The legal reform implementation initiated a powerful public response. 21% of respondents declared participation in demonstrations, of which 4% – declared regular participation in demonstrations. Moreover, there is no fundamental difference in answers between respondents born in different countries (Diagram 7. Table 11)
Do you participate in demonstrations against reform?
Diagram 7
Do you participate in demonstrations against reform? (by country of birth):
| Total | Refuse to answer | No | Occasionally | Yes – regularly | Country of birth |
| 100% | 7% | 72% | 17% | 4% | Israel |
| 100% | 2% | 74% | 19% | 5% | Countries of the former USSR |
| 100% | 8% | 72% | 15% | 5% | Other answers |
Almost half of the respondents (48%), characterizing the motivation for participating in actions, believe that the majority of protesters are convinced of the effectiveness of the demonstrations as a way to put pressure on authorities. 10-13% of respondents believe that mass actions are not an effective tool for solving the problem, and that some people are rewarded for participating in and protests – this is the reason for their participation, and that many protesters have only a general and vague understanding of proposed reform, and therefore their actions are the result of someone’s manipulation. (Table 12)
Which of the following proposals best reflects your position on people involved in demonstrations and protests surrounding legal reform?
| Total | Answers |
| 48% | Most demonstrators believe that through demonstrations it is possible to exert effective pressure on authorities |
| 12% | People’s desire to express a position is understandable, but mass actions are not an effective tool for solving problems |
| 11% | Some people are rewarded for taking part in demonstrations |
| 13% | Many protesters have only a general and vague understanding of reform |
| 5% | Some protesters subject to foreign manipulation |
| 11% | Don’t know |
| 100% | Total |
It is noteworthy that the answer values match, according to which the majority of demonstrators believe that through demonstrations it is possible to exert effective pressure on authorities (48% – Table. 12) and mass protests are an effective tool for influencing political decisions (47% – Diagram 8). Meanwhile, in total, a little less than half of the respondents believe that demonstrations are not effective in legal reform event of (12%), and they do more harm than good (26%).
Diagram 8
Analyzing the age difference in responses about the protests impact on political decisions, it should be noted that its values are basically not fundamentally different by age groups. The fact that protests a) are not effective as a tool for solving problems, and even b) are destructive, as they cause loss, responses by groups vary in a small range (23-28%, and 9-14%, respectively). However, the assessment of protests as an effective tool for influencing political decisions varies in the range from 42% to 64% and is growing from younger groups to older ones. (Diagram 9)
Diagram 9.
It is interesting to note that “Don’t know” answers are also more typical for young groups, and less typical for older ones. Pearson’s coefficient calculation based on the data presented in Table 13.1. allows approving:
a) the presence of a direct connection between the responses characterizing protests as an ineffective tool and the ” do not know” responses (r = 0.94 is a strong positive linear dependence, which means that the higher the value of one parameter, the higher the value of the other, and vice versa);
b) the presence of feedback between responses characterizing mass protests as an effective tool and ” don’t know” responses (r = -0.985, indicates a strong negative linear relationship between parameters. This means that as the value of one parameter increases, the other parameter tends to decrease with a high degree of inverse proportionality. That means, the less “Don’t know” answers in the group, the higher the probability of a positive assessment of mass actions in this group). (Table 13.1.)
Do protests influence political decision-making (by age):
| Total | Don’t know | Effective tool | Protests cause loss | Protests are not effective in solving problems | Age |
| 100% | 20% | 42% | 24% | 17-30 | |
| 100% | 17% | 43% | 28% | 12% | 31-49 |
| 100% | 50% | 28% | 10% | 50-64 | |
| 100% | 4% | 23% | 9% | 65+ |
The respondents born in countries of the former USSR are fundamentally less than others consider mass actions an effective tool for influencing political decisions (36% versus 47-48% in other groups), and more than 2 times more often find it difficult to answer this question (29% versus 13-14%). True, they also less often than others believe that mass actions cause loss (21% versus 26-31% in other groups), but this is a continuation of the topic of the influence lack. Interestingly, the values of these answers in other groups are almost identical, and thus only the respondents born in countries of the former USSR stand out from them, which may indicate a fundamentally weaker position of this group in Israel political life. (Table 13.2. Diagram 10)
Do protests influence political decision-making (by country of birth):
| Total | Don’t know | Effective tool for influencing power | Cause loss | Not effective | |
| 100% | 14% | 48% | 26% | 12% | Israel |
| 100% | 29% | 36% | 21% | 14% | Countries of the former USSR |
| 100% | 13% | 47% | 31% | 9% | Other answers |
“Right” are more categorical in their views regarding the inefficiency and destructiveness of mass actions and “moderately left” – are more categorical in their views regarding about the effectiveness of mass actions. (Diagram 11. Table 13.3).
Diagram 10.
“Right” and “moderate right” are slightly more often than “centrists” and to varying degrees of “left” talk about the ineffectiveness of protests, much less often – about their effectiveness (their answers about the effectiveness of mass actions are in the range of 26-47%, in other groups – from 56% to 80%). However, they significantly more often claim that protests cause more damage (27-46% versus 4-18%). “Right” are the most categorical in their views on the inefficiency and destructiveness of mass actions, “moderately left” most often speak about effectiveness (Diagram 11. Table 13.3).
Diagram 11.
According to the parameter “secularity-religiosity,” Knitted kippah are more than others convinced of the ineffectiveness of mass actions (19% of them versus 8-15% in other groups), and they are slightly less than ultra-Orthodox, but still more often than others believe that mass actions cause loss (46% and 59% – Knitted kippah and ultra-Orthodox versus 15% secular and 36% of traditions-observing). So it can be approved that as the degree of religiosity decreases, the conviction that mass actions cause damage decreases, and on the contrary, confidence in their effectiveness increases (from 16% to 25% in ultra-Orthodox and Knitted kippah groups to 42% among traditions-observing and 63% among secular).
- Do protests influence political decision-making (by political attitudes and religiosity):
| Total | Don’t know | Effective tool | Cause loss | Not effective | |
| Political attitudes | |||||
| 100% | 14% | 26% | 46% | 14% | Right |
| 100% | 12% | 47% | 27% | 14% | Moderately right |
| 100% | 16% | 56% | 18% | 10% | Center |
| 100% | 9% | 80% | 4% | 7% | Moderately Left |
| 100% | 11% | 65% | 12% | 12% | Left |
| 100% | 49% | 29% | 11% | 11% | Others |
| Religiosity – Secularity | |||||
| 100% | 14% | 63% | 15% | 8% | Secularity |
| 100% | 9% | 13% | Observing traditions | ||
| 100% | 10% | 25% | 46% | 19% | Knitted kippah |
| 100% | 12% | 16% | 59% | 13% | Jew – ultra-Orthodox |
| 100% | 25% | 46% | 14% | 15% | Arab Christian, Muslim, other |
Arabs Christian, Muslims and others are more likely in this position closer to secular and traditions-observing – almost half of them (46%) are convinced of effectiveness of mass actions, and only 14% believe that they cause loss. (Table 13.3.)
Let’s discuss in more detail about what negative consequences we are talking about in connection with mass actions holding. Judging by index values calculated on the basis of question ” To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding the possible risks associated with the attempt to carry out legal reform and protests?” [1] the most serious risk, according to respondents opinion, is the increase in unrest (the significance index of this risk is 41), with which 70% of respondents in sum fully and partly agree. In second place in importance is the aggravation of political instability (70% of respondents in total agree with this completely and partly, but the index is already 37). Further goes the risk of aggravation of split among people and even civil war, as 70% of respondents say with varying degrees of confidence, but due to the fact that almost half of this amount are answers “rather agree,” the onset index of this risk is even less – 33.5. And to the group of high risks, perhaps, can be attributed the risk of damage to investments, the business sector and economic stability, the index of which is 31, and the share of those who agreed to this statement to varying degrees is 66%.
Significant below, according to respondents opinion, are the risks of undermining the state security (21) and the deterioration of Israel international relations (22). The risk of illegitimate change of power has a negative index value, so is rather absent. (Diagram12. Table 14).
[1] By formula: n1 +1/2 n2 – n3, where n1 – the proportion of those who chose the “agree” answer option; n2 -“agree partly”, n3 – “disagree”.
Diagram 12.
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding the possible risks associated with attempting legal reform and protests?
| Answer options | Agree | Agree partly | Disagree | Don’t know | Indices | Total |
| Protest will lead to an illegitimate change of power | 19% | 22% | 43% | 16% | -13 | 100% |
| Aggravation of the split among the people, civil war | 39% | 31% | 21% | 9% | 33,5 | 100% |
| Rising unrest | 42% | 32% | 17% | 9% | 41 | 100% |
| Undermining the state security | 34% | 30% | 28% | 8% | 21 | 100% |
| Worsening political instability | 44% | 26% | 20% | 10% | 37 | 100% |
| Deteriorating Israel international relations | 42% | 12% | 26% | 10% | 22 | 100% |
| Damage to investment, business sector and economic sustainability | 44% | 22% | 24% | 10% | 31 | 100% |
Respondents who born in countries of the former USSR, for the most part of positions, tend to give lower categorical risk assessments than Israelis and those born in other countries. So,
– 21% of those born in countries of the former USSR agree with the risk of aggravation of society split and even civil war, but 40% – born in Israel, 38% – born in other countries;
– risk of increase and exacerbation of unrest – 24% versus 43% and 44%;
– undermining the state security – 21% against 34% and 37%.
In other cases, those who born in countries of the former USSR give answers, mainly similar to Sabras and immigrants from other countries. (Table 14.1.)
Proportion of those who agree on each risk (by country of birth):
| Answer options | Countries of the former USSR | Israel | Other countries |
| Protest will lead to an illegitimate change of power | 18% | 20% | 19% |
| Aggravation of the split among the people, civil war | 21% | 40% | 38% |
| Rising unrest | 24% | 43% | 44% |
| Undermining the state security | 21% | 34% | 37% |
| Worsening political instability | 43% | 43% | 50% |
| Deteriorating Israel international relations | 40% | 42% | 50% |
| Damage to investment, business sector and economic sustainability | 47% | 43% | 47% |
In general, the bulk of respondents agree that the optimal strategy in current situation is a compromise between reform supporters and opponents, as stated by 44% of respondents (Diagram 13), mainly “moderately right” – 63%. (Table 15) However, there are also enough supporters of reform implementation and abolition – 21% and 28% (Figure 13), which indicates a significant society split regarding the existing situation. “Right” overwhelmingly support the reform implementation (72% of them, and among supporters of other political views, such answers are from 1 to 12%); primarily “Left” support the reform abolition (63%) and “moderately left” (54%), but also “centrists” to a significant extent (35%).
Diagram 13.
In your opinion, which strategy is better suited to solving the problem of Israel legal system reforming? (by political attitudes)
| Political attitudes | Compromise | Reform implementation | Reform abolition | Don’t know | Total |
| Right | 37% | 47% | 6% | 10% | 100% |
| Moderately right | 63% | 12% | 19% | 6% | 100% |
| Center | 38% | 12% | 35% | 15% | 100% |
| Moderately Left | 42% | 1% | 54% | 3% | 100% |
| Left | 20% | 5% | 63% | 12% | 100% |
| Others | 24% | 9% | 34% | 33% | 100% |