1. A majority of Israelis are convinced of the existence of a conflict between the Collective West and the Global South. Nearly 70% of respondents fully or largely agree with this assertion. Secular men, Jews with above-average income levels, and those born in the former USSR are more likely to believe in this conflict, while religious women with average education levels from the Arab sector and those with below-average income are less likely to agree.
2. Opinions on the nature of this conflict are divided into two major camps: 41% see it as defining modern geopolitics, while 59% view it primarily as economic competition within the global economy between the Golden Billion countries and developing nations. The former group predominantly consists of Jews born in the former USSR, while the latter includes more native Israelis.
3. Israelis perceive only India as showing interest in Israel joining BRICS, with sharply negative interest values from all other countries.
4. Responses vary significantly by region. Northern and Southern Israelis are more likely to perceive Indian interest in Israel joining BRICS, while central residents are less likely. Central Israelis more frequently mention Brazil’s interest, while Jerusalem and Asharon residents are more skeptical. Asharon residents rate South African interest relatively higher, while Jerusalem and Southern residents rate it lower. It seems that the most common for Israelis in this context are expectations from Russia and China: in their respect, the lowest differences by city in estimates of interest are recorded. The residents of Jerusalem and Asharon give the highest and least high estimates of the interest of these countries in Israel’s accession to the BRICS, but the residents of Jerusalem are more often characterized by negative expectations.
5. The Jewish sector is more convinced of the disinterest of most countries listed in the survey regarding Israel joining BRICS, except for India, where negative expectations prevail in the Arab sector.
6. There are significant differences in expectations between native Israelis (Sabras) and former USSR immigrants regarding Brazil and especially India’s interest in Israel joining BRICS. The interest index for India differs by over 50 percentage points (-25 among former USSR immigrants and 26.4 among Sabras, reflecting the latter’s more optimistic views). The difference concerning Brazil is 22 percentage points.
7. There is no consensus on Israel’s optimal geopolitical alignment. About 35.8% favor neutrality and constructive relations of Israel with both the Collective West and the Global South, 22.2% believe decisions should be situation-dependent, and 19% support aligning with the Collective West. Only 3.2% favor siding with the Global South, a figure within the margin of error.
8. With age, Israelis increasingly lean towards neutrality and constructive relations with both sides and alignment with the Collective West, while situational approaches decrease.
9. In most cases, responses relating to the global South have values that are comparable to the margin of error and therefore not quantifiable. Meanwhile, Israelis tend to see Israel as a country that does not occupy one side or the other, but rather neutral, building constructive relations with other countries. This means that despite the prevailing orientation towards the West today, they are not against mutually beneficial cooperation and good relations with the South.
10. The most explicit institutional expression of the Global South is the BRICS alliance. At the same time, only 6% of Israelis are well aware of this organization, and another 10% have heard something about it. The vast majority of respondents (55%) did not even hear such a name, which seems to be an important component of the low level of responses regarding Israel as part of the Global South.
11. In the Arab sector and among people born in the former USSR, they are much more likely to talk about awareness of this organization and less often about lack of information than among Jews and native Israelis. By age, the population of 55 + is characterized by the lowest degree of awareness.
12. Israeli public opinion is distinguished by the idea of a very high level of Israeli dependence on the United States in most key areas. In all studied areas, the values of the index we calculated have a high dependence rate. Moreover, three areas (military security, economy and foreign policy) are characterized by a very high degree of dependence with index values above 50 pp in the index measurement range from + 100 (maximum dependence) to -100 (maximum independence). Secular Israelis give the highest estimates of such dependence, and religious ones give the lowest. The values characterizing Israel’s dependence on the United States increase from younger age groups to older.
13. In the groups of respondents identified by the level of material wealth and education, the fundamental differences in the answers concern mainly the military security of Israel, and, to a lesser extent, the stability of the economy: the higher the level of both, the more often there are judgments about Israel’s dependence in these areas.
14. In the Arab sector, more than in the Jewish sector, Israel is considered dependent on military security and foreign policy. In the Jewish sector, it is fundamentally more common to report on Israel’s dependence in the domestic political sphere, as well as in the spheres of culture and science. Native Israelis consider Israel’s position more independent from the United States than the repatriates of the countries of the former Union.
15. Israelis tend to believe that one way or another, Israel’s accession to the BRICS union will affect relations with other countries and unions. Meanwhile, the forecasts differ significantly among themselves, which allows us to talk about the weak formation in the public consciousness of the Israelis of the idea of the possibility of Israel joining this union. This is also evidenced by more than a third of the respondents who found it difficult to answer this question. Regarding the United States, 29% of respondents say that Israel’s accession to the BRICS will have a positive effect on their attitude with Israel; the same number say that it is negative, and a slightly larger proportion of answers fall on the “I don’t know” option.
A similar situation is developing around determining the nature of the change in attitude on the part of the EU, as well as Russia. With regard to Iran, only 6% believe that this will contribute to improving its relations with Israel, about a third – deterioration and found it difficult to answer this question, and about one in four believes that such an accession will not affect Iran’s attitude towards Israel.
16. A somewhat more definite and most positive situation is recorded in relation to India and Saudi Arabia. In both cases, the proportion of responses about the positive impact of this event is 2-4 times higher than the proportion of negative expectations.
17. The most optimistic assessments of potential relationships with countries in the event of Israel joining BRICS are given by Israelis who observe tradition, while pessimistic assessments are more common among religious Israelis.
For the United States, the EU and India, fundamentally higher values of the relationship improvement index are given by Israelis who observe the tradition.
In relation to Russia, the most optimistic assessments are given by religious Israelis, and in relation to Saudi Arabia – secular and observing tradition.
In relation to Iran, the values of the Index in all groups are pronounced negative, but they are most negative among religious Israelis.
18. In general, if Israel joins the BRICS alliance, Israelis expect positive changes in all areas of the country’s life. They associate the most positive expectations with economic stability and improved foreign policy.