Now, with the extensive shelling of Gaza and a ground operation underway, it is evident that defeating Hamas is only part of the problem. The justification for this intensive operation largely depends on the decisions that will be made regarding the Gaza sector and how the situation will develop in that territory without Hamas.
According to the overwhelming majority of respondents (62%), the destruction of the Hamas organization is possible. This figure is twice the percentage of responses indicating it is impossible.
- In your opinion, is it possible, under current geopolitical conditions, to completely destroy the Hamas organization?
Absolutely possible | 34% | 62% |
Most likely possible | 28% | |
Most likely impossible | 27% | 32% |
Definitely impossible | 5% | |
I don’t know | 6% | |
Total | 100% |
Moreover, the majority of respondents expressing doubt about this possibility predominantly hold ultra-left political orientations (68% among them, compared to 15-42% of those with similar views in groups characterized by different political orientations).
In the continuum of “right – left political orientations,” there is a significant decrease in the proportions of responses expressing confidence in the possibility of complete destruction of the Hamas organization, ranging from ultra-right to ultra-left by 2.5 times (from 85% to 32%).
The possibility of complete destruction of the Hamas organization
Possible | Impossible | Total | |
Political Orientation | |||
Ultra-right | 100% | ||
Moderately Right | 65% | 35% | 100% |
Center | 59% | 41% | 100% |
Moderately Left | 58% | 42% | 100% |
Ultra-left | 32% | 68% | 100% |
Country of Birth | |||
Israel | 65% | 35% | 100% |
Former USSR Countries | 69% | 31% | 100% |
Others | 72% | 28% | 100% |
After the overthrow of the Hamas organization, the next question that will largely determine the fate of Israel and this region is the organization of life in Gaza.
Another question that may be related to the fate of post-war Gaza is the relationship between its residents and Palestinians in the West Bank/Judea and Samaria. According to 75% of Israelis, residents of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria identify themselves to a full/great extent with Gaza residents on a political, cultural, and social level.
How do you think the Palestinian residents of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria identify or do not identify themselves with the residents of the Gaza sector on a political, cultural, and social level?
Not at all identifies oneself | 3% | 13% |
Rather do not identify | 10% | |
Rather identify | 38% | 75% |
Fully identifies | 37% | |
I don’t know | 12% | |
Total | 100% |
Based on the responses, Israeli society appears to be in a state of confusion regarding how to politically resolve the conflict. However, it is unequivocally clear that the idea of “One state for two peoples” will not be supported, as only 8% of Israelis endorse it. About a quarter of respondents lean towards the “Two states for two peoples” model and the annexation of the West Bank/the territories of Judea and Samaria, as well as the Gaza sector. Meanwhile, 25% of respondents found it difficult to answer this question.
What political strategy do you think is most promising for Israel after the end of the war?

Only 4% of Israelis support the creation of a Palestinian state within the pre-1967 borders. The creation of a Palestinian state in the territories of the Palestinian Authority without the Gaza sector is supported by 15%.

The concept of “Two states for two peoples” is most supported by representatives of moderate and left political views, with 67% and 69%, respectively, endorsing it. In general, regarding the vision of Israel’s political future, they show the greatest unity, with the distribution of responses for other options not exceeding 6% in most cases.

In contrast, representatives of no other political orientation have gained an absolute majority (over 50%) for any position.
For example, representatives of the right, who more than others support the idea of annexing the West Bank/territories of Judea and Samaria, as well as the Gaza sector, garnered 49% of the votes for this option.

Among the moderately right, there is even greater disunity on this issue: support for the options of “Two states for two peoples,” “Annexation of the West Bank/territories of Judea and Samaria, as well as the Gaza sector,” and “Continue the current situation” ranges from 18% to 24%, with 29% of respondents finding it difficult to choose an answer.
The “Center,” most focused on the “Two states for two peoples” position, is supported by just over a third of the votes, and 33% of them found it difficult to answer.
Respondents born in the territory of the former USSR, like other citizens, somewhat more often endorse the “Two states for two peoples” concept and least often support “One state for two peoples.”
What political strategy, in your opinion, is most promising for Israel after the end of the war?
There is an age-related difference in responses to the question about Israel’s priority political position after the end of the war.
As age increases, interest in the “Two states for two peoples” concept rises from 15% among 18-30 year-olds to 47% in the 65+ age group. The percentage supporting the annexation of the West Bank/territories of Judea and Samaria, as well as the Gaza sector, decreases (from 32% to 10%), and the idea of “One state for two peoples” also decreases (from 12% to 3%).
Thus, the “Two states for two peoples” model is more often supported by the 65+ age group (47% compared to 15-30% in other groups), while the annexation idea is more supported by the 18-30 age group (32% compared to 10-26% in other groups).
Which political strategy, in your opinion, is most promising for Israel after the end of the war?
Two states for two peoples | One state for two peoples | Annexation | To continue to act as they have been acting | I don’t know | Total | ||
Age | |||||||
18-30 | 15% | 26% | 100% | ||||
31-49 | 30% | 7% | 26% | 13% | 24% | 100% | |
50-64 | 29% | 7% | 25% | 14% | 25% | 100% | |
65+ | 47% | 3% | 10% | 16% | 24% | 100% | |
Ethno-religious characteristic | |||||||
Secular | 42% | 6% | 18% | 19% | 21% | 100% | |
Adhering to traditions | 17% | 9% | 30% | 21% | 21% | 100% | |
Religious | 4% | 4% | 52% | 2% | 37% | 100% | |
Ultra-Religious | 5% | 1% | 52% | 21% | 21% | 100% | |
Arabs | 40% | 15% | 6% | 2% | 37% | 100% |
In terms of ethno-religious characteristics, the greatest similarity is noted in the positions of secular Jews and Arabs, who express support for the “Two states for two peoples” model more frequently than others (42% and 40%, respectively, compared to 5-17% in other groups).
Jews who observe tradition (30%) and even more religious and ultra-religious Jews (52%) are significantly more likely than others to advocate for the annexation of the West Bank/territories of Judea and Samaria, as well as the Gaza sector. Among secular Jews and Arabs, this position is supported by 6 to 18% of respondents.
A small but statistically significant portion of Arabs, 15%, supports the “One state for two peoples” model, which is most rejected by religious and ultra-religious Jews.
The idea of implementing the model of establishing a Palestinian state in the territories of the Palestinian Authority but without including the Gaza sector finds little support among Israelis (15%), and even less support for the idea of creating a Palestinian state within the pre-1967 borders (4%). Among those who still support the “Palestinian Authority without Gaza” model, representatives of the left political wing, especially ultra-leftists, are least common (4% compared to 10% among the left and 15-17% among others). Slightly more often than others, this is supported by those born in the territory of the former USSR (20% compared to 14-16% in other birthplace groups), those aged 65+ (19% compared to 13-16% in other age groups), and secular or tradition-observing Jews (18-19% compared to 5-11% in other groups).
Regarding who will become the main actor in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and governance after the destruction of Hamas, there is no consensus in the responses, as is the case with many other questions. However, opinions are roughly evenly split between the UN, the US, and the EU, on one hand, and Arab countries and Persian Gulf countries, at approximately 25% each. Russia, together with the EU or the US, as well as China and the League of Arab States, are practically not considered by anyone.

According to the survey, 42% of respondents believe that relations with Arab countries will improve after the elimination of the Hamas organization. Among them, only 11% report a significant improvement, while 31% mention a general improvement. About 26% of respondents express expectations of worsening relations, with only 6% specifying a significant deterioration. 15% of respondents anticipate no impact on the change in relations with Arab countries after the elimination of Hamas. Overall, positive expectations are predominant, particularly regarding Western European countries. About 45% of respondents, in total, anticipate a possible improvement in their relations with Israel, with 12% expecting a significant improvement. In contrast, predictions about Russia’s relations with Israel are more negative. While 13% of respondents overall consider the possibility of improvement, 37% expect a deterioration.
How, in your opinion, will the elimination of Hamas in the Gaza Strip affect the attitude towards Israel from the perspective of:
Arab countries | Russia | Western Europe | |
Will significantly improve | 11% | 3% | 12% |
Will slightly improve | 31% | 10% | 33% |
Will slightly worsen | 20% | 29% | 15% |
Will become very bad | 6% | 8% | 4% |
No effect | 15% | 31% | 21% |
Don’t know | 17% | 19% | 15% |
Total | 100% | 100% | 100% |
Index of Expectation of Relationship Change (the difference between positive and negative responses) | |||
+16 | -24 | +26 |
Among the responses regarding other countries’ attitudes toward Israel, those characterizing positive expectations prevail. The highest values of the expectation index relate to the improvement of relations with Western Europe (+26). Somewhat lower but still positive values are associated with attitudes from Arab states (+16). The expectation index for relations with Russia is negative (-24).

The respondents born in the countries of the former USSR are the most inclined to expect a deterioration in relations with Israel from Russia, with a total of 44%, compared to 30-37% in other groups. They are also slightly less likely than others to mention the possibility of an improvement in relations (9% in total, compared to 12-14% in other groups).
Change in relations with Russia | Israel | Former USSR countries | Others |
Will significantly improve | 4% | 5% | 2% |
Will slightly improve | 10% | 4% | 10% |
Will slightly worsen | 29% | 35% | 25% |
Will become very bad | 8% | 9% | 5% |
No effect | 31% | 34% | 29% |
Don’t know | 18% | 13% | 29% |
Total | 100% | 100% | 100% |