The analysis of the interview data revealed a wide range of positions among Israelis, ranging from diametrically opposed to practically all questions. This can be interpreted as the lack of a formed mainstream, and therefore, to a large extent, a lack of a societal and political paradigm, public consensus, at least regarding the fate of Gaza and Palestine.

1. Indeed, there are significant disagreements regarding the scenarios for achieving a “Gaza without Hamas” situation ranging from non-violent options (successful peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, fair elections in the Palestinian territories resulting in representatives not supporting Hamas, neutralizing Hamas’s influence through marginalization and disarmament by suprastate structures) to violent and mixed approaches (initially through military means, followed by the establishment of life in Gaza through the implementation of various scenarios). Some responses argue the practical impossibility of both the complete destruction of the Hamas organization and the destruction of Hamas in the Gaza Strip while preserving the population of the Gaza Strip.

The specificity of the answers characterizing the possibility of a non-violent solution to the issue lies in their lack of reliance on facts and justification of the real mechanisms for the occurrence of such a situation; they are hypothetical in nature or do not represent short-term scenarios. For example, when Gaza is already liberated from Hamas, a new governance system will be formed, the socio-economic situation will be established, the quality of life will improve, and then Gazans will vote for those who led them to this situation, and not for Hamas – not a forceful option for leveling the influence of Hamas through free elections.

The need for force scenarios is justified, first of all, by the long-term absence of subjects among the Palestinians of Gaza capable of conducting dialogue, especially among the Hamas organization.

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2. In this regard, there is a pressing question about the fundamental ability and possibility of the current residents of the Gaza Strip to peacefully coexist with Israel. The majority of responses argue the impossibility of this at present.

Opinions on this issue are polarized. The first group argues that “Hamas and Gaza are not the same; there is a significant portion of people in Gaza who do not support Hamas,” including “because Gaza has a long history that goes far beyond the political formation of Hamas, and it is home to a diverse cultural, religious, and political population.”

The second viewpoint justifies the appropriateness of identifying Gaza with “Hamas” due to the fact that the population of the Gaza Strip is effectively held hostage by this organization and cannot resist its demands. Additionally, there is a prolonged period of promoting an ideology in which Jews have no place anywhere under any circumstances.

The solution to this problem, as seen by the respondents, involves: restructuring the political governance system in Gaza with the coordination and oversight of the global community interested in resolving the issue, primarily through the creation of a Palestinian state; promoting more Israel-friendly ideologies in Gaza and developing a constructive policy systematically; and radical methods, such as relocating the population of Gaza from the territory.

Regardless of the expressed positions, the essence of the majority of responses boils down to the following: the situation of “Gaza without Hamas” will require international joint participation at the level of values, principles, managerial technologies, and substantial financial subsidies and investments.

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3. In a large portion of responses discussing the prospect of “Gaza without Hamas,” any possibility of resolving this problem outside the context of “Two states for two peoples” is generally absent. Therefore, the discussion revolves around the feasibility of creating a Palestinian state at present.

Various scenarios are presented regarding this question, ranging from pessimistic outlooks due to reasons such as: a) the weakness of the Israeli political leadership, its inability, and unwillingness to negotiate; b) Israel’s lack of readiness due to its objective disinterest in strengthening the Palestinian state as a potential conflict source; c) different socio-political interests and preferences among Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza.

Additionally, a scenario is proposed suggesting that the unfeasibility of UN Resolution 181 from 1947 necessitates deviation from it based on agreements that imply maintaining Israel’s current borders.

Another scenario is voiced as “One state for two peoples”, which, in the long run, could be associated with the federalization of Israel and the potential creation of a confederation with the Palestinian Authority.

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4. Regardless of the scenario in question, its implementation in one way or another involves determining the status of Jerusalem. When asked, “Is it possible to create a Palestinian state in the temporary absence of a clear status for Jerusalem,” all respondents unanimously agree on the unequivocal necessity of its definition. However, there is no consensus on how this can happen, leading to a deferral of this answer for an indefinite period.

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5. Overall, the majority of respondents view the prospect of “Gaza without Hamas” in a constructive light, seeing it as a condition for advancing the implementation of the Abraham Accords and creating new opportunities for peaceful negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Another group of respondents highlights the risks of increased tension associated with: a) the possibility of settlement expansion and the “transfer” of Palestinian populations; b) the perception of “Gaza without Hamas” as a victory for Israel, exacerbating the crisis in Palestinian-Israeli relations; c) the strengthening of radical elements within the Palestinian population, potentially undermining the peace process and normalization of relations.

A third group of respondents discusses the prospects of neutralizing the Hamas organization in the context of forming the Palestinian Authority, asserting that its existence in the Gaza Strip does not affect the development of the Palestinian Authority on the “West Bank,” as the main problem lies in Israel’s unwillingness to have the State of Palestine nearby, at least de-jure.

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6. One of the significant consequences of Hamas leaving the political arena could be a change in Israel’s borders. According to the respondents, this could happen within several scenarios:

• expansion of borders: annexation of the Gaza Strip and additional territories on the West Bank to Israel, leading to an enlargement of its borders;
• reduction of borders: Israel might be compelled to revert to its pre-1967 borders, or withdraw from Zone B and partially from Zone C on the West Bank;
• maintaining existing borders.

The success and long-term viability of addressing these issues in the absence of a mainstream understanding of the situation will be determined primarily by conceptual approaches rather than the use of force. This, in turn, may shape the future political landscape of Israel.