The overwhelming majority of Israelis (52-56%) believe that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine does not affect the external and internal situation of the state of Israel. In total, 32-33% in each of the spheres are convinced that this conflict in one way or another affects the external and internal situation of the state of Israel, mainly negatively. It has a more negative effect on Israel international status (25%) and on social situation in the country (26%). The positive influence of the conflict is reported by maximum of 13% of respondents, linking such influence to Israel military security.
In your opinion, does the conflict between Russia and Ukraine affect or does not affect the State of Israel in each of the following areas? (May-July, 2023)
Answer Options | Does Not Affect | Affect Negatively | Affect Positively | Do not know | |
May | Israel International status | 41% | 28% | 10% | 21% |
July | 52% | 25% | 7% | 16% | |
May | Israel military security | 45% | 23% | 15% | 17% |
July | 56% | 18% | 13% | 13% | |
May | Social situation in Israel | 50% | 26% | 7% | 17% |
July | 54% | 26% | 6% | 14% |
Comparing these data with answers to a similar question received three months earlier, it can be claimed that Russian-Ukrainian conflict influence on various spheres of Israel life began to be perceived as less significant. Thus, 11% more respondents began to claim that this conflict does not affect the international status and defense capability of Israel.

The negative influence of this conflict is more often reported by those born in the USSR:
- on social situation – 47% against 14-24% in other groups;
- on defense capability – 26% against 14-18%;
- on international status of Israel – 29% against 22-25%.

Respondents born in the USSR also differ from others in that they speak more often about the lack of influence of this conflict on Israel defense capability (62% versus 53-54% in other groups), but less often about its positive influence (4% versus 13-15% in other groups).

Does the conflict between Russia and Ukraine affect or not the State of Israel?
International status of Israel | Security | Social situation | Answer Options | Country of Birth |
51% | 55% | 55% | Does Not Affect | Israel |
25% | 18% | 24% | Affect Negatively | |
7% | 13% | 6% | Affect Positively | |
17% | 14% | 15% | Do not know | |
100% | 100% | 100% | Total | |
51% | 62% | 36% | Does Not Affect | USSR |
29% | 26% | 47% | Affect Negatively | |
6% | 4% | 8% | Affect Positively | |
14% | 8% | 9% | Do not know | |
100% | 100% | 100% | Total | |
56% | 53% | 64% | Does Not Affect | Others |
22% | 14% | 14% | Affect Negatively | |
6% | 16% | 4% | Affect Positively | |
16% | 17% | 18% | Do not know | |
100% | 100% | 100% | Total |
The bulk of Israelis is convinced that Israel is quite actively involved in the situation that arose as a result of Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict, providing humanitarian assistance to affected population (70%), facilitating repatriation (75%), providing political asylum to those in need (55%), and also supporting their citizens participating in the military operation (39%). At the same time, every third believes that Israel provides military assistance (weapons, ammunition and other means), and those who disagree with this are only slightly more (39%).
Comparing these data with those obtained three months earlier, it is noticeable that the proportion of Israelis who believe that Israel is providing humanitarian assistance has decreased from 79 to 70%. And, on the contrary, earlier only 7% of the population believed that Israel does not provide humanitarian assistance, and three months later the share is already 12%. The share of those who found it difficult to answer this question increased slightly. There is a similar difference between May and July responses regarding repatriates reception. 80% of respondents reported this in May, and 75% – in July. Also in July, respondents to 7 percentage point became less often talk about granting political asylum. However, the share of those who believe that Israel provides military assistance increased from 25 to 33%, and slightly (by 4 percentage point) – legalassistance.
As far as you know, is Israel currently involved or not in Russian-Ukrainian conflict in any form?
May-July | Total | Do not know | Not involved | Involved | |
May | 100% | 14% | 7% | 79% | Humanitarian aid |
July | 100% | 18% | 12% | 70% | |
May | 100% | 50% | 26% | 24% | Providing intelligence |
July | 100% | 47% | 25% | 28% | |
May | 100% | 41% | 23% | 36% | Support in international organizations |
July | 100% | 39% | 23% | 38% | |
May | 100% | 11% | 9% | 80% | Repatriation facilitation |
July | 100% | 14% | 11% | 75% | |
May | 100% | 21% | 17% | 62% | Granting political asylum |
July | 100% | 25% | 20% | 55% | |
May | 100% | 39% | 23% | 38% | Support of citizens participating in military operation |
July | 100% | 39% | 22% | 39% | |
May | 100% | 37% | 43% | 20% | Legal aid |
July | 100% | 39% | 27% | 24% | |
May | 100% | 29% | 46% | 25% | Military assistance (weapon, ammunition, etc.) |
July | 100% | 28% | 39% | 33% |
The distribution of responses among respondents born in different countries does not have significant differences regarding the forms of Israel participation in conflict. Unless native Israelis are much less often than others talk about Israel humanitarian assistance (69% versus 78-80% in other groups).
Israel participation in Russian-Ukrainian conflict in each of the spheres:
Others | Native Israelis | Born in the USSR | |
78% | 69% | 80% | Humanitarian aid |
31% | 33% | 33% | Military assistance with weapons, ammunition and other means |
34% | 27% | 32% | Information Support (Intelligence) |
42% | 37% | 41% | Diplomatic support in international organizations |
74% | 74% | 79% | Repatriates reception |
53% | 54% | 57% | Granting political asylum |
37% | 41% | 31% | Support of citizens participating in military operation |
It is noteworthy that the absolute majority of citizens (54%) associate the main risk from Israel involvement in the situation around Russian-Ukrainian conflict with deterioration of relations with Russia. All other risks Israelis do not consider significant. They are reported by 4 to 10%, and only one in 10 shares the risk of deteriorating relations with the United States.
It should also be noted that in three months the risk assessment remained unchanged.
It is interesting that native Israelis more often than others mention the risk of deteriorating relations with Russia (58% versus 44% of immigrants from the USSR countries and 52% from other countries) and less often – with the United States and other countries (8% versus 12-14%). In turn, immigrants from the USSR countries are more often worried about possible economic damage, a decrease in investments from foreign sources, etc. (15% versus 6-7% in other groups).
In your opinion, what is the main risk of the following possible risks from Israel involvement in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as it is happening today?
Born in other countries | Native Israelis | Born in the USSR | July, 2023 | May, 2023 | |
52% | 58% | 44% | 54% | 56% | Damage to relations with Russia |
4% | 3% | 6% | 4% | 3% | Damage to relations with Ukraine |
12% | 8% | 14% | 10% | 9% | Damage to relations with the United States and other countries |
7% | 6% | 14% | 8% | 5% | Economic damage, declining investment in Israel |
3% | 4% | 1% | 3% | 5% | Damage to Israel defense capability |
1% | 2% | 4% | 2% | 2% | Damage to Israel social stability |
3% | 3% | 8% | 3% | 3% | Damage to Jewish communities around the world |
4% | 4% | 1% | 4% | 2% | There are no risks at all |
14% | 12% | 8% | 12% | 15% | Do not know |
100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | Total |
Among respondents with different political attitudes, a fundamental difference in answers exists only in relation on the risks of damage of relations with Russia, which are higher among representatives of right (60%) and left (59%) wings, and lower among ultra-left (45%).
The main risks of Israel involvement in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia
Ultra-right | Right | Center | Left | Ultra-left | |
55% | 60% | 55% | 59% | 45% | Damage to relations with Russia |
2% | 5% | 5% | 7% | 4% | Damage to relations with Ukraine |
9% | 12% | 8% | 9% | 13% | Damage to relations with the United States and other countries |
9% | 6% | 8% | 6% | 9% | Economic damage, declining investment in Israel |
4% | 3% | 3% | 4% | 3% | Damage to Israel defense capability |
2% | 3% | 3% | 2% | 3% | Damage to Israel social stability |
4% | 2% | 3% | 1% | 3% | Damage to Jewish communities around the world |
5% | 2% | 2% | 4% | 6% | There are no risks at all |
10% | 7% | 13% | 8% | 14% | Do not know |
100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | Total |