restraint.

After the election, the convergence of interests will disappear regardless of the outcome. The terms that take hold in the meantime will remain, because they already stand in third-country documents and do not depend on the Israeli agenda.

6. The Ukrainian Factor: Facts and Alternative Explanations

Established. During the period under study, Ukrainian officials and communication actors associated with the Ukrainian agenda addressed Israeli political forces and public audiences on bilateral and domestic Israeli policy issues.

On August 3, the president of Ukraine included Israel's election in the list of elections in partner countries during which ambassadors are tasked with working with society and media (Section 2.2).

Officially, Israel does not supply weapons to Ukraine, has not joined sanctions against Russia, and maintains working relations with Moscow.

Analysis indicates. Some public arguments by Ukrainian actors coincide with criticism of Israel's current government voiced by other sources, including Turkish ones.

Not established. The existence of a unified campaign against the Israeli government. Contacts between the relevant Turkish and Ukrainian structures.

The overlap in instruments (Section 2.3) admits three explanations. They are ranked by strength of evidence.

1. Independent application of similar methods with a partial overlap of interests. The baseline explanation. Turkey is a NATO member. Its Directorate of Communications and Center for Combating Disinformation were established according to the same NATO and European standards as the Ukrainian structures. Shared professional training explains the overlap in techniques. The overlap in target and timing is explained by both sides operating within the same Israeli electoral calendar.

2. Professional contacts, exchange of expertise, or situational awareness. Working hypothesis. The Ukrainian strategy provides for transferring expertise to counterparts, including from the Middle East (Section 2.1). There is no direct evidence of contacts with the Turkish side.

3. Operational alignment or unified administration. Unconfirmed hypothesis. The sides' ultimate goals do not coincide, and the costs of exposure are out of proportion to the gains.

Only targeted data can distinguish between the first and second explanations: overlaps in personnel and contractors, contacts between the relevant agencies outside the bilateral agenda, and the appearance of matching formulations on one side before they enter open circulation.

7. Limitations of the Study and Verification Plan

The absence of Turkish attribution in reports by the State Comptroller and the Shin Bet, and the absence of publications on Turkish networks, do not refute the report's findings.

What is unknown	Why it matters	What to collect	When the question is closed
Which sources the leading language models draw on when they answer questions about Israel	A growing number of people get basic information about Israel from model answers, and the share of Turkish sources in those answers is unknown	The same set of questions about Israel, put to the models in 8–10 languages every quarter, with a count of the sources they cite	Two or three quarterly waves can be compared with each other
How much coverage of Israel TRT Arabi, TRT World, TRT's Russian service, and the Anadolu wires produce in each language, and how many staff and how much money these desks have	Without these figures there is no way to judge how much Turkey invests in each language	A count of publications for the period, plus budgets and staffing from the public reporting of TRT, Anadolu, and the Directorate of Communications	A table for each language with the number of items, staff, and budget
Which Israeli Arabic-language outlets besides Arab48 republish the Anadolu wire	Republication is confirmed for only one portal, so the reach of this channel is unknown	A check of the publications and imprint data of Israeli Arabic-language outlets for Anadolu attribution	A list of outlets with confirmed use of the wire
How Israel describes the conflict to the outside world: who is to blame, who is the victim, and why	Until such a description exists, there is nothing to measure on the Israeli side	An approved text of Israel's external communication frame	The document is approved, and its terms are tracked by the same measurements as the Turkish ones

The last gap has a domestic dimension. A frame of one's own does two jobs. Externally, it displaces the other side's frame, and internally, it provides a basis for agreement on how reality is described. Dor Moriah's mass surveys of 2024–2026 record two competing worldview models: religious-conservative and secular-liberal. Whether the Israeli frame should rest on one of them or on what they share is a decision for the political leadership.

Conclusion

Applied to Ankara's actions, the description of cognitive warfare reveals a working system: vocabulary produced within the state apparatus, dissemination through state broadcasting and foreign newsrooms, entrenchment in third-country documents and in language-model responses, coalition multiplication, personalization of the adversary, transfer of the dispute to the judicial plane, and substitution of on-the-ground presence and outside recognition for a missing mandate. August 2026 added the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, under which regional security is arranged without Israeli participation.

Turkish structures operate openly. Israeli checks are tuned to covert activity, so they find nothing, and the null result is taken to mean there is no threat. Rebuttals on the merits take place inside the Turkish frame and leave it untouched. Only a frame of one's own, produced and disseminated in the same way, can displace it.

Israel does not yet have an external frame of its own.

Appendix A. Sources

Dor Moriah's own studies

Study	Period	Sample	Partner	Margin of error
Expert panel	May 2026	11 specialists ranging from the secular left to the religious right	—	Not applicable
Mass survey	May–June 2026	1,007 respondents	Geocartography Institute	±3.1%
Survey on the tolerance threshold for international isolation	Mid-August 2026	1,003 respondents	Geocartography Institute	±3.1%
Survey on cleavages	October 2024	1,005 respondents	Geocartography Institute	±3.1%

Margins of error are given at the 95% confidence level. The clustering methodology of the October 2024 survey, question wording, target population, sampling design, and weighting are set out in a separate methodological note by Dor Moriah.

Primary documents

- Communication Strategy of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 2026–2030, presented June 18, 2026, approved by order of Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs on July 23, 2026.
- Public Diplomacy Strategy of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presented June 18, 2026.
- Ukraine's Foreign Policy Strategy.
- Address by the president of Ukraine to the meeting of heads of diplomatic missions, August 3, 2026.
- Statements by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkey's Presidential Directorate of Communications, April–August 2026; the August 11–12 communiqué; the August 19 statement by the head of the Directorate of Communications.
- Materials of Istanbul court case 2026/108; the July 14 warrant; the August 21 request for an Interpol Red Notice.
- Makkah Joint Defence Agreement (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan), August 7, 2026, published summary.
- Special report of Israel's State Comptroller of July 7, 2026; Shin Bet annual report for 2025; materials of the Knesset intelligence subcommittee of July 27.