

# Establishing a Regional Alliance: The Hexagonal Alliance Initiative

## Results of a Public Opinion Survey in Israel

### Methodology

The survey was conducted online in early March 2026 among 1,010 respondents: internet users aged 18 and above, drawn from a nationally representative sample of this population segment in Israel. Jewish and Arab respondents were represented in proportion to their demographic weight. The maximum margin of sampling error is  $\pm 3.1\%$  at the 95% confidence level.

Fieldwork was conducted by Geocartography, a professional survey research institute, using a questionnaire developed by Dor Moriah analysts.

Results are disaggregated by religious self-identification (secular, traditional, religious) and by ethno-national community (Jewish and Arab).

Where appropriate, composite indices were constructed to facilitate comparison across questions. These indices are defined as the difference between the proportions of respondents holding opposing positions; the calculation is specified in each case.

Differences between groups, by religious observance and community affiliation, were tested using the chi-square ( $\chi^2$ ) test. The threshold for statistical significance was set at  $p < 0.05$ .

## Survey Results

### Middle East Policy: International Actors and Media Coverage

Asked which international actors are best placed to contribute to regional stability, respondents point overwhelmingly to the United States: 44.1% identify it as the principal potential stabilizing force. Gulf states rank second, at 23.2%, with a substantial gap separating them from the rest of the field. Russia, the UN, and China each register figures at or near the margin of sampling error.

**Table 1. Which of the following actors, in your opinion, can contribute most to stability in the Middle East? (%)**

|                                    | Total | Secular | Traditional | Religious | Jewish | Arab |
|------------------------------------|-------|---------|-------------|-----------|--------|------|
| United States                      | 44.1  | 46.7    | 48.5        | 51.5      | 48.3   | 19.1 |
| Gulf states (UAE, Saudi Arabia)    | 23.2  | 29.6    | 20.9        | 15.8      | 23.9   | 19.3 |
| UN and international organizations | 4.2   | 3.1     | 4.2         | 2.6       | 3.4    | 9.3  |
| Russia                             | 2.6   | 2.4     | 2.9         | 0.5       | 2.2    | 5.2  |
| China                              | 2.2   | 1.0     | 3.1         | 2.3       | 2.0    | 3.2  |
| Another state/coalition            | 1.2   | 0.6     | 1.7         | 1.2       | 1.1    | 1.8  |
| No actor is capable                | 8.5   | 5.2     | 5.2         | 10.5      | 6.3    | 21.5 |
| Don't know                         | 14.0  | 11.4    | 13.4        | 15.5      | 12.9   | 20.6 |

Responses vary to some extent by religious observance. **The tendency to identify the United States as the key stabilizing force increases with religiosity** (46.7% among secular, 48.5% among traditional, and 51.5% among religious respondents). **Secular respondents, by contrast, are notably more likely to point to the Gulf states** (29.6%, compared to 20.9% among traditional and 15.8% among religious respondents). These differences are statistically significant ( $\chi^2=27.3$ ,  $p=0.018$ ), though the effect size is modest.

The gap between Jewish and Arab respondents is considerably wider. Among Jewish respondents, nearly half (48.3%) name the United States as the primary guarantor of regional stability; among Arab respondents, the corresponding figure is 19.1%. Conversely, Arab respondents are far more likely to state that no actor is capable of ensuring stability (21.5%, vs. 6.3% among Jewish respondents) or to withhold judgment altogether. These differences are large and highly significant ( $\chi^2=68.4$ ,  $p<0.001$ ).

Overall, respondents express moderately critical views of Israeli media coverage of international affairs. The most frequent rating is “not very good” (31.7%), while positive ratings (“very good” and “fairly good”) together account for 29.3%. Another 12.9% rate coverage as poor. Roughly one in four respondents either do not follow the media on these matters or could not offer a rating.

**Table 2. How would you rate the quality of Israeli media coverage of the policies of countries that affect the Middle East — toward the region in general and toward Israel specifically? (%)**

|                                     | <b>Total</b> | <b>Secular</b> | <b>Traditional</b> | <b>Religious</b> | <b>Jewish</b> | <b>Arab</b> |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------|-------------|
| Very good                           | 5.6          | 3.5            | 7.3                | 5.8              | 5.3           | 7.7         |
| Fairly good                         | 23.7         | 26.0           | 22.6               | 19.1             | 23.4          | 25.1        |
| <b>Sum (good)</b>                   | <b>29.3</b>  | <b>29.5</b>    | <b>29.9</b>        | <b>24.9</b>      | <b>28.7</b>   | <b>32.8</b> |
| Not very good                       | 31.7         | 38.1           | 31.8               | 26.2             | 33.6          | 20.7        |
| Poor                                | 12.9         | 11.0           | 10.8               | 18.2             | 12.4          | 15.9        |
| <b>Sum (poor)</b>                   | <b>44.6</b>  | <b>49.1</b>    | <b>42.6</b>        | <b>44.4</b>      | <b>46.0</b>   | <b>36.6</b> |
| Don't follow the media              | 11.1         | 9.8            | 8.9                | 18.7             | 11.3          | 10.4        |
| Don't know                          | 15.0         | 11.7           | 18.6               | 11.9             | 14.1          | 20.2        |
| <b>Media coverage quality index</b> | <b>-15.3</b> | <b>-19.6</b>   | <b>-12.7</b>       | <b>-19.5</b>     | <b>-17.3</b>  | <b>-3.8</b> |

Secular respondents are more critical: 38.1% rate coverage as “not very good.” Religious respondents are less likely to choose that characterization (26.2%), but more likely to call coverage outright poor (18.2%) and more likely to report not following the media at all (18.7%). These patterns are statistically significant ( $\chi^2(10)=23.4$ ,  $p=0.009$ ), though again the effect size is small.

Arab–Jewish differences on this question are weaker and approach, but do not clearly cross, the conventional threshold of statistical significance. Arab respondents rate coverage somewhat more favorably in aggregate (32.8% positive vs. 28.7% among Jewish respondents), are less likely to describe it as “not very good,” and are more likely to say they don’t know.

To summarize the direction of opinion, a media coverage quality index was calculated — *defined as the difference between the combined positive and combined negative ratings. Values run from -100 to +100; positive values indicate a net favorable assessment, negative values a net critical one.*

The index is negative across all groups, indicating a predominance of critical assessments. The most negative values are observed among secular and religious respondents; among Arab respondents, the net balance is close to zero.

**Table 3. In your opinion, do Israeli media provide balanced or unbalanced coverage of the following countries’ policies toward the Middle East? (%)**

|                     | <b>Total</b> | <b>Secular</b> | <b>Traditional</b> | <b>Religious</b> | <b>Jewish</b> | <b>Arab</b> |
|---------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------|-------------|
| <b>China</b>        |              |                |                    |                  |               |             |
| Unbalanced          | 34.7         | 37.1           | 35.2               | 29.0             | 34.8          | 34.2        |
| Balanced            | 22.5         | 24.1           | 19.8               | 20.7             | 21.9          | 26.1        |
| Don’t know          | 42.7         | 38.8           | 45.0               | 50.2             | 43.2          | 39.7        |
| <b>Iran</b>         |              |                |                    |                  |               |             |
| Unbalanced          | 31.7         | 30.0           | 32.8               | 26.1             | 30.2          | 41.0        |
| Balanced            | 39.4         | 47.9           | 38.4               | 38.8             | 42.8          | 18.5        |
| Don’t know          | 28.9         | 22.1           | 28.8               | 35.1             | 27.0          | 40.5        |
| <b>Russia</b>       |              |                |                    |                  |               |             |
| Unbalanced          | 34.6         | 38.5           | 34.3               | 26.7             | 34.7          | 33.8        |
| Balanced            | 27.0         | 28.4           | 24.1               | 27.7             | 26.8          | 28.1        |
| Don’t know          | 38.5         | 33.2           | 41.6               | 45.6             | 38.5          | 38.1        |
| <b>Saudi Arabia</b> |              |                |                    |                  |               |             |
| Unbalanced          | 30.0         | 31.6           | 30.3               | 25.1             | 29.8          | 31.0        |
| Balanced            | 28.2         | 28.2           | 27.4               | 25.8             | 29.5          | 20.0        |
| Don’t know          | 35.7         | 31.1           | 37.4               | 43.3             | 35.7          | 35.6        |
| <b>Turkey</b>       |              |                |                    |                  |               |             |
| Unbalanced          | 36.1         | 36.1           | 35.2               | 30.9             | 34.8          | 44.4        |
| Balanced            | 28.2         | 32.8           | 27.4               | 25.8             | 29.5          | 20.0        |
| Don’t know          | 35.7         | 31.1           | 37.4               | 43.3             | 35.7          | 35.6        |

**Responses on China are characterized by high uncertainty.** “Don’t know” is the modal answer (42.7%), with roughly a third calling coverage unbalanced (34.7%) and less than a quarter calling it balanced (22.5%). Group differences by observance level and community are not statistically significant.

With respect to **Iran**, a modest plurality considers coverage **balanced** — 39.4%, against 31.7% who call it unbalanced. Among secular respondents, nearly half (47.9%) take the balanced view; the figure drops to 38.8% among religious respondents ( $\chi^2=16.2$ ,  $p=0.003$ ). The Jewish–Arab gap is more pronounced: 42.8% of Jewish respondents rate coverage as balanced, compared to only **18.5%** of Arab respondents, who are far more likely to call it unbalanced or to express no opinion ( $\chi^2=38.7$ ,  $p<0.001$ ).

Coverage of **Russian policy** is also marked by pronounced uncertainty: “don’t know” (38.5%) and “unbalanced” (34.6%) are the two most common responses, while 27% consider coverage balanced. As observance increases, the proportion unable to evaluate coverage rises from 33.2% to 45.6%, while the proportion calling it unbalanced falls from 38.5% to 26.7% ( $\chi^2=10.5$ ,  $p=0.033$ ). Jewish–Arab differences on Russia do not reach statistical significance.

For **Saudi Arabia**, responses are distributed relatively evenly across the three options — roughly a third each for “unbalanced” (30.0%), “balanced” (28.2%), and “don’t know” (35.7%). No significant group differences emerge.

With respect to **Turkey**, a plurality perceives coverage as **unbalanced** (36.1% vs. 28.2% balanced, with 35.7% uncertain). Observance-level differences are not significant; community-level differences are ( $\chi^2=11.3$ ,  $p=0.003$ ). Arab respondents are considerably more likely to call coverage unbalanced (44.4% vs. 34.8% among Jewish respondents), while Jewish respondents lean slightly toward “balanced.”

*To capture the overall direction of opinion for each country, a coverage balance index was constructed — the difference between the proportions rating coverage balanced and unbalanced. Positive values indicate a net perception of balanced coverage; negative values indicate a net perception of bias.*

**Table 4. Coverage balance index for Israeli media reporting on Middle Eastern countries / proportion “don’t know”**

|              | Balanced | Unbalanced | Balance index | Don’t know |
|--------------|----------|------------|---------------|------------|
| China        | 22.5%    | 34.7%      | -12.2         | 42.7%      |
| Russia       | 27.0%    | 34.6%      | -7.6          | 38.5%      |
| Turkey       | 28.2%    | 36.1%      | -7.9          | 35.7%      |
| Saudi Arabia | 28.2%    | 30.0%      | -1.8          | 36.7%      |
| Iran         | 39.4%    | 31.7%      | +7.7          | 28.9%      |

The data suggest a consistent pattern: countries with lower reported familiarity among respondents — reflected in high “don’t know” rates (China: 42.7%, Russia: 38.5%) — also tend to generate stronger perceptions of unbalanced coverage. Iran, which receives substantially more attention in Israeli media, shows the lowest rate of uncertainty (28.9%) and is the only country with a positive balance index. Across all five cases, the relationship between media exposure and perceived fairness runs in the same direction.

**Table 5. Coverage balance index by community and observance level**

|              | Jewish | Arab  | Secular | Traditional | Religious |
|--------------|--------|-------|---------|-------------|-----------|
| China        | -12.9  | -8.1  | -13.0   | -15.4       | -8.3      |
| Iran         | +12.6  | -22.5 | +17.9   | +5.6        | +12.7     |
| Russia       | -7.9   | -5.7  | -10.1   | -10.2       | +1.0      |
| Saudi Arabia | +3.3   | +3.5  | +4.0    | +0.3        | +6.4      |
| Turkey       | -5.3   | -24.4 | -3.3    | -7.8        | -5.1      |

**Community affiliation is associated with larger and more consistent variation in balance assessments than religious observance.**

The starkest divide concerns **Iran**: among Jewish respondents the index is positive (+12.6), meaning balanced assessments outnumber unbalanced ones, while among Arab respondents it is sharply negative (-22.5), indicating a dominant perception of biased coverage.

**Turkey shows a similar pattern.** The index stands at -5.3 among Jewish respondents but falls to -24.4 among Arab respondents — the widest Arab-Jewish gap in the table after Iran.

Differences by religious observance are more muted. **The clearest variation concerns Iran**: the index runs from +17.9 among secular respondents to +5.6 among traditional and +12.7 among religious respondents.

### **The “Hexagonal Alliance” Initiative**

Prime Minister Netanyahu has announced the “Hexagonal Alliance” — a proposed regional grouping stretching from India through Greece, Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain to the countries of the Horn of Africa. The initiative is framed as a vehicle for strengthening Israel’s regional standing through economic and security cooperation.

**Table 6. Had you heard of this initiative before today? (%)**

|          | Total       | Secular | Traditional | Religious | Jewish | Arab |
|----------|-------------|---------|-------------|-----------|--------|------|
| Yes      | 32.9        | 29.5    | 36.1        | 36.5      | 33.1   | 31.3 |
| No       | <b>56.2</b> | 63.2    | 50.0        | 53.1      | 56.7   | 53.6 |
| Not sure | 10.9        | 7.3     | 13.9        | 10.4      | 10.2   | 15.1 |

Roughly one in three respondents (33%) had heard of the initiative prior to the survey. Awareness is somewhat higher among traditional and religious respondents — around 36% in each group — compared to 29.5% among secular respondents; this difference is statistically significant ( $\chi^2=7.81$ ,  $p=0.02$ ). A clear majority (56%) had not heard of the initiative, with secular respondents the most likely to fall into this category. About 11% were unsure, a rate that is noticeably higher among Arab respondents.

When asked how they characterize the initiative, a plurality (31.1%) describe it as a promising diplomatic strategy (Table 7).

**Table 7. In your opinion, the “Hexagonal Alliance” initiative is, first and foremost: (%)**

|  | Total       | Secular | Traditional | Religious | Jewish      | Arab        |
|--|-------------|---------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|
| A promising diplomatic strategy                    | <b>31.1</b> | 28.7    | 35.5        | 43.6      | <b>34.0</b> | <b>13.6</b> |
| A political signal to allies and Iran              | 16.0        | 14.9    | 17.9        | 19.0      | 16.8        | 11.4        |
| An attempt to break out of international isolation | 14.8        | 16.6    | 12.4        | 10.7      | 14.0        | 19.6        |
| A domestic political maneuver                      | 13.5        | 19.4    | 8.6         | 3.7       | 12.6        | 19.2        |
| An attempt to ease domestic polarization           | 4.6         | 4.1     | 6.6         | 0.5       | 4.2         | 6.9         |
| Other  | 1.9         | 1.8     | 1.5         | 2.1       | 1.8         | 2.6         |
| Don't know   | 18.2        | 14.6    | 17.5        | 20.3      | 16.7        | 26.7        |

**This view becomes more common with higher levels of religiosity** — from 28.7% among secular to 43.6% among religious respondents — and shows **the largest Jewish–Arab gap among the response options, at more than 2.5 to 1** (34.0% of Jewish vs. 13.6% of Arab respondents). **Among Arab respondents, the more prevalent interpretations are that the announcement represents a bid to overcome international isolation or a domestic political maneuver** (19.6% and 19.2% respectively, vs. 14.0% and 12.6% among Jewish respondents).

The remaining options each attract 13–16% support: some respondents read the initiative as a political signal to allies and Iran, others as an attempt to break out of isolation, and still others as a domestic PR exercise. Another 4.6% see it as aimed at reducing internal polarization. **Uncertainty is highest among**

**Arab respondents: 26.7% say they don't know how to characterize the initiative**, compared to 18.2% overall.

Along the religiosity dimension, the share who interpret the initiative as a political signal declines from religious to secular respondents (declining from 19% to 14.9%), whereas the reverse pattern appears for the isolation and PR interpretations — each drawing 17–19% among secular respondents against 4–11% among religious ones.

A clear majority of respondents (60.6%) believe that **establishing such a regional alliance would strengthen Israel's security (Table 8)**.

**Table 8. In your opinion, how would establishing the “Hexagonal Alliance” affect Israel's security?**

|                                   | Total       | Secular | Traditional | Religious | Jewish      | Arab        |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|---------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|
| Strengthen it                     | <b>60.6</b> | 60.3    | 66.8        | 73.1      | <b>65.1</b> | <b>34.2</b> |
| Weaken it                         | 3.3         | 2.4     | 4.5         | 0.5       | 2.7         | 6.9         |
| Would not significantly change it | 20.5        | 23.0    | 14.8        | 11.6      | <b>17.9</b> | <b>36.3</b> |
| Don't know                        | 15.5        | 14.4    | 13.9        | 14.8      | 14.3        | 22.6        |

**Confidence in a positive security impact rises steadily with religious observance: 60.3%** among secular respondents, **66.8%** among traditional, and **73.1%** among religious. The proportion expecting no significant change declines correspondingly, from 23% among secular to 11.6% among religious respondents ( $\chi^2=20.7$ ,  $p=0.002$ ).

**The community gap is even more pronounced ( $\chi^2=53.5$ ,  $p<0.001$ ).** Among Jewish respondents, **65.1% anticipate a security benefit; among Arab respondents, fewer than half that proportion do (34.2%)**, while 36.3% expect no substantial change.

**More respondents consider the initiative likely than unlikely to be realized in the coming years: the combined “very likely” and “fairly likely” categories reach 38.3%.** A further 30.8% assess the odds as moderate, while a combined 17.8% consider realization unlikely or impossible (Table 9).

**Table 9. In your opinion, how likely is it that an effective “Hexagonal Alliance” will be established in the coming years? (%)**

|                   | Total       | Secular | Traditional | Religious | Jewish      | Arab        |
|-------------------|-------------|---------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|
| Very likely       | 12.2        | 8.5     | 15.0        | 19.3      | 12.9        | 8.4         |
| Fairly likely     | <b>26.1</b> | 21.9    | 30.0        | 36.1      | <b>27.5</b> | <b>17.7</b> |
| Moderately likely | <b>30.8</b> | 34.2    | 29.3        | 26.1      | 30.9        | 30.4        |
| Unlikely          | 12.2        | 16.7    | 10.5        | 3.1       | 11.8        | 14.4        |
| Impossible        | 5.6         | 8.0     | 2.5         | 0.5       | 4.6         | 11.4        |
| Don't know        | 13.0        | 10.6    | 12.8        | 14.8      | 12.2        | 17.7        |

Optimism rises with religious observance: 30.4% of secular respondents rate realization as likely or very likely; the figure climbs to 45.0% among traditional and 55.4% among religious respondents. At the same time, pessimistic assessments (“unlikely” or “impossible”) fall from 24.7% among secular to 13.0% among traditional and 3.6% among religious respondents ( $\chi^2=37.6$ ,  $p<0.001$ ).

The Jewish–Arab gap is also statistically significant ( $\chi^2=25.9$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). A combined 40.4% of Jewish respondents consider the initiative likely to be realized, against 26.1% of Arab respondents. Arab respondents are more likely to regard it as improbable (25.8% vs. 16.4% among Jewish respondents).

### The Alliance’s Expected Impact on the Shia and Sunni Axes

Nearly half of respondents (48.2%) believe establishing the alliance would weaken the Shia axis — Iran, Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis, and Shia militias in Iraq (Table 10).

**Table 10. If the “Hexagonal Alliance” is established, how would this affect the threat to Israel from the “Shia axis” (Iran, Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis, and Shia militias in Iraq)? (%)**

|                                  | Total | Secular | Traditional | Religious | Jewish | Arab |
|----------------------------------|-------|---------|-------------|-----------|--------|------|
| Would strengthen Iran’s position | 8.5   | 6.3     | 11.2        | 5.9       | 7.9    | 12.4 |
| Would weaken it                  | 48.2  | 48.1    | 48.7        | 65.0      | 51.7   | 27.7 |
| Would have no effect             | 21.2  | 26.3    | 16.9        | 9.1       | 19.7   | 30.6 |
| Don’t know                       | 22.0  | 19.4    | 23.2        | 20.0      | 20.8   | 29.2 |

**Both religious observance and community affiliation are associated with significant variation in these assessments.**

Religious respondents are the most confident that the alliance would reduce the Iranian threat: 65.0%, compared to roughly 48% among secular and traditional respondents ( $\chi^2=19.9$ ,  $p=0.003$ ). The Jewish–Arab gap is wider still ( $\chi^2=29.7$ ,  $p<0.001$ ): 51.7% of Jewish respondents expect the Iranian bloc to be weakened; among Arab respondents the figure is 27.7%, and they are considerably more likely to say the alliance would have no effect or to offer no assessment.

Regarding the potential impact on the Turkish-led axis, the pattern broadly mirrors the findings on Iran: **weaken the bloc’s influence** is again the modal response, drawing 39.8% (Table 11).

**Table 11. In your opinion, how would establishing the Hexagonal Alliance affect the threat from the “Sunni axis” (Turkey, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood)? (%)**

| Response                          | Total       | Secular | Traditional | Religious | Jewish      | Arab        |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|---------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|
| Would strengthen the axis         | 10.9        | 10.2    | 13.1        | 4.4       | 10.0        | 16.2        |
| Would weaken the axis             | <b>39.8</b> | 35.3    | 45.3        | 52.7      | <b>42.2</b> | <b>25.3</b> |
| Would not significantly affect it | 24.4        | 31.6    | 17.3        | 17.5      | 23.9        | 27.2        |
| Don’t know                        | 24.9        | 22.9    | 24.2        | 25.4      | 23.9        | 31.4        |

Again, optimism rises with religious observance — 35.3% of secular, 45.3% of traditional, and 52.7% of religious respondents expect the Sunni axis to be weakened — while secular respondents are

considerably more likely to expect no significant impact (31.6%). Group differences are statistically significant ( $\chi^2=24.8$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). The community gap is significant as well ( $\chi^2=16.9$ ,  $p<0.001$ ): 42.2% of Jewish respondents expect a weakening of the Turkish bloc against 25.3% of Arab respondents, with Arab respondents more inclined to anticipate a strengthening or to withhold judgment.

*To compare anticipated impact across the two axes, an expected-impact index was constructed — the difference between the proportions expecting a weakening and those expecting a strengthening of each axis.*

**In public assessments, the alliance is seen as bearing more decisively on the Iranian threat than on the Turkish one.** The expected-impact index for the Shia axis (+39.7) exceeds that for the Sunni axis (+28.9) by 11 percentage points.

**Table 12. Expected-impact index: anticipated effect of the Alliance on the Iranian and Turkish axes**

*(Higher positive values indicate stronger expectations of threat reduction)*

|                | <b>Iran (Shia axis)</b> | <b>Turkey (Sunni axis)</b> |
|----------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| <b>Overall</b> | <b>+39.7</b>            | <b>+28.9</b>               |
| Secular        | <b>+41.8</b>            | <b>+25.1</b>               |
| Traditional    | <b>+37.5</b>            | <b>+32.2</b>               |
| Religious      | <b>+59.1</b>            | <b>+48.3</b>               |
| Jewish         | <b>+43.8</b>            | <b>+32.2</b>               |
| Arab           | <b>+15.3</b>            | <b>+9.1</b>                |

Because both index values are positive, meaning that expectations of threat reduction outweigh expectations of threat growth in every group, the comparison below focuses on the magnitude of the anticipated benefit rather than on its direction.

Religious respondents express by far the strongest expectations of threat reduction (Shia axis: +59.1; Sunni axis: +48.3). The Jewish–Arab gap is substantial across both axes: Jewish respondents score +43.8 and +32.2; Arab respondents, +15.3 and +9.1.

The widest within-group divergence between the two axes is observed among secular respondents (17 percentage points gap), while in all other groups the differential does not exceed 11 percentage points ( $\chi^2=19.1$ ,  $p=0.004$ ). Across all groups, however, **the anticipated reduction in the Iranian threat is consistently rated higher than the anticipated reduction in the Turkish one.**