



Alaska Summit: Trump-Putin

Mass Survey of Israeli Public Regarding Expectations and Outcomes

August 2025

Abstract

New research conducted by the Dor Moriah think tank in August 2025 reveals that while experts debate geopolitics, Israelis are ignoring the "great game."

The Dor Moriah analytical center conducted a two-phase study of the Trump-Putin summit's impact on Israeli society. Phase one consisted of expert interviews with 14 specialists on August 10-12, just before the Alaska meeting. Phase two was a mass public opinion poll of 1,009 respondents conducted jointly with the Geocartography Institute from August 20-30, following the summit.

The Trump-Putin summit in Alaska on August 15, 2025, was supposed to be a global-scale event capable of reshaping the geopolitical map of the Middle East. At least, that's what 14 Israeli experts surveyed by the Dor Moriah analytical center believed on the eve of the meeting.

Reality proved far more mundane: for the majority of the 1,009 Israelis surveyed, the meeting passed virtually unnoticed, while the right-wing political flank used the moment to advance a doctrine of maximum independence from any external players, including traditionally the United States.

Research Team:

Lola Kolpina - PhD in Sociology, Researcher at Haifa University

Igor Kaminnik - Director of the Dor Moriah Analytical Center, expert on social mobilization issues

Dan Fayutkin - International law expert, Chairman of the Dor Moriah Advisory Board

About the Dor Moriah Center: An independent research center specializing in analysis of social inequality, solidarity structures, lobbying, and the human development index as a tool for political analysis. The center develops practical solutions for overcoming social divisions and building an effective society based on principles of solidarity and ethics.

Trump-Putin Summit Survey in Alaska (August 2025)

Total Sample Size: 1,009 respondents

In mid-August 2025, a summit took place in Alaska between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin.


1. Awareness and General Expectations from the Summit

Question 1: Were you aware of the summit? If yes, what were your main expectations?


Response	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Total
Knew about the meeting but had no expectations	47.2%	40.3%	39.4%	41.1%
Didn't know about the meeting	22.5%	34.0%	31.3%	28.9%
Expected specific progress on bilateral issues	17.6%	10.6%	18.1%	14.9%
Expected declaration of intent to open new chapter in relations	6.2%	6.6%	4.4%	7.3%
Expected global consequences	3.6%	3.3%	2.5%	3.9%
Expected media move to boost leaders' status	2.6%	4.6%	4.4%	3.5%
Expected something else	0.3%	0.7%	-	0.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	386	303	160	1009

41.1% of respondents knew about the meeting but had no expectations. Less than a third expected something from it (30% total). 28.9% didn't know about the meeting. These figures indicate the low significance of this event for Israelis.

The secular population showed the highest awareness of the summit, more often reporting they knew about the meeting (47.2% vs. around 40% in other groups) and less often reporting ignorance (22.5% vs. 31-33% respectively).



Were you aware of the summit? If yes, what were your main expectations?





Question: Were you aware of the summit? If yes, what were your main expectations? / by income level and education

Response	Below Average Income	Average Income	Above Average Income	High School	Vocational	University
Knew about meeting, no expectations	35.4%	44.5%	45.5%	37.8%	39.4%	44.6%
Expected specific progress on bilateral issues (sanctions, Ukraine, economic cooperation)	12.5%	14.5%	20.6%	10.2%	11.3%	19%
Expected declaration to open new Russia-US chapter	7.7%	8.6%	6.5%	8.1%	9.5%	5.8%
Expected global consequences	3.2%	4.3%	4.7%	2.0%	4.3%	4.5%
Expected media move for status boost	3.7%	3.1%	4.3%	2.0%	3.9%	3.9%
Expected something else	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	1.2%	-	0.2%
Didn't know about the meeting	37.2%	24.6%	18.1%	38.6%	31.6%	22.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	376	256	277	246	231	516

There's a notable difference in responses about the summit among respondents with different income levels. Affluent respondents more often had expectations of progress on bilateral issues (20.6% vs. 12.5% among lower-income), while less affluent more often had no expectations at all. Summit awareness directly correlates with income level: among below-average income respondents, 37.2% didn't know about the meeting, while only 18.1% among above-average income.

Differences also appear by education level. Ignorance about the summit decreases with higher education (dropping 16.5 percentage points from 38.6% to 22.1%), as do specific

expectations on bilateral issues (dropping almost by half from 19% to 10-11%), though overall, university-educated respondents somewhat more often said they essentially expected nothing from the meeting.




According to official sources, summit topics were to include: resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict, possible easing of sanctions against Russia, developing US-Russia partnership, and strategic nuclear arms control negotiations.


Question 2: What topic, in your opinion, should have been at the center of the summit?

Topic	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Total
Russia-Ukraine war	50.5%	33%	41.2%	40.1%
Iran's nuclear program	10.6%	21.1%	19.4%	14%
New world order and emerging power centers	11.7%	10.9%	7.5%	10.5%
Middle East situation	8.0%	8.9%	8.1%	10.1%
US-Russia economic cooperation	4.4%	3.6%	5%	4.6%
Sanctions against Russia	2.6%	6.6%	1.3%	3.7%
Other	0.5%	0.7%	-	0.5%
Don't know	11.7%	15.2%	17.5%	16.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	386	303	160	1009

A relative majority of Israelis (40.1%) believe the Russia-Ukraine war should have been the central agenda item. Secular respondents think this significantly more often (55%), while traditional respondents less often (33%). Meanwhile, traditional and religious respondents are twice as likely as secular ones (19-21% vs. 10.6% respectively) to report that Iran's nuclear program should have been the central topic.



What topic, in your opinion, should have been at the center of the summit?




What topic, in your opinion, should have been at the center of the summit agenda?

Topic	Below Average Income	Average Income	Above Average Income
Russia-Ukraine war	31.4%	43.8%	50.2%
Iran's nuclear program	14.1%	13.3%	13.7%
New world order and emerging power centers	11.7%	10.5%	9.7%
Middle East situation	12.8%	10.5%	7.6%
US-Russia economic cooperation	6.1%	3.9%	2.9%
Sanctions against Russia	4.0%	4.7%	3.6%
Other	0.5%	0.4%	0.7%
Don't know	19.4%	12.9%	11.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	376	256	277


The Ukrainian conflict is viewed as a priority by 50.2% of the most affluent respondents versus 31.4% of the lowest income group; Middle Eastern issues concern less affluent strata more (12.8% vs. 7.6%). The "don't know" level decreases with rising income: 19.4% → 12.9% → 11.6%.

What topic, in your opinion, should have been at the center of the summit agenda?



Question 3: To what extent were your expectations from the summit met? (Among those who had expectations)

Response	Percentage
To a very large extent	0.7%
To a large extent	5.6%
To some extent	27.9%
Barely met	26.6%
Not met at all	23.3%
Don't know	15.9%
Total	100%
N	301




Of the 30% of respondents who had some expectations from the meeting of the Presidents, only 6% total indicated these expectations were met to a very large or large extent, 30% - to some extent, and 50% - that they were barely or not at all met.

Specific Expectations from the Summit

Question 4: What, in your opinion, is the most likely scenario for the summit's impact on the Iran situation?

Scenario	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Below Avg	Average	Above Avg	Total
Summit won't affect	44.6%	27.4%	31.3%	25.5%	37.9%	40.4%	33.8%
Increased US involvement in regional initiatives around Iran	14%	18.2%	17.5%	15.2%	14.5%	17.3%	15.6%
Regime change in Iran	7.5%	12.9%	8.7%	13.8%	9.8%	7.2%	10.0%
Iran's collapse	8.3%	8.9%	10%	10.4%	10.9%	6.5%	8.8%
Deepening Russia-Iran partnership	5.7%	8.9%	5.6%	7.2%	6.3%	6.5%	6.7%
Increased support from Global South countries	2.3%	4.3%	1.9%	4.0%	2.3%	2.5%	3.2%
Other	0.5%	-	-	0.3%	-	0.4%	0.2%
Don't know	17.1%	19.5%	25%	23.7%	18.4%	19.1%	21.7%
Total	100%						
N	386	303	160	376	256	277	1009

The main portion of Israelis either are convinced the summit won't affect the Iran situation (33.8%) or find it difficult to assess its possible impact on Iran (21.7%), which to some extent explains the low significance of this meeting for Israelis.







Table: Most likely scenario for summit's impact on Iran / by region

Scenario	Jerusalem	Center	North	South	Sharon
Summit won't affect	32.2%	37.8%	31.1%	33.8%	55.6%
Increased US involvement in regional initiatives around Iran	20.7%	16.1%	15.8%	18.3%	5.6%
Regime change in Iran	5.7%	8.8%	11.7%	11.4%	5.6%
Iran's collapse	13.8%	8.4%	8.6%	8.7%	5.6%
Deepening Russia-Iran partnership	6.9%	7.2%	6.8%	5.9%	8.3%
Increased support from Global South	3.4%	2.8%	3.2%	3.2%	1.4%
Other	-	-	0.9%	-	-
Don't know	17.2%	18.9%	22.1%	18.7%	18.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	87	249	222	219	72


Responses about the summit's possible impact on Iran show some regional differences, primarily the greatest skepticism from Sharon residents. They significantly more often than others (55.6%) believe the summit won't affect the Iran situation (21.8 percentage points above average!). They also have minimal expectations of active changes across all scenarios.



Question 5: How, in your opinion, will the summit affect Turkey's position in the Middle East?

Response	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Total
Turkey will significantly strengthen its position	2.8%	2.6%	2.5%	2.7%
Will strengthen to some extent	14.5%	13.5%	12.5%	13.7%
Will weaken to some extent	9.1%	16.8%	14.4%	13.6%
Will significantly weaken its position	1%	3.3%	0.6%	2.1%
Will have no impact	44.6%	32.3%	30%	36.7%
Don't know	17.1%	19.5%	25%	31.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	386	303	160	1009

More than a third of respondents (36.7%) believe the event will have no impact on Turkey's position. Meanwhile, every third person (31.3%) had difficulty answering - the highest level of uncertainty.




Question 6: Will the summit affect the international legitimacy of Israeli sovereignty over disputed territories?

Response	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Total
Will significantly increase legitimacy	2.3%	3.3%	1.3%	2.8%
Will increase to some extent	11.4%	11.9%	10.0%	11.2%
Will decrease to some extent	10.4%	11.2%	10.6%	10.6%
Will significantly decrease legitimacy	3.9%	3%	2.5%	3.3%
Will have no impact	51.3%	45.2%	48.1%	46.5%
Don't know	20.7%	25.4%	27.5%	25.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	386	303	160	1009

Almost half of respondents (46.5%) believe the summit won't affect the international legitimacy of Israeli sovereignty over disputed territories, while a quarter of respondents (25.7%) had difficulty answering.

Will the summit affect the international legitimacy of Israeli sovereignty over disputed territories?




According to international law, starting with the UN Charter, the principle of territorial integrity applies: state borders cannot be changed by force or unilaterally, only by mutual agreement.

Question 7: To what extent might the summit results weaken the principle of territorial integrity of borders?

Response	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Total
To a very large extent	5.2%	3.6%	5.0%	4.9%
To a large extent	10.1%	10.6%	15.6%	11.1%
Moderately	17.6%	21.1%	17.5%	19.3%
To a small extent	14.8%	11.6%	10.0%	11.7%
Won't affect at all	8.8%	12.2%	12.5%	11.0%
Process occurs independently of summit	10.1%	4.0%	8.1%	7.5%
I see no connection between these things	8.8%	9.9%	6.3%	8.2%
Don't know	24.6%	27.1%	25.0%	26.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	386	303	160	1009

When answering about the summit's potential role in weakening the principle of territorial integrity, respondents most often choose "don't know" (26.3%), while the second most common is "moderately" (19.3%). The options "Process occurs independently of summit" and "I see no connection between these things" were marked by about 8% of respondents each.


To what extent might the summit results weaken the principle of territorial integrity of borders?



Question 8: Will the restoration of a direct communication channel between Russia and the US affect Israel? If yes, how?

Response	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Total
Will significantly improve Israel's position	4.1%	5.6%	5.6%	5.5%
Will improve to some extent	32.6%	27.4%	41.9%	30.9%
Will somewhat worsen	19.7%	20.5%	12.5%	18.2%
Will greatly worsen	4.9%	3.3%	1.3%	4.4%
Won't affect Israel	17.9%	13.9%	13.1%	15.2%
Don't know	20.7%	29.4%	25.6%	25.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	386	303	160	1009

In total, 36% of respondents believe that restored US-Russia dialogue will improve and significantly improve Israel's position. However, a considerable number (though substantially fewer) are convinced of the opposite (somewhat worsen and greatly worsen - 22.6% chose these answers). This polarization may indicate some contradiction in Israelis' perception of Russia.




Question 9: In your opinion, can the restoration of direct dialogue between Russia and the US affect the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? If yes, how?

Response	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Total
Will greatly help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict	2.3%	2.0%	3.1%	3.5%
Will help to some extent	24.1%	20.8%	22.5%	23%
Will complicate to some extent	17.4%	18.5%	11.2%	15.6%
Will greatly complicate	4.1%	6.9%	5.0%	5.6%
Won't affect	28.8%	19.5%	28.1%	23.8%
Don't know	23.3%	32.3%	30.0%	28.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	386	303	160	1009

Some optimism regarding the summit's impact on Israel can be seen in responses to the question "can the restoration of direct dialogue between Russia and the US affect the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?"


26.5% of respondents to varying degrees agree that restored direct dialogue between Russia and the US will help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Though the share of those holding opposite views (21.2% total think it will complicate or greatly complicate resolution) is not significantly lower. And, as in most previous questions, the share of those unable to answer is high (28.5%).



Secular respondents more often than other groups by religiosity report that the summit won't affect various geopolitical processes (exception - impact on the principle of territorial integrity, where all groups have similarly low assessments of possible impact).

Summary table for "Summit won't affect" response option among groups by degree of religiosity

Topic	Secular	Traditional	Religious
Iran situation	44.6%	27.4%	31.3%
Turkey's Middle East status	44.6%	32.3%	30.0%
International legitimacy of Israeli sovereignty over disputed territories	51.3%	45.2%	48.1%
Principle of territorial integrity	8.8%	12.2%	12.5%



Conclusions

1. The summit was not a significant political event for most Israelis

Survey data indicates the low importance of the Trump-Putin summit for Israeli society. 41.1% of respondents knew about the meeting but had no expectations, 28.9% didn't know it was happening.

Expectations were modest and met for only 6% of respondents

Less than a third of Israelis had any expectations from the summit. Among those who did, only 6% indicated their expectations were met to a very large or large extent, while 50% stated their expectations were barely or not at all met.

2. Most expected topics were the Ukrainian conflict (40.1%) and Iran's nuclear program (14%)

Secular respondents more often (50.5%) consider the Ukrainian conflict a priority compared to traditional (33%) and religious (41%) respondents, while traditional and religious groups are twice as likely as secular ones to name Iran's nuclear program as the central topic. This is one of the few questions showing substantial differences among respondents with different degrees of religiosity.

3. High numbers of "don't know" responses indicate high uncertainty

"Don't know" responses ranged from 21.7% to 31.3% across different questions, indicating the difficulty of predicting summit consequences and lack of clear understanding of its potential impact on regional processes. The greatest difficulty was the question about the summit's impact on Turkey's Middle East position.

4. On most questions, Israelis believe the summit won't significantly impact key geopolitical processes

The dominant opinion was expectation of no impact: on Iran - 33.8%, on Turkey's position - 36.7%, on international legitimacy of Israeli sovereignty - 46.5%, on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - 23.8%.

5. Differences by religiosity are small on most questions, except for summit agenda priorities and general skepticism level

Secular respondents demonstrate higher skepticism about the summit's impact on geopolitical processes and more often consider the Ukrainian conflict a priority, while traditional and religious groups pay more attention to the Iranian threat and are somewhat more optimistic about potential consequences of restored superpower dialogue.

6. Income and education levels notably affect responses

Summit awareness directly correlates with income: it's higher among above-average income respondents. Affluent respondents more often have specific expectations of bilateral progress (20.6% vs. 12.5% among lower-income), while less affluent more often had no summit expectations. There's a difference in international agenda priorities: The Ukrainian conflict is viewed as priority by 50.2% of above-average income respondents versus 31.4% of lower-income. On Iran impact: 40.4% of above-average income believe the summit won't affect anything, versus 25.5% of below-average income. The affluent less often expect radical scenarios (regime change, Iran's collapse).

Higher-educated respondents have generally lower summit expectations but higher ones specifically regarding bilateral progress (sanctions, Ukraine, economic cooperation). They also substantially less often report not knowing about the meeting.

7. Regional differences appear in responses about the summit's possible impact on Iran, primarily the greatest skepticism from Sharon residents

They significantly more often than others (55.6%) believe the summit won't affect the Iran situation (21.8 percentage points above average!) and have minimal expectations of active changes across all scenarios.

8. Ambivalent attitude toward Russian-American dialogue with predominant moderate optimism

36% of Israelis believe restored US-Russia dialogue will improve Israel's position (including 5.5% - "significantly improve"), versus 22.6% pessimists. This polarization indicates **contradiction in Israelis' perception of Russia** - on one hand seeing potential benefits from normalized superpower relations, on the other fearing negative consequences.

9. Religious groups are more optimistic about Russian-American rapprochement

41.9% of religious respondents believe restored US-Russia communication will improve Israel's position (versus 32.6% among secular). This correlates with expert assessments that religious-conservative circles see Russia as a potential partner in defending traditional values.

10. Skepticism about Russia's negative influence on the Iranian issue

Only 6.7% consider deepening Russia-Iran partnership likely after the summit, suggesting Israelis don't perceive Russia as an unequivocal ally of Iran. Meanwhile, 15.6% expect increased US involvement (with Russia's support) in regional initiatives around Iran.

11. Russia not perceived as key player in Palestinian issue

26.5% see potential benefit from Russian-American dialogue for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but 23.8% think it won't affect anything. Russia is perceived more as an additional but not decisive factor.

12. Socioeconomic factors influence perception of Russia

Affluent strata demonstrate greater interest in Russian-American relations and their potential impact on Israel. This may reflect their greater involvement in the international agenda and understanding of geopolitical processes.

13. Regional specifics: periphery residents more skeptical

The Sharon region particularly stands out, where 55.6% see no influence from Russian-American dialogue on the Iran situation. This may reflect greater concern with local security problems than global geopolitics.

Overall conclusion on perception of Russia:

Israeli society demonstrates restrained-pragmatic attitude toward Russia - not as a threat or unconditional ally, but as a regional player whose dialogue through US mediation could bring certain tactical benefits. Most don't overestimate Russia's ability to influence issues key to Israel. Russia is perceived more as part of a complex geopolitical equation than as an independent factor for change.