A preliminary analysis of the data allows us to summarize that among Russian-speaking Israelis there is an active core that implements solidarity practices on all social levels:
– 75% of its representatives provide pro bono assistance to strangers with varying frequency, of which almost one in four is permanent;
– more than a third participate in some kind of activity as a volunteer with some regularity, of which 10% are regular volunteers;
– almost a third of the Russian-speaking population participates in demonstrations, protests, signing petitions and other socio-political events with varying regularity, of which 7% participate on a regular basis. Almost a third of those surveyed (30.4%) are ready to support mass demonstrations against the fall in living standards, in defense of their rights, and to come out with political demands.
According to the study, participants in mass solidarity actions are convinced of the lack of implementation of the principles of social justice in Israeli society, of the low efficiency of the use of professional and intellectual potential of repatriates from CIS countries, and of their discrimination. A significant portion of them are also volunteers, and their environment is characterized by real socio-political activity.
Despite the presence of an active core among the repatriates from the CIS countries and a certain level of readiness to participate in mass social and political activities, it must still be stated that the Russian-speaking Aliya today is not a social and political subject, at least because of weak self-identification as a group – the underdeveloped idea of themselves as a specific social group with unique characteristics, properties, common problems and interests.
The correlation analysis suggests that the significant determinant that determines the difference in assessments of life in Israel is material prosperity.
Average, good and very good levels of wealth are characterized by Russian-speaking Israelis, mostly living in the country for more than 15 years, and rather poor and bad – 10 years or less. This suggests that it takes an average of 10 years for Russian-speaking repatriates to fully adapt socially and economically, or that there have been major changes in the socio-economic conditions of repatriates that occurred about 10 years ago.
As material prosperity worsens, the proportion of responses about discrimination against repatriates from CIS countries, inefficient use of their intellectual and professional potential, and poor implementation of the principles of social justice here increases. In turn, such attitudes directly correlate with readiness to participate in socio-political actions.
An interesting fact is that assessments of the situation themselves correlate with the implementation of solidarity practices at different levels; material prosperity correlates, at a minimum, with assessments of the situation in the country. Meanwhile, no statistically significant connection was found directly between material wealth and the level of socio-political activity, either in terms of solidarity action or readiness for it, or in terms of solidarity practices at the micro-social level.
The repatriates from the CIS named among the main reasons that hinder solidarity and mutual assistance in their community the negative aspects of their own difficulties in adapting to life in Israel – 51.5%, followed by lack of a sense of unity and mutual responsibility among the repatriates from the former Soviet Union – 36.7%, the attitude “my house is not my business” – 30.3% and lack of energy and time for others – all is spent on earning money and solving everyday problems – 28.5%.
The tension (aggressiveness, mistrust) among Russian-speaking Israelis outside the “short social radius” of relations (expressed, for example, in “confrontation” of different waves of Aliyah, in the belief that lobbying is an effective tool, but not in the case of the Russian community), along with consistently lower self-assessments of themselves as a social community, compared to other repatriates and sabers (e.g. that in other groups of Israelis mutual support is better, self-organization and cohesion in pursuit of common interests is higher), suggests as one of the significant reasons for poor integration the problem of low formation of social identity of the “Russian-speaking group”, the position “between two chairs”. This refers to a certain feeling of detriment from belonging to the “Russian” group while at the same time being unable to fully integrate into the Hebrew-speaking environment. “Like the women who are accustomed to the chauvinistic view of themselves, the new repatriates, too, have internalized the contemptuous view under the sabre’s dictates. Thus, they are sure that their home-cooked food is bad, even though they have been used to it since childhood; others are embarrassed by the Russian accent. They are ashamed of their names, and replace them with European copies, which never happened in their country of origin: Natasha becomes Natalie, and Sasha. Alex, in fact.“.
A consequence of the weak formation of the “Russian” identity and distrust outside the narrow circle of relationships, is the lack of responsibility for the situation in one’s group and the lack of trust in representatives of the “country of origin” as a social and socio-political force and subject of social and political change.
As a result, on the level of public policy, “Russian” Israelis are perceived as no more than a part of the population whose specificity lies mainly in their lack of knowledge of Hebrew. The phrase “Russian community in Israel” comes up only in the context of the struggle of various parties for the Russian-speaking electorate. A social group that does not perceive and present itself as a community, with specific characteristics, problems and interests, is not able to make general socio-economic demands, and therefore is not a subject of Israeli politics.
Overcoming the identified negative trends involves a number of steps, including:
- Russian-speaking Israelis recognize themselves as a linguistic and cultural minority, a social community characterized, despite its diversity, by common features and peculiarities of the life situation, which determine its specific interests in the structure of Israeli society;
- Organizing a broad discussion on the topic of cohesion and solidarity among Russian-speaking Israelis as a prerequisite for influencing the adoption and implementation of political decisions;
- Formulating common problems of the Russian-speaking minority with their own negative psychological, socio-economic and political implications for this group of Israelis;
- Introducing into the daily activities of the Russian-speaking minority the tools of political influence successfully used by other minorities in Israel to promote interests: lobbying, social mobilization, elections.
- Strengthening social mobilization as an instrument for influencing necessary political decisions;
- Development of self-organization and mechanisms of political participation to solve problems at the local and state levels;
- To ensure a public policy that supports the Russian-speaking minority in Israel and publicly promotes the socio-economic interests of this minority.