

Visions of Israel's Future — 2030
Analytical Report Based on an Expert Survey
Think Tank Dor Moria | Haifa, 2026

Key Takeaways

1. Israeli experts do not describe one future for Israel, but several competing futures.
2. The deepest cleavage is between a secular-liberal vision and a religious-conservative vision of the state.
3. Brain drain is the only major risk recognized across all camps, although its causes are interpreted differently.
4. The United States remains Israel's indispensable external framework through 2030.
5. Multi-vector foreign policy is viewed by almost all experts as unrealistic.
6. The main unresolved question is whether Israel can rebuild a social contract broad enough to retain both camps.

Introduction

Dor Moria launched the "Visions of Israel's Future — 2030" project in response to a growing need in Israeli society. After October 7, 2023, it became critically important for Israelis to understand where the country is headed, and which visions of the future are gaining influence among different social groups. The war exposed deep internal conflicts and called into question the resilience of the current "social contract."

This report presents the results of the first stage of the study: an expert survey conducted in April 2026. The objective is to identify the main directions in which Israeli society and the Israeli state may develop, as currently discussed in professional circles. The second stage — a mass survey of Israelis — will test which of these views are shared across different social groups.

The study is being conducted on the eve of the Knesset elections scheduled for October 2026. The term of the new Knesset will end in 2030. Thus, *Visions of Israel's Future — 2030* is not merely a forecast but a real assessment of the consequences of the choice the country will make this autumn.

Methodology

Design. A qualitative written expert survey. Each participant received the same structured guide, which included 17 open-ended questions across three thematic blocks: domestic politics (Q1–Q5), the geopolitical situation (Q6–Q14), and economic development (Q15–Q17). Some questions included a numerical scale or a set of predefined response options, with a mandatory written justification. Responses were provided individually in writing, without group discussion.

Purpose and objectives. To understand how Israeli experts assess the country's prospects to 2030 — in politics, security, and economics. The objectives were: (1) to identify points of consensus and division within the expert community; (2) to understand how an expert's worldview position shapes their image of the future; and (3) to formulate hypotheses about possible gaps between expert assessments and the views of ordinary Israelis — for testing in the subsequent mass survey.

Sample. The sample consisted of 12 experts selected through purposive sampling along two axes: disciplinary specialization and publicly identifiable ideological orientation. The selection principle was to maximize ideological and disciplinary variation while preserving the professional qualifications of each participant. The sample is not statistically representative.

Limitations. Because respondents are anonymized, their institutional affiliations are not disclosed. The qualitative design does not permit statistical generalization. The written format limits the possibility of asking follow-up questions. The full questionnaire is provided in Appendix 1.

Sample Description

By ideological orientation, the experts were divided into three types.

Type 1. Secular-liberal positions (6 experts: 1, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12). The central categories are the social contract, rights, institutions, Israel's qualitative edge, and brain drain.

Type 2. Religious-conservative positions (4 experts: 2, 4, 6, 10). These positions rely on the language of mission, direction, internal cohesion, a "strong state," and religious identity.

Type 3. Intermediate / meta-positions (2 experts: 3, 9). These experts position themselves above the camps and use a comparative-historical or normative-operational approach.

No.	Specialization	Ideological orientation	Religious profile
1	Political scientist	Left-wing	Secular
2	Political scientist	Right-conservative	Traditional
3	Historian	Centrist	Secular
4	Political scientist	Right-conservative	Religious
5	International economist	Centrist-pragmatic	Secular
6	National security analyst	Right-conservative	Religious
7	Security analyst	Left-wing opposition	Secular
8	Sociologist	Left-wing	Secular
9	Lawyer	Left-wing	Secular
10	Journalist	Center-right	Traditional
11	Human rights advocate	Left-liberal	Secular
12	Civic activist	Center-left	Secular

Main Findings

The survey's main finding is the internal link between two themes that may initially appear distinct: the worldview cleavage and the emigration of highly educated professionals.

The main practical conclusion is that most experts believe the religious-conservative camp will not be able to achieve full dominance by 2030, because it will be constrained by Israel's High Court of Justice (Bagatz), the IDF, the high-tech sector, and the broader judicial system. At the same time, most experts also recognize migration and brain drain as a major problem. Further study is required to determine how quickly the strengthening of the religious-conservative camp and the growing outmigration of secular Israelis will affect the stability of the social institutions designed to maintain the balance between secular and religious camps.

Part I. Two Images of the Future

The survey showed that experts from different camps describe "different countries," even though they are looking at the same one.

The Secular-Liberal Image

Israel in 2030 is a technological state normatively integrated into the Western world. Its source of legitimacy is the social contract and institutions. The outside world consists of allies and partners with whom agreements must be reached. The threat is a theocratic turn, the loss of international legitimacy, and the departure of those who carry a secular-democratic worldview.

Expert 1: *"A diplomatic Israel, integrated into the international normative system, resolving the conflict through multilateral agreements and the gradual removal of the causes of conflict."*

Expert 5: *"If the state does not revise its priorities, it risks being left with a bloated public sector and social dependents, but without the 10 percent of the population that generates 90 percent of innovation and taxes."*

Expert 7: *"Dominance is not even institutional capture; it is the paralysis of strategic thinking. The main damage is not Shabbat or schools, but the country's inability to formulate a long-term security doctrine — because formulating one requires a consensus that does not exist."*

Expert 8: *"The main underestimated risk is Israel's transformation into a 'platform country': a high-tech shell in which a globally integrated elite lives in the world of the future while state institutions degrade."*

Expert 11: *"The real threat is not institutional capture, but the gradual narrowing of the space for civil liberties and minority rights."*

Expert 12: *"Dominance is already happening — not at the level of institutions, but at the level of society's ability to formulate common goals. When the shared civic framework breaks down, even formally secular institutions lose their capacity to resist ideological pressure."*

The Religious-Conservative Image

Israel in 2030 is a sovereign Jewish state that relies on its own power and is not dependent on international legitimation. Its source of legitimacy is historical mission and internal cohesion. The outside world is an arena of threats in which the strong survive. The threat is a weak state, the loss of a sense of mission, and the dilution of identity.

Expert 2: *"Religious Zionism is integrating into state institutions on the basis of productive cooperation; the Haredim are different, but they are a sector, not the center. The mechanism is coalition-based, and that is normal for a parliamentary system."*

Expert 4: *"Strengthening is inevitable; dominance is not. The danger is not 'theocracy,' but the inability to translate demographic growth into administrative competence. This is a normal correction of the secular tilt of the 1990s."*

Expert 6: *"The danger is not 'theocratization,' but fragmentation of command chains if the Haredim enter the army seriously without preparation. The army is the main point of friction. The very existence of the reserve system depends on the quality of Haredi integration into combat units."*

The Meta-Position

Expert 3, a historian, and Expert 9, a lawyer specializing in international law, do not identify with either camp. They see the ongoing process as a phase transition analogous to Turkey under Erdogan, Poland in the 2010s, and, in part, the United States.

Expert 3: *"Demographically growing traditionalist segments acquire political weight in societies experiencing external pressure and a crisis of secular legitimacy. Precedents include Turkey under Erdogan, Poland in the 2010s, and, in part, the United States."*

Expert 9: *"Strengthening through demographic and coalition mechanisms. Full institutional dominance is limited: Bagatz, the IDF, the security agencies, academia, and the high-tech sector retain their secular character and resource base. The vector is strengthening, not dominance."*

Why This Matters

There are substantial differences between these two images in their perception of threats. A secular expert says "erosion of the social contract"; a religious expert says "loss of direction." Both are describing the same phenomenon, but in incompatible causal languages. This is not merely a disagreement that can be resolved through argument; it reflects competing descriptions of reality. This phenomenon is also confirmed by the findings of sociological surveys conducted by the Dor Moria Analytical Center.

Part II. Emigration as the Material Face of the Cleavage

The theme of brain drain — the emigration of highly educated professionals — ran through all 12 questionnaires and produced the richest range of conceptualizations. The secular camp interprets emigration as voting with one's feet against the social contract; the religious camp interprets it as a symptom of the loss of identity and direction; the meta-position interprets it as an indicator of a phase transition. The link between the cleavage and emigration is not an accidental correlation. The carriers of the secular-liberal image of the future constitute the core of the highly educated professionals leaving the country. The cleavage is not merely a clash between two views of the future; its results determine who will remain in that future.

Secular-Liberal Positions

Expert 1: *"Those leaving are not traitors; they are people who do not see how to realize the values for which their parents built this state."*

Expert 5: *"Extreme cost of living → tax burden on 20 percent of workers → erosion of the social contract after the judicial reform and the war → network effect of departure → physical relocation. If the state does not revise its priorities, it risks being left with a bloated public sector and social dependents, but without the 10 percent of the population that generates 90 percent of innovation and taxes."*

Expert 7: *"If your best people are leaving, it means the problem is not the economy, but the doctrine. First the Qualitative Edge leaves as a physical fact. Then it leaves as an idea."*

Expert 8: *"Free Rider Problem: 20 percent of the population provides 90 percent of taxes → critical alienation → internal emigration → physical relocation."*

Expert 11: *"It is not only engineers who leave, but also those who can no longer accept the moral cost of staying. This is a different category of emigration — it removes the voice of conscience from society."*

Expert 12: *"Emigration is not the defeat of the economy; it is the defeat of democracy. Those who have a choice are the first to leave. The fact that they choose to leave is the loudest referendum we have had in the last ten years."*

Religious-Conservative Positions

Expert 2: *"A serious but manageable risk. The solution is the restoration of a strong state in which the high-tech and scientific elite has pride, not only a salary. It is a question of identity, not infrastructure."*

Expert 4: *"Brain drain is a serious problem, but it is solved not through salaries, but through the return of an idea. Young people are leaving not because of the cost of living, but because of the feeling that the country has lost direction. Restore the direction, and they will return."*

Expert 6: *"The emigration of reserve officers, defense-industry engineers, and cybersecurity specialists is not a social problem; it is an operational one."*

Expert 10: *"The departure of high-tech families to Lisbon or Athens has already become a familiar theme in Israeli weekend media. In a year, it will be the lead story."*

The Meta-Position

Expert 3: *"The emigration of the educated professional class is an indicator of a phase transition in society. This happened in Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s, in Russia in the 1990s, and in Turkey in the 2010s. This is not brain drain in the technical sense; it is a symptom of the loss of historical optimism."*

Expert 9: *"Brain drain: high tech, physicians, scientists. Negative net migration. Almost complete loss of the country's attractiveness."*

It is noteworthy that, in their conceptualization of causes and solutions, the experts diverge radically, while in their assessment of the scale of the threat they almost do not. This is a rare case in which deeply divided camps recognize the same problem while offering mutually exclusive prescriptions.

Part III. Thematic Blocks

Domestic Politics

Dominance of the Religious-Conservative Camp by 2030 (Q1)

The panel's average score was 3.1. The ideological spectrum is nonlinear: nonreligious right-conservative experts (2, 10) regard the very concept of "dominance" as alarmist; religious-right experts (4, 6) view strengthening as a manageable process; secular-liberal experts (7, 11, 12) see the threat not as institutional capture, but as paralysis of consensus.

Expert 1 — 3: *"An alarming but not inevitable scenario. The barrier is not so much the institutional framework as international pressure and dependence on external agreements."*

Expert 2 — 2: *"The very concept of 'dominance' is an alarmist metaphor. Religious Zionism is integrating into state institutions on the basis of productive cooperation."*

Expert 5 — 2: *"Unlikely. The high-tech sector provides the lion's share of taxes and creates a powerful economic counterweight."*

Expert 7 — 4: *"Dominance is not even institutional capture; it is the paralysis of strategic thinking."*

Expert 8 — 3.5: *"In terms of coalition weight — 4 (religious parties remain veto players). In terms of institutional conversion — 3 (Haredim are less represented in military service and professional elites)."*

Expert 11 — 4: *"The real threat is not institutional capture, but the gradual narrowing of the space for civil liberties and minority rights."*

Expert 12 — 4: *"Dominance is already happening — not at the level of institutions, but at the level of society's ability to formulate common goals."*

Where Strengthening Will Be Felt Most Strongly (Q2)

Both camps name the same spheres — education, public space, and resource allocation — but evaluate them in opposite ways. Secular experts call this erosion; religious-conservative experts call it correction.

Expert 2: *"Strengthening will be felt in the allocation of budgetary resources and in symbolic politics — but not in strategic institutions (the army, intelligence, economic management)."*

Expert 4: *"Strengthening will be felt in schools, in resource allocation, and in settlement policy. This is a normal correction of the secular tilt of the 1990s."*

Expert 9: *"Marriage, divorce, conversion, burial, Shabbat, military conscription, and a mandatory quota for employers to hire Haredim without competency requirements."*

Expert 11: *"Minority rights: LGBTQ+ people, Reform and Conservative Jewish communities, Arab citizens, women in the public sphere. These are the first pressure points, and they are already under pressure."*

Burden-Sharing (Q3)

This is a rare case of substantive agreement among experts from different camps: most assign scores of 4–5. They diverge only on how exactly the problem should be solved.

Expert 4: *"This is an existential structural issue: the army will not withstand the pressure without Haredi integration. The political use of the issue is a consequence, not the cause, of its urgency."*

Expert 5: *"This has become a question of state survival. The reserve system has reached the limits of attrition."*

Expert 6: *"This is a question of military survival. The reserves are already beyond the threshold of sustainability."*

Expert 11: *"This is a question of equality in civic obligations, and it is directly connected to equality in civil rights."*

Expert 12: *"This is not about 'taxes' and not about 'the army'; it is about whether a single 'we' exists at all, for whose sake sacrifices can be made."*

Infrastructure as a Constraint on State Resilience (Q4)

Most experts "somewhat agree," but each identifies infrastructure as only the consequence of another, deeper constraint.

Expert 1: *"The main constraint will not be infrastructure deterioration, but diplomatic isolation and the loss of legitimacy in the international arena."*

Expert 6: *"Somewhat agree — especially in relation to protective infrastructure. One-third of the population lacks adequate protection."*

Expert 7: *"The main constraint on resilience is the absence of collective security institutions. Infrastructure is a consequence."*

Expert 12: *"The main constraint on resilience will be the collapse of the social contract. Infrastructure is only the physical expression of that collapse."*

Triggers of the 2026 Elections (Q5)

Secular experts name housing, health care, and schools; religious-conservative experts name the army, security, and protective infrastructure.

Expert 1: *"Housing — as a symptom of the broader issue of social inequality and the collapse of the civic compact between the state and young people."*

Expert 2: *"Security and the state of the army. The right-center electorate does not vote on housing; it votes on Gaza, Lebanon, and Judea and Samaria."*

Expert 6: *"Protective infrastructure and the condition of safe rooms. This may become the visual point of failure after the next large-scale exchange of strikes."*

Expert 11: *"Medicine and health care, especially in peripheral and Arab towns."*

Expert 12: *"Housing, because it is the most painful element in the new social contract that is failing to take shape."*

Geopolitics

Major Geopolitical Shifts (Q6)

The consensus among all 12 experts centers on three themes: the U.S. withdrawal from the region, the rise of Turkey, and the transformation of the Iranian factor. Experts from different camps name the same events, but interpret their consequences in fundamentally different ways.

Expert 3: *"The contraction of the American global presence is a pattern familiar from other imperial retreats. The final collapse of Ben-Gurion's 'periphery doctrine': Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia — all three pillars have been lost."*

Expert 4: *"The U.S. withdrawal from Syria and the formation of a Sunni crescent under Turkish patronage. The collapse of the 'periphery doctrine' — the loss of Ethiopia and the broader turn of the Horn of Africa against Israel."*

Expert 7: *"The final collapse of the global nonproliferation regime. Iran's demonstration of its capacity to strike Israel directly nullified the previous deterrence model."*

Expert 11: *"The ethnoreligious cleansing in Syria in 2025 and the failure of the international community to prevent it. The transformation of human rights from a universal norm into an instrument of geopolitical bargaining."*

The Main Constraint on Foreign Policy (Q7)

All 12 identify dependence on the United States as the decisive factor, but they evaluate it in fundamentally different ways.

Expert 2: *"The main constraint is internal cohesion. The United States applies pressure, but that pressure is manageable if the coalition is strong."*

Expert 6: *"The pace of ammunition expenditure and dependence on the American air bridge. In modern high-intensity war, this is the absolute limit."*

Expert 7: *"Dependence on the United States is pathological, and it is intensifying precisely because Israel has for decades rejected instruments of collective security."*

Expert 11: *"Complicity in violations of international humanitarian law makes Israel dependent on allies who cover that complicity. This is the most serious constraint, and it comes from within, not from outside."*

Expert 12: *"Internal fragmentation. A country that cannot agree on its identity cannot conduct a consistent foreign policy."*

Multi-Vector Foreign Policy (Q8)

The average score was 2.1. This is the lowest consensus score in the entire survey. Distribution: 1 point — Expert 6; 2 points — Experts 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12; 3 points — Expert 3; 3–4 points — Expert 8 ("asymmetric multi-vectorism").

Expert 2: *"Multi-vectorism for Israel is a euphemism for weakness. Multi-vectorism is a luxury of large countries and neutral countries. We are neither."*

Expert 3: *"Historically, small states master multi-vectorism only when three conditions are present: a stable internal system, geographic protection, and a cultural reputation. Israel has only one — a stable internal system, and even that is in question."*

Expert 6 — 1: *"Unrealistic. For ammunition, missile defense, and expendables there is one source, and it cannot be diversified without losing combat capability."*

Expert 7: *"Only multilateralism is realistic — participation in collective institutions, which Israel avoids."*

The baseline outline of foreign policy through 2030 is: "the United States as the indispensable center of gravity" — 9 experts (2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12); "a hybrid scheme with limited diversification" — 3 experts (1, 3, 8); "a turn toward multipolarity" — 0. Within the American option, almost all experts add qualifications that change the tone despite formal agreement in the choice: for some, this is a rational given; for others, it is a diagnosis of failure.

Red Lines on China and Permissible Forms of Cooperation (Q9–Q10)

Q9 and Q10 produced the most homogeneous result in the entire panel: the positions of all 12 experts substantively coincided. Responses are presented in summary form; individual quotations in this case would not add analytical value.

The substantive consensus is as follows: dual-use technologies, AI, communications, and ports are closed zones. All 12 experts agree that there will be no strategic partnership with the PRC. Remaining areas include medicine, agritech, water technologies, and limited infrastructure without dual-use applications. Characteristic of the scenario outlook is Expert 8's forecast of a "digital Iron Curtain" (2028–2030): Chinese communications infrastructure in Israel triggers a U.S. demand for dismantlement under threat of exclusion from CJADC2.

Russia (Q11)

The dominant formula across the panel is "pragmatic minimum, without illusions." For the experts, Russia is neither a partner nor an adversary, but a functional factor in the Syrian theater. No expert advocates a complete rupture; no expert expects normalization either.

Expert 7: *"Russia is not an 'instrument' and not a 'threat.' It is the second power in Syria, with which Israel needs a hotline, verification, and transparent rules of deconfliction."*

Expert 8: *"Cold pragmatism with elements of conflict management. Russia is a 'difficult neighbor' with whom communication must be maintained in order to avoid accidental clashes."*

Expert 11: *"Russia is complicit in ethnoreligious cleansing in Syria, and any cooperation with it must be publicly justified."*

Expert 12: *"A pragmatic minimum with preservation of the hotline — Russia to some extent constrains Turkish influence in Syria. This is a side effect, but it works."*

The "Hexagonal Alliance" (Q12)

For some experts, it is a real architecture; for others, a "rhetorical superstructure." The division does not run strictly along camp lines.

Expert 1: *"A rhetorical superstructure over bilateral deals. The participants have different maps, different enemies, and different time horizons."*

Expert 6: *"A real architecture, especially in air defense and joint exercises with Greece and Arab partners. This is an example of a functioning regional response to the Iranian threat."*

Expert 7: *"It is a set of bilateral ties that is not an alliance, because it has neither verification mechanisms, nor mutual guarantees, nor a common doctrine."*

Expert 8: *"An emerging geoeconomic framework with high potential. IMEC, the Great Sea Interconnector, regular joint exercises, and the Indian 'anchor.'"*

Turkey as the New Main Adversary (Q13)

Score of 2 — 8 experts; score of 3 — 3 experts. Consensus: direct war is unlikely; local incidents in Syria are likely.

Expert 2: *"After the fall of the ayatollahs, Turkey will become our main adversary. It is a matter of time. The main theaters are the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria."*

Expert 3: *"Direct conflict between two states integrated into the Western system is historically extremely rare. What is dangerous is not intentions, but institutional collapse: if NATO weakens, both sides will find themselves in a self-help mode."*

Expert 10: *"Direct conflict is highly unlikely. The media effect of an incident is dangerous: one downed aircraft can shift public sentiment in 48 hours."*

Regional Analytical Framework (Q14)

The framework of a "Sunni axis versus a Shiite axis" was rejected by 11 of 12 experts as analytically insufficient. The proposed alternatives differ fundamentally and carry a clear ideological imprint.

Expert 1: *"A colonial scheme inherited from Orientalism. The region operates according to the logic of interests, not identities."*

Expert 4: *"An axis of revisionists against status quo powers' — Iran, Turkey, Russia, and Qatar against Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan."*

Expert 5: *"Forces of stability and integration' (Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt) versus the 'axis of chaos and revisionism' (Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi proxies)."*

Expert 7: *"Analytically useless and ideologically harmful. Alternative: the framework of 'states ready for a WMDFZ versus those not ready.'"*

Expert 10: *"A useful simplifying scheme for editors, but in twenty years it has never helped predict a single real crisis."*

The diversity of alternative frameworks is itself an analytical finding: the Israeli expert community lacks a shared language for describing regional dynamics after the Syrian collapse.

Economy

The Economic Scenario for 2030 (Q15)

"Island growth" — 4 experts (1, 5, 10, 11); "prolonged budgetary pressure due to military expenditures" — 2 experts (2, 4); combined/hybrid scenario — 6 experts (3, 7, 8, 9, 12; Expert 6 did not identify a separate scenario). The substantive consensus is that high tech survives due to its global character, while the periphery and state programs come under increasing pressure.

Expert 2: *"Prolonged budgetary pressure is the price of survival. High tech will offset part of the pressure; the rest must be paid for by reducing civilian programs."*

Expert 8: *"A hybrid scenario with high heterogeneity. An economy of ultra-high achievements in narrow niches amid growing social tension in the periphery."*

Expert 12: *"High-tech islands intensify the cleavage rather than solve it, because they are not integrated into a national project."*

Main Underestimated Risks (Q16)

Each expert names something different — and that "something" follows directly from his or her professional and worldview frame.

Expert 1: *"The diplomatic cost of current foreign policy. It is not voiced because it is a politically taboo issue in the governing coalition."*

Expert 2: *"The demographic fragility of a unified military cohort. Without changing the structure of conscription, the defense system will degrade regardless of budgets."*

Expert 4: *"The erosion of the historical sense of mission. Without it, the state will be sustained only by utilitarian motives."*

Expert 5: *"Brain drain: the departure of top engineers, physicians, and scientists. It is not voiced because it is painful for society to admit that the best want to leave."*

Expert 7: *"The cost of the absence of regional security institutions. Every rocket, every use of Iron Dome is the price paid for the fact that an architecture was not created 20 years ago."*

Expert 8: *"Israel's transformation into a 'platform country': personnel depletion, the feudalization of ministries, erosion of the monopoly on rule enforcement, crisis of the social contract, and bureaucratic inertia."*

Expert 10: *"The information gap between the expert agenda and the public agenda. When society does not understand what experts are discussing, any threat catches it by surprise."*

Expert 11: *"Accumulated international legal responsibility. The ICJ, the ICC, and sanctions regimes will not disappear, and each month increases the long-term cost."*

Expert 12: *"The complete disintegration of the social contract. This is not a risk; it is a process. It is not voiced because discussing it requires admitting that the country is ceasing to exist as a single political community."*

Part IV. Where Experts Converge and Diverge

Points of Full or Near-Full Consensus

Multi-vectorism as a full-fledged strategy is unrealistic (all 12; median score of 2). Direct military conflict with Turkey is unlikely (11 of 12). The United States remains the indispensable external framework (12 of 12). Brain drain is a serious problem (12 of 12). Technological cooperation with China is limited to the civilian sphere (12 of 12). Russia: pragmatic minimum, neither rupture nor normalization (12 of 12).

Major Cleavages

Interpretation of dependence on the United States. Right-conservatives (2, 4, 6): rational, and the task is to strengthen it. Left-wing experts (1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12): pathological or systemic; they differ on whether it can be resolved. Centrists (3, 5, 10): a structural given requiring an adaptive strategy.

Interpretation of the strengthening of the religious camp. Religious-right experts (4): a positive process. Nonreligious right-conservatives (2, 6, 10): acceptable if integrated into institutions; the very concept of "dominance" is alarmism. Centrists and left-wing experts (1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12): varying degrees of concern, but all distinguish between "strengthening" and "dominance."

Zones of Divergence

The nature of the dominance threat: structural or exaggerated. The mechanism for solving the emigration problem: a social contract or restoration of mission. The triggers of the 2026 elections: social or military. The "hexagonal alliance": reality or rhetoric. The regional analytical framework: the panel has no common language.

These divergences are not accidental; they follow structurally from different images of the future. An expert who sees Israel as a technological republic and an expert who sees it as a sovereign Jewish state will answer almost any question differently. This is not an error by either of them, but a reflection of an expert community divided at the level of basic assumptions.

Part V. Main Conclusion

The survey shows that Israel is approaching not one future scenario, but a point at which the choice of scenario will be made not by political decisions, but by the demographic composition of those who remain in the country by 2030.

Institutions such as Bagatz, the IDF, the high-tech sector, and universities currently appear to be barriers to radical change. But if the carriers of the secular-liberal image of the future continue to leave at the pace described by Expert 5, then by the end of the decade these institutions may gradually come to be dominated by members of the conservative-religious camp. This would occur not primarily through political struggle, but through demographic replacement.

This means that the conversation about Israel's future must be conducted in the language of restoring a social contract in which the carriers of both images of the future see themselves as part of a single project. Whether such a contract exists today is a separate question to which the experts do not provide an answer.

The next stage of the study — a mass public opinion survey to be conducted in April–May 2026 — will test how widely these expert-defined visions are shared by the broader population, and in which social groups they are rooted.

Appendix 1. Survey Questionnaire

Block I. Domestic Politics

Q1. How likely is it that by 2030 the religious-conservative camp will establish dominant influence over Israel's key state institutions?

1 — extremely unlikely; 5 — practically inevitable.

Explain your assessment. Through which mechanism — demographic, coalition-based, institutional — is this happening or not happening?

Q2. If the religious-conservative camp strengthens, in which sphere will this be felt most strongly by an Israeli outside the religious-conservative camp?

Q3. To what extent will the conflict over the "equal distribution of obligations" among sectors intensify by 2030?

1 — the conflict will weaken; 5 — it will become one of the central conflicts.

Is the issue of "burden-sharing" a real structural conflict or a political instrument for mobilizing the electorate? What lies behind it?

Q4. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "By 2030, the deterioration of civilian infrastructure will become one of the main constraints on resilience, alongside security"?

Strongly agree / Somewhat agree / Somewhat disagree / Strongly disagree.

Provide your argument. If you disagree, what will be the decisive constraint, and why?

Q5. Which specific infrastructure problem — housing, transportation, health care, schools — may become the main political trigger for the 2026 elections? Why this one rather than the others?

Block II. The Geopolitical Situation

Q6. Which three changes in the international environment over the past five years have most strongly altered Israel's room for foreign-policy maneuver?

Q7. What is currently the main external constraint on the autonomy of Israeli foreign policy — pressure from allies, geopolitical and regional threats, international legal pressure, or something else? Justify your answer.

Q8. How realistic is a strategy of partial multi-vectorism for Israel by 2030?

1 — unrealistic; 5 — entirely realistic.

Which external framework will remain the baseline for Israel by 2030?

- The United States as the indispensable center of gravity
- The West in the broad sense (the United States + the EU)
- A hybrid scheme with limited diversification
- A more autonomous multi-vector model

Justify your choice.

Q9. In your view, where does the "red line" of multi-vectorism lie — beyond which the United States will require Israel to make a definite choice? Provide a specific scenario.

Q10. Which areas of cooperation with China will remain permissible and practically feasible for Israel by 2030?

Q11. What format of Israeli-Russian relations by 2030 do you consider most likely: pragmatic arrangements on regional security or de facto rupture under pressure from Western allies?

Q12. Is the "hexagonal alliance" (Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus, Arab partners) a real geopolitical project or political rhetoric? Provide your argument.

Q13. Assess the likelihood of a direct military conflict between Israel and Turkey over a 5–10-year horizon.

1 — extremely unlikely; 5 — highly likely.

Which escalation scenario between them do you consider most realistic — and through which theater (Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, proxies)?

Q14. How analytically useful is the framework of the "Sunni axis versus the Shiite axis"? Does it help explain the region, or does it simplify to the point of losing meaning? What alternative framework better describes regional dynamics?

Block III. Economic Development

Q15. Which scenario of Israel's economic development by 2030 do you consider most likely?

- Sustainable growth through structural reforms
- "Island growth" — a strong high-tech core with a weak periphery
- Prolonged budgetary pressure due to military expenditures
- A combined scenario with high heterogeneity
- Other

What stands behind your choice? Which indicator, if it changed, would change your forecast?

Q16. Which economic risk by 2030 do you consider the main one that is underestimated in the public agenda? Why is it not being voiced?

Q17. Data from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics register a sharp acceleration in emigration: whereas in 2019–2021 an average of about 36,000 citizens left the country annually, in 2024–2025 that figure rose to an average of 76,000 people per year — while only about 21,000 returned. At the same time, aliyah declined threefold: from 74,400 immigrants in 2022 to fewer than 22,000 in 2025.

How do you assess the short-term (1–3 years) and medium-term (5–10 years) risks for Israel associated with this dynamic? Which of them do you consider most critical — and why?

WMDFZ — Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The concept of establishing such a zone in the Middle East was adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and has not been implemented since.