
Dr. Boris Lazarev, Member of the Haifa City Council (1998-2008)
Introduction on the need for a public shake-up
Over the 75 years of the State of Israel’s existence, a system of municipal governments has developed in the country. This system is perceived by many today as working satisfactorily, even though it has already hardened. In recent years, there has not even been an attempt to reform it. There were not even attempts to make any significant changes in the mechanism of its functioning. Meanwhile, there is nothing under the sun that is not only new, but perfect. This applies to our municipal system as well. Local governments over the years have become less and less reflective of residents’ interests. And from my perspective – needs a significant shakeup.
Rationale for the shakeup
As you know, municipal elections take place once every five years. Voters elect a separate mayor and separate city/regional council members. At the same time, deputies of local councils are elected not by territorial constituencies, which would be quite natural. Deputies are elected by lists, as in Knesset elections. Lists can be of two types, party lists or local citizens’ associations. Fundamentally, this separation does not improve the situation. The voter is often only familiar with the name of the first number on the list. And that’s the only one he’s casting his vote for. The rest of the deputies pass “on the tail” of the leader of the list. And their composition cannot be influenced in any way by the average voter. This is the first major flaw in the current system.
The second defect will become clear if we look into the history of local elections using Haifa as an example. For many decades Haifa was called “red Haifa.” In the early decades of the State of Israel, Haifa was referred to as “red Haifa”. A representative of the Avodah party was permanently elected mayor of this city. His deputy faction on the City Council didn’t need partners to build a sustainable coalition. The last time this situation occurred was in 1988. At that time, Avodah won 18 of the 31 seats on the City Council. The remaining seats went to affiliates of the various parties represented in the Knesset. In such a scenario, a group of residents could always turn to a deputy from the ruling party (Avodah). After convincing him that they were right, they would get representation before the mayor. With an almost 100% chance of success.
So what happened next?
In 1993, an Avodah nominee again became mayor. But this party managed to get only 13 deputies to the City Council. And in 1998 – even less: 7 deputies. In 2003, Haifa’s mayor became an independent candidate for the first time. But he only had six people on his roster. And they represented completely different political currents (the Shinui Party, the Greens, and defectors from Avodah).
The mayor had to form a coalition from a large number of small factions. This increased its dependence on coalition partners. The situation reached its peak in 2018. Then the mayor was again an independent candidate. But he had only 4 deputies in his faction (out of 31!). More than half of all City Council deputies were elected from non-party lists (1-2 deputies each). The mayor was forced to build a motley coalition of small “splinters” and depend heavily on their whims. To the point where he had to choose between the interests of residents and the interests of the coalition. Either go along with the wishes of a group of residents or deny them in order to keep the coalition together.
A typical situation for many cities across the country.
But there is also a third, most important, defect. During the five-year cadence of the local council, the voter does not influence the deputies. There is no formalized mechanism of interaction between deputies and voters. A deputy is not obliged to meet with residents and listen to their complaints and suggestions. Nor is he obligated to advance their interests on the City Council and before the mayor. If individual MPs do so, it is absolutely at will. It is not possible to recall a deputy or otherwise express your displeasure with him or her. The deputy has no responsibility to the residents. Right up until the next election in five years. When he can again be in the “wagon” of the list leader and become a deputy again.
The main vice of the current system of local government is the lack of feedback between residents and their elected representatives. And the only way the citizens can influence the decisions of the mayor and the city council is by organizing pressure groups. Groups are most often formed along territorial lines or by shared interests.
There are the most common reasons for the confrontation between initiative groups and the mayor’s office. These are conflicts over construction and improvement plans in certain neighborhoods of the city. Around new road construction, opening/closing of schools or cultural centers, etc. It is also possible to list the most common tools of pressure from city residents. These include pickets, demonstrations, attempts to disrupt City Council meetings, engaging the press and social media, and going to court. Clearly, the best chances for success are those groups organized by residents of “expensive” neighborhoods. They can fight their battle with the help of qualified professionals. Residents of neighborhoods with low socioeconomic status are left to their share of outrage on social media. We can also wait for the “coming of the messiah”, i.e. new elections. Then the city will have new leadership that is more responsive to the requests and pleas of residents than the previous leadership.
Is there a ray of light?
However, not everything is as hopeless as it seems at first glance. There is a lever that can sometimes be used to get the mayor and city council to get the results residents want. This instrument has been known for many years and is called vaad schoonati (district or neighborhood committee). “Vaad schoonati” represents a group of enterprising citizens of the neighborhood. These are citizens who are dissatisfied with the actions of the municipality in their area. They have ideas about how to beautify their neighborhood. And they systematically bother the municipal authorities with requests and demands. And “vaad schoonati” does so on behalf of all the residents of the neighborhood. As opposed to the usual local pressure groups.
This gives the actions of “vaad schoonati” added weight. It’s the same thing that makes the local government (sometimes) reckon with his intentions. But there’s an important problem. It lies in the fact that the “vaad schoonati” is not authorized by anyone to conduct such activities. It is formed, as a rule, not as a result of elections, but through spontaneous self-organization of socially active citizens. There is a lack of formal legitimacy of these committees. And this leads to the fact that local authorities are not obliged to take into account their demands and proposals. And their effectiveness depends entirely on the goodwill of the mayors. And this “goodwill” in many cases turns out to be completely unselfish. Чаще всего она обусловливается пожеланием поддержки на следующих выборах. But if suddenly the mayor and the “vaad schoonati” became confrontational? Then it sometimes comes down to the mayor creating an alternative vaad of his supporters in the neighborhood. This is done to neutralize the activities of a too independent vaad. As a result, as always, the residents suffer, whose voice now does not reach the local authorities at all.
Useful invention
“Vaad schoonati is a very useful invention. There are cities where individual neighborhoods are very different across the board. And by geolocation, and by religious-ethnic composition, and by social status, etc. It is quite natural that their residents look at certain problems differently and offer different solutions. All of this should (ideally) be taken into account by the city government. And this is where the “vaad schoonati” becomes the perfect mouthpiece for the residents’ groups. It is necessary to give the neighborhood committees legal status. It is necessary to formalize their relationship with the city authorities – mayors and deputies.
This can be accomplished by reorganizing the local government structure. In addition to the election of the mayor and deputies, formally introduce the election of neighborhood committees. Today in municipal elections, voters cast two ballots – one for mayor, one for the deputy list. In my view, one more ballot should be added for voting – for the members of the “vaada schoonati”. These neighborhood representatives should be nominated by lists, but on an individual basis. So that every voter knows for whom exactly he or she is casting his or her vote. The seven or nine candidates with the highest number of electoral votes in a district form the vaad of that district. The Legislature must delegate certain powers to these committees. Establish rights and obligations and prescribe the mechanism of their interaction with municipal authorities. Proposals made by the vaadas should be considered at City Council meetings with representatives from all vaadas present.
The size of a neighborhood can vary depending on the specifics of the locality. These areas become electoral districts and may have several hundred to tens of thousands of residents.
Such a reform may be relevant primarily to the populations of large (by Israeli standards) cities. Cities where the difference between both residents and neighborhoods is quite substantial. Establishing a streamlined system of neighborhood committees with known powers can bring tangible benefits to the community.