‘In your opinion, what events could signify the onset of a ‘Palestine without HAMAS’ situation? We ask you to imagine possible scenarios of such a future, contemplating how it might unfold.’
In responses regarding possible paths to achieving a ‘Gaza without HAMAS’ scenario, the ‘nonviolent’ option proved to be the least popular. Other responses justify a fundamental denial of such a possibility in the foreseeable future and suggest mixed scenarios.
Two scenarios proposing nonviolent paths to neutralize the influence of HAMAS in the Gaza Strip are as follows:
a) Peace Negotiations
“If there are successful peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority that lead to a comprehensive peace agreement, Hamas may lose popular support and its role in Palestinian politics may diminish. Successful negotiations can only be achieved if there are genuine partners in Israel willing to negotiate in good faith with the Palestinian Authority and make all the necessary concessions to sign an agreement.”
b) Fair Elections.
“If honest and free elections take place in Palestinian territories, including Gaza, and the Palestinian people elect representatives not aligned with HAMAS, this could lead to the neutralization of HAMAS’s power.” This could happen under the condition of sustained economic growth and development in the Palestinian territories, which ‘may lead to improved living conditions and potentially reduce support for groups such as HAMAS. The Palestinian administration should allocate funds towards economic development and infrastructure creation to serve the people, open the labor market, and generate employment for the benefit of the Palestinian population. Investing in the people will diminish the popularity of HAMAS.’ “With the support of Arab countries (from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE), Fatah is slowly organizing the socio-economic restoration of Gaza; under this auspices of establishing order there, he introduces his own security and management structures, and naturally comes to power.” “International diplomatic efforts, such as those by the United Nations or major world powers, could lead to a resolution that marginalizes and disarms Hamas, opening the way to a Hamas-free Palestine. International diplomatic efforts that pressure Israel to end its aggression against Palestinians and its blockade of Gaza, and that promote humanitarian aid to Gaza, will ultimately weaken Hamas’s strong hold on Gaza and lead to a change in power.”
In all peaceful scenarios, the motives of the Palestinian Authority are not explicitly outlined, explaining why it would invest its efforts and resources in the development of the Gaza Strip, which is under the control of its competitor, the HAMAS organization. Additionally, the motives for HAMAS willingly allowing the influence of the Palestinian Authority in the internal politics of the Gaza Strip are unclear. Furthermore, it remains uncertain why HAMAS would consider giving up its power.
The remaining responses, in one way or another, provide compelling arguments for the impracticality of any ‘nonviolent’ scenario, primarily due to the long-term absence of willing participants among the Palestinians in Gaza capable of engaging in dialogue, especially within the HAMAS organization. ‘In the history of Israel, I am unaware of any government that made consistent efforts to collaborate with the entire Arab population, including Gaza and other territories. The same applies to the major cities in Israel, accumulating bit by bit supporters of peaceful coexistence.’ ‘The male population in Gaza, not aligned with HAMAS, was physically destroyed. However, a society cannot consist exclusively of women. The actual destruction of HAMAS’s military leadership, without relocating the rest of the population, will not change anything, especially if all political leadership remains alive.’ ‘There is no prospect in the next 40-60 years, across 2-3 generations. Undoubtedly, both sides are to blame. Killing all the HAMAS members in the tunnels might be possible, but killing them in the hearts of the people of Gaza is unrealistic. If they are left in the territory, they will seek revenge for a lifetime. It is better to drive them out of Gaza alive and then criticize oneself for cruelty for a couple of years than to continue mutual killings for many years.’ ‘Gaza without HAMAS’ could have happened with a SUCCESSFUL and relatively swift realization of the hypothetical ‘large-scale ground operation’ scenario. In my opinion, this is no longer happening and is most likely NOT going to happen.’
“The scenario of ‘Gaza without HAMAS’ does not exist: the partially recognized de jure State of Palestine, specifically its legislative, executive, and judicial authorities, does NOT control the distinct geographic territory of the Gaza Strip de facto. This territory is controlled by the political opposition to the regime in power in the State of Palestine. In turn, this opposition performs the functions of state power in this semi-enclave territory de facto. The way of existence of the ethnically homogeneous population of the semi-enclave (from semi-blockade to full blockade for many years) and its current standard of living (with one of the lowest HDI in the world) leave it with precarious chances for an existence that would not be dependent on the structures of HAMAS or exist in parallel to them: HAMAS controls the entire system of providing social goods in the enclave, the import-export from the enclave, and dominantly rules ‘on the ground.’ The compact territory, dense population, restricted entry and exit for local residents beyond the sector, and the clan-family conservative structure of Arab society contribute to the fact that any disagreement with HAMAS’s political line ‘beyond kitchen conversations’ is harshly and unconditionally suppressed: there is NO opposition to HAMAS within Gaza. In fact, ‘from the perspective of an ordinary citizen,’ Gaza is the largest ghetto on Earth. Its external perimeter is controlled by Egypt and Israel, while the internal order and the entire vertical of power and life activities are under the complete control of HAMAS.”
Taking into account the above, when the population of Gaza is completely dependent on Hamas, one can’t count on re-elections, as a result of which forces capable of conducting a dialogue with Israel will come to power. This position is complemented by the following answer: “The older generation of voters has already poisoned the second and third generations with hatred.” And for this to happen, “it is necessary to evict 100% of the population and plant the entire territory with useful plants. The time to create a unified state is completely lost. But the Arabs are not asking for two states. They need one thing – without Jews”. “Hamas is present in the Gaza semi-enclave at the cellular level.” The removal of such “DNA” from the Strip is possible only with a massive “extraction” of its population; in other words, when committing genocide or ethnic cleansing. Both scenarios are unlikely in the current realities (in the first case, Israel will not agree to this, in the second, the Arab neighbors, Egypt and Jordan, no longer agree).” Therefore, “Gaza without Hamas” is, in principle, possible only after “The adoption of an agreement on strategic influence and education of future generations in the spirit of humanistic unity. This is a target orientation – a path away from the principles of education of hatred and intolerance in the direction of Tolerance and moral and ethical unity.”
It should be noted that in most of the answers there is no possibility of discussing this problem outside the context of “Two states for two peoples”, and therefore the discussion essentially comes down to whether such a form of government is possible now. “Israel has long used Hamas as a tool in the fight against the Palestinian Authority, in order to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state. Also, it should be taken into account that since 2006, three subethnic groups of Palestinians have been formed on the territory of Israel and the conditional Palestinian state: Palestinians are citizens of Israel; Palestinians of the Gaza Strip; Palestinians of the West Bank. Therefore, it can be assumed that the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Palestinians of Gaza may have different political interests and socio-economic needs.”
The possibility of creating two states for two peoples is doubted by a number of respondents not only due to the reluctance of Gaza or the Palestinians as a whole to engage in dialogue, but also due to the unwillingness of Israel for this. “Strengthening the power of Palestine” in general and in Gaza in particular is also not a “functional scenario” without the full assistance of Israel, which is objectively NOT interested in providing such assistance. From my point of view, in the current geopolitical situation of the actual parity of the “Western” and “non-Western” blocs on the world stage, the option “Palestine without Hamas” is incorrect, and the option “Gaza Strip without Hamas” is NOT visible.” “Two states for two peoples means a significant increase in the territory from which shelling of the conditional “Jews” will be carried out and an increase in the length of the borders on which there will be repetitions of 10/07/2023. With unconditional guilt on both sides.” “The Israeli Foreign Ministry has never been able to establish normal relations with the outside world and will not be able to in the next 60 years. Unable to cooperate productively even with Europe. For 75 years he has been refusing to join the most powerful European institutions. Who, how and when will this change? Tens of thousands of Falashmurs arriving in the country and hundreds of thousands of children born to them here? Yes, there are useful resources in society, but they categorically refuse to unite.”
The scenarios in which ‘Gaza without HAMAS’ can exist are based on the following initial position. ‘All issues of Gaza’s reconstruction and elimination of HAMAS will require robust social protection systems for the population, which the Palestinian Authority lacks. Various UN and other international organizations may take on this role.’ And then the following options are outlined:
1. Unification of Gaza and the West Bank under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas.
This option assumes the eventual creation of a Palestinian state that recognizes Israel. It is anticipated that under the “rumble of a humanitarian catastrophe,” the Palestinian Authority (PA) will be pressured to recognize states within existing borders and not claim the boundaries defined by UN Resolution 181. Questions regarding the return of refugees and East Jerusalem remain. It can be assumed that no one will insist on the return of refugees. The PA administration will need to arrange for the residents of the Gaza Strip. There is a suspicion that it may not cope with these tasks. However, in the case of the creation of a Palestinian state, the infiltration of refugees from camps outside of Israel will become a priority in the demographic war with the Jewish population. As a derivative of this option, the answer “Or Fatah on Israeli bayonets” quickly or slowly comes to power in Gaza.”
2. “Introduction of international peacekeeping forces (League of Arab States) into the territory of the sector.
It is already mentioned that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will become the main participant in this process. In this case, the economic potential of the territory will be restored, but it will not be transferred under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Perhaps this option is most acceptable for Israel, as it turns Gaza into a demilitarized economic hub within the framework of the Abraham Accords. Power in the sector is handed over to the Khomul leaders, with whom intelligence services will cooperate. At the same time, there will be no talk of creating a Palestinian state.“
3. “Complete eviction of the residents of the Gaza Strip beyond its borders and annexation of the sector to the territory of Israel.
This will lead to refugee flows to Western countries and worsen Israel’s image. The most controversial scenario.”
One way or another, the main position of the respondents mainly boils down to the following: “Gaza without Hamas will require international joint participation – at the level of values, principles, management technologies and large financial subsidies, investments – the Alliance of different countries in the creation of new infrastructure and a new political structure of Gaza. The leader of such an Alliance can and should be Israel, the USA, the UAE, Singapore, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.”