

Israeli Attitudes Toward Options for Resolving Territorial Conflicts

The study was conducted as a specialized online survey of **1,008 respondents**, internet users aged **18 years and older**. The sample is **nationally representative** of Israel's adult population and includes both **Jewish and Arab populations** in proportions that reflect their demographic share. **Jews:** 847 respondents (approximately **84%**); **Arabs:** 159 respondents (approximately **15.8%**). The survey was conducted in **early December 2025**. The **margin of error** is **±3.1%** at a **95% confidence level**.

Public Perception Dynamics

The December survey results reveal several noteworthy patterns in Israeli attitudes toward territorial issues. As in previous research, we observe a substantial gap between regional geopolitical realities and how Israelis perceive possible conflict resolution options.

The most striking disconnect concerns **Russia's role in the Syrian-Israeli conflict**. Despite Russia's long-term military presence in Syria (including the naval base at Tartus and Khmeimim air base) and requests from Syria's new President Al-Sharaa for Russian military police to return, only **4.7%** of respondents see deployment of Russian military police in a buffer zone as viable. This figure is remarkably low given Russia's role as a key player in the Syrian conflict over the past decade. Combined with the fact that over 50% of respondents reject peaceful territorial transfer, this suggests most envision a buffer zone scenario that would be difficult to implement without Russian involvement.

The survey also shows very high expectations of the United States across all examined dimensions. This is clearest on the question of countering Turkey: **55% of respondents** (among Jews, **60.1%**) say only the U.S. can handle this. Russia ranks second at just 6.4%. All other potential mediators (UN, EU, NATO, Gulf states) register in the single digits. This degree of reliance on one actor is notable given Turkey's expanding influence across Syria, Lebanon, Palestinian territories, and Mediterranean regions.

Equally striking is the **deep skepticism toward peace agreements**. Only **5.5%** believe the Gaza ceasefire will lead to lasting peace, despite U.S. mediation. The majority (**46.4%**) expect it to fail soon, while **36.4%** anticipate it will hold but with periodic violence.

In short, the study reveals substantial contradictions: Russia's role is underestimated despite its actual regional presence; hopes are concentrated heavily on the U.S. despite skepticism about mediation effectiveness; and views on external security guarantees remain deeply divided.

Prospects for Peace Agreement in Gaza

Table 1. Since October 2025, a ceasefire agreement mediated by the United States has been in effect in the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, clashes continue. How do you assess the chances that this agreement will be sustained?

	Total	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Jews	Arabs
The agreement will fail in the near future, hostilities will resume	46.4%	42.6%	56.4%	58.4%	50.2%	25.8%
The agreement will hold, but with periodic clashes	36.4%	44.6%	28.2%	31.7%	36.7%	35.2%
The agreement will lead to lasting peace without clashes	5.5%	3.0%	5.9%	3.7%	4.1%	12.6%

	Total	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Jews	Arabs
Don't know	11.7%	9.7%	9.4%	6.2%	9.0%	26.4%

Only 5.5% of Israelis believe the Gaza peace agreement will succeed, expecting it to lead to lasting peace without clashes. This view is more common among Arabs (12.6%) than Jews (4.1%).

The largest share of respondents (46.4%) believe the agreement will fail soon and hostilities will resume. This view is more prevalent among religious Israelis (58.4%) than secular (42.6%). Another 36.4% believe it will hold but with periodic clashes. Secular Israelis are more likely to hold this view (44.6%) compared to traditional and religious Israelis (28-32%).

Fate of the Buffer Zone on Syrian Territory

Table 2. After the fall of the Assad regime, the IDF created a buffer zone inside Syrian territory. What do you think will be the fate of this zone?

	Total	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Jews	Arabs
Will remain under Israeli control for a long time	37.2%	35.9%	39.4%	48.4%	39.4%	25.2%
Will be returned to Syrian control as part of a peace agreement	19.9%	20%	18.8%	16.8%	19.0%	25.2%
Will remain a zone of rivalry between different states	15.8%	20%	17.1%	11.2%	17.4%	7.5%
Russian military police will be deployed in the zone	4.7%	3.7%	4.9%	3.7%	4%	7.5%
Other	0.8%	1.2%	0.3%	1.2%	0.9%	0%
Don't know	21.6%	19.2%	19.5%	18.6%	19.2%	34.6%

A plurality of respondents (37.2%) believe the buffer zone inside Syrian territory will remain under Israeli control for an extended period. Another 19.9% expect it will be returned to Syrian control as part of a peace agreement, and 15.8% believe it will remain contested between different states. About 5% are confident that Russian military police will be deployed in this zone.

Religious respondents more often believe the buffer zone will remain under Israeli control (48.4%) compared to secular respondents (35.9%). Conversely, secular respondents more often believe it will remain contested between different states (20% versus 11% among religious).

The Turkish Threat

Table 3. How do you assess the threat that Turkey poses to Israel?

	Total	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Jews	Arabs
Poses both a military and ideological threat	48.3%	44.1%	52.3%	67.1%	52.5%	25.2%
Poses only an ideological threat	32.1%	37.4%	35.3%	22.4%	33.7%	23.3%
Poses only a military threat	8.8%	9.2%	5.2%	5.6%	8.4%	10.7%
Does not pose a threat	10.8%	9.2%	7.3%	5%	5.4%	40.9%

Nearly half of respondents (48.3%) view Turkey as posing both a military and ideological threat to Israel (this view is more common among religious Jews). Another 32.1% see only an ideological threat (more common among secular and traditional Jews), while 8.8% see only a military threat. Fewer than 10% see no threat, though this view is far more common among Arabs (27%) than Jews (5.4%).

Table 4. Which state or organization, in your opinion, is capable of neutralizing the threat that Turkey poses to Israel?

	Total	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Jews	Arabs
U.S.	55%	60.6%	56.4%	65.8%	60.1%	27%
Russia	6.4%	7.7%	7.3%	4.3%	7.0%	3.8%
Gulf states	4%	4.7%	3.1%	1.9%	3.7%	5.7%
UN	2.9%	2.2%	2.1%	3.7%	2.5%	5%
EU	2.8%	2.5%	2.1%	1.9%	2.2%	5.7%
Egypt	2.3%	1.7%	2.8%	1.2%	2%	3.8%
NATO	2.1%	2.0%	1.0%	1.2%	1.5%	5%
Other	3.8%	2.7%	5.2%	5.6%	4.1%	1.9%
Don't know	20.8%	15.7%	19.9%	14.3%	16.9%	42.1%

More than half of respondents believe the U.S. is capable of countering the Turkish threat (this answer dominates). However, 6.4% believe Russia could also do so. Other countries receive 2-4% each. One-fifth of respondents were unable to answer this question.

On the possibility of countering Turkey, there is consensus across religiosity groups but substantial divergence by ethnicity: among Jews, 60% see the U.S. as the answer; among Arabs, only 27%.

Ceasefire Agreement with Lebanon

Table 5. Since November 2024, a ceasefire agreement has been in effect between Israel and Lebanon, but both sides violate it due to Hezbollah's refusal to disarm. What position, in your opinion, should Israel take?

	Total	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Jews	Arabs
Achieve Hezbollah's disarmament, then withdraw from Lebanese territory	55.9%	64.8%	61.7%	55.9%	62.1%	22.6%
Remain in Lebanon regardless of the Hezbollah situation	21%	18.2%	22.3%	34.8%	22.7%	11.9%
Withdraw from Lebanon regardless of the Hezbollah situation	8.6%	5.5%	3.8%	3.7%	4.6%	30.2%
Other	2.3%	2.0%	1.7%	0.6%	1.7%	5.7%
Don't know	12.2%	9.5%	10.5%	5.0%	9%	29.6%

A majority of Israelis (56%) believe the strategically sound choice would be to achieve Hezbollah's disarmament and then withdraw from Lebanese territory. This position leads substantially over the second most common view: remain in Lebanon regardless of the Hezbollah situation, supported by about half as many (21%).

Secular Israelis more often favor achieving Hezbollah's disarmament before withdrawing (64.8%), while this conviction declines as religiosity increases (to 55.9%). Religious respondents are nearly twice as likely as secular to favor remaining in Lebanon regardless of the Hezbollah situation (34.8% versus 18.2%).

The position "Withdraw from Lebanon regardless of the Hezbollah situation" is unpopular among Jews (under 5%) but six times more common among Arabs (30.1%).

Jews are 2-3 times more likely than Arabs to favor both achieving Hezbollah's disarmament before withdrawal (62.1% versus 22.6%) and remaining in Lebanon regardless of circumstances (22.7% versus 11.9%).

Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the West Bank

Table 6. What solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the West Bank, in your opinion, is most likely?

	Total	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Jews	Arabs
Management of the West Bank by another state by agreement with Israel	27.1%	33.2%	30%	15.5%	28.7%	18.2%
Annexation of the West Bank	26.6%	19.2%	32.8%	51.6%	30.0%	8.8%
Creation of a Palestinian state	13.7%	16.2%	3.5%	2.5%	9.3%	37.1%
Other	8.4%	6.2%	9.8%	11.2%	8.4%	8.8%
Don't know	24.2%	25.2%	24%	19.3%	23.6%	27.0%

As in previous studies, this survey shows no consensus on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict in the West Bank. Management of the West Bank by another state through agreement with Israel received 27.1% support, annexation of the West Bank 26.6%, and creation of a Palestinian state 13.7%. The share unable to answer this question remains high (24.2%).

Secular and traditional Israelis more often favor management by another state through agreement with Israel (30-32% versus 15% of religious respondents).

Religious Israelis more often favor annexation of the West Bank (51.6% versus 19.2% of secular and 32.8% of traditional).

Jews are substantially more oriented toward management by another state or annexation, while Arabs favor creation of a Palestinian state.